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Since the beginning of the Cold War, the influence of public opinion on 
presidential decision-making has been debated.  Because the United States is a 
democracy, one would expect that public opinion and the ideas and concerns of the 
people should weigh on the decisions of the policy makers.  In theory, at least, 
presidential decision-makers should not solely determine policy.   Yet most presidential 
administrations would have the public believe that they are leading, not following, public 
opinion based on their inherent charge as elected officials to advocate what they perceive 
to be in the best interest of the country.  It is important to understand the relationship 
between public opinion and executive decision-makers.   
Comparing U.S. policies implemented in response to terrorist attacks against U.S. 
sovereignty and Iraq’s persistent pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by 
presidents from two different political parties offers an opportunity to analyze how public 
opinion is viewed by presidents, what actions the administrations took to influence public 
opinion, and whether public opinion ultimately affected the foreign policy decision-
making of the executive.  How and when public opinion constrains policymakers and 
their options is essential to understanding why certain policy decisions for the use of 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.   PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE  
 
Since the beginning of the Cold War, the influence of public opinion on 
presidential decision-making has been debated.  Seymour Lipset argued that, “The 
president makes opinion, he does not follow it.”1 Bernard Cohen’s famous quotation 
from a State Department official bluntly stated the reasoning for a lack of responsiveness: 
“To hell with public opinion … We should lead, and not follow.”2  Philip Powlick 
disagreed: “The prevailing norm among foreign policy officials since Vietnam has 
emphasized public support for policy (or at least a lack of opposition) as a sine qua non 
for good policy.”3 This research will assess the interaction between public opinion and 
presidential decision-making in the foreign policy arena.  This thesis will assess how the 
Clinton and George W. Bush administrations viewed public opinion, what they did or did 
not do to influence public opinion, and how this view affected their foreign policy actions 
toward two critical foreign policy issues:  Iraq’s defiance of the international community 
on its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program and the U.S. response to Osama bin 
Laden’s terrorists and their training camps following the Kenya and Tanzania embassy 
bombings and 9/11.  It will then assess the implications for future policy decisions on use 
of force.   
Because the United States is a democracy, one would expect that public opinion 
and the ideas and concerns of the people should weigh on the decisions of the policy 
makers.  In theory, at least, executive branch decision-makers should not solely 
determine policy.   Yet most presidential administrations would have the public believe 
that they are leading, not following, public opinion based on their inherent charge as 
elected officials to advocate what they perceive to be in the best interest of the country.  
As Edmund Burke wrote, “[A representative’s] unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, 
                                                 
1 Seymour Martin Lipset, “The President, the Polls, and Vietnam,” Transaction, 1966, 20. 
2 Bernard C. Cohen, The Public’s Impact on Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973) 62. 
3 Philip J. Powlick, “The Attitudinal Basis for Responsiveness to Public Opinion among American 
Foreign Policy Officials,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35: 611-641. 
 2 
his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of 
men living … Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and 
he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”4  The problem with 
this assertion lies in the very nature of other forms of government.  If public opinion has 
no effect and executives make decisions however they please, the government ceases to 
be a democracy and devolves into a dictatorship.  As a result, “does public opinion have 
any weight in the decisions of the executive when it comes to foreign policy?” becomes a 
very salient question.    Although presidential statements may minimize the effects of 
public opinion on foreign policy and use of force, a review of presidential and public 
beliefs and decisional context can provide additional insight into the potentially 
constraining effect of public opinion. 
It is important to understand the relationship between public opinion and 
executive decision-makers.  How public opinion constrains policymakers and their 
options is essential to understanding why certain policy decisions for the use of force are 
made and what decisions can be predicted in the future.   As Louis Klarevas correctly 
observed: “The indication from policy makers is that American military operations 
require public support.  As a result, scholars and analysts have come to realize that public 
opinion is the ‘essential domino’ of military operations.”5     
Comparing policies implemented in response to Iraq’s WMD issue and terrorist 
attacks against U.S. sovereignty by presidents from two different political parties offers 
an opportunity to analyze how public opinion is viewed by presidents, what actions the 
administrations took to influence public opinion, and whether public opinion ultimately 
affected the foreign policy decision-making of the executive. A study of these two cases 
will help us to gauge how public opinion affects executive decision-making on U.S. 
foreign policy and provide implications for what we might expect in future debates over 
the possible use of force.    
 
 
                                                 
4 Ross J.S. Hofman and Paul Levack, eds., Burke’s Politics (New York: Knopf, 1949), 115. 
5 Louis Klarevas, “The ‘Essential Domino’ of Military Operations:  American Public Opinion and the 
Use of Force,” International Studies Perspectives (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 417. 
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B. PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY NEXUS – WHAT THE 
EXPERTS THINK AND WHAT’S MISSING 
 
This research will add to current understanding of how public opinion and 
presidential decision-making interact to affect foreign policy, namely the use of force.  
Four influential studies were consulted and used to provide the basis of knowledge 
regarding public opinion for this thesis.   
The first book, entitled Counting the Public In by Douglas Foyle, is a case study 
analysis of presidential decisions from Truman through the early Clinton administration 
(1995).  Foyle’s primary argument is that “an individual’s beliefs about public opinion 
and the decision context in which a choice must be made interact to determine the 
influence of public opinion.”6 Through his initial review of presidential opinions, Foyle 
introduces three models to identify each decision-maker’s public opinion preference.  
First is the Beliefs Orientation Model.   
 
  Is public support of a foreign policy 
necessary? 
  YES NO 
YES Delegate Executor Is it desirable for 
input from public 
opinion to affect 
foreign policy 
choices? 
NO Pragmatist Guardian 
 
Table 1. Beliefs Orientation Model7 
 
In this model decision-makers are identified as a “Delegate,” “Executor,” “Pragmatist,” 
or “Guardian”8 based on empirical data (autobiographical data, statements from close 
associates, observations verified by multiple sources) that illustrate personal beliefs 
regarding importance of public opinion.  These categories are defined further in Table 2.  
 
                                                 
6 Doulgas Foyle, Counting the Public In (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), x. (emphasis 
added)   
7 Foyle, 11. 
8 Foyle, 11. 
 4 
 
Delegate It is desirable for public opinion to influence policy choices and necessary 
to have public support for a successful foreign policy. 
Executor Public opinion should be one of the initial factors considered in foreign 
policy formulation, and it might limit the options under consideration or 
suggest possible alternatives.  Public opinion is not needed for support of a 
policy. 
Pragmatist Public input affecting foreign policy choices is not desirable, public support 
of the chosen policy is necessary. 
Guardian Public input into foreign policy choices is undesirable and the public’s 
support is not necessary for a successful foreign policy. 
 
Table 2. Belief Definitions9 
 
Every policymaker has a core set of beliefs that they bring to the job.  These beliefs 
provide a foundation from which decisions are made and agendas are set.  By first 
identifying the foundational beliefs of decision-makers in regards to the importance of 
public opinion, we are able to gain an important insight into the mind of the decision-
maker which helps foreshadow potential decisions they may make in the realm of foreign 
policy.  Foyle’s model provides a clear and succinct categorization of decision-makers.  
For practical purposes, this model will be used to help identify the beliefs of the two 
policy-makers (Presidents Clinton and Bush) in the two cases in this thesis.    
Similar but less descriptive, useful, and arguably redundant to the first is Foyle’s 
second model.  This model categorizes the actions vice beliefs of each decision-maker in 
international relations (IR) terms.  The actions are defined as realist or Wilsonian liberal.  
The definition of each is contained in Table 3. 
 
Realist Policy-makers should not consider public opinion as they formulate 
foreign policy, but can build support if needed for the chosen policy.   
Wilsonian 
liberal 
Public opinion should affect foreign policy formulation because of 
democratic norms and the public’s moderating influence on elites. 
 
Table 3. Foyle’s IR Model10 
 
                                                 
9 Foyle, 11-14.  Definitions are paraphrased and tabled for ease of reference 
10 Foyle, 4-7. 
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Although Foyle provides an analysis of the actions conducted by each decision-maker in 
the context of realist or Wilsonian liberal, he does so half-heartedly.  His final conclusion 
is that merely reviewing the actions and defining them in IR terms is insufficient and 
provides no predictive or causal influence on decisions by the policy-maker, because the 
executive’s decisions may not follow IR theory.  In most cases, the decision-maker 
followed their beliefs in the decision context of the issue.   
Foyle’s third model helps to define the “decision context” variable in his primary 
argument.  For every situation that confronts a decision-maker, there is a context in which 
the situation evolves.  Foyle makes a clear identification of the threat scenario which has 
prompted the foreign policy decision: executive decision-makers are faced with multiple 
threats and decisions, which range in importance and severity.  Depending on the 
importance and severity of the context, the decisions of the executive will vary.  As a 
result, his analysis is centered on high threat situations where time constraints are 
separated into “crisis (short decision time and surprise), reflexive (short decision time and 
anticipation), innovative (extended decision time and surprise), and deliberative 
(extended decision time and anticipation).”11   Ultimately, when taking threat situations 
into consideration, decision-makers should discount and not consider public opinion in 
crisis, short-time-framed actions, but may view public opinion more closely when time 
permits in the deliberative threat situation.  The analyst should be able to determine the 
importance of public opinion on the decision-maker.   His conclusion and findings for 
model three are again mixed but he does recognize the importance of decision context in 
the mind of the executive while creating policy. 
In the end, Foyle concludes that each relationship between executive and public is 
conditional and varies depending on circumstances surrounding and influencing the 
event.  The beliefs of the executive, represented in Table 1, provided the best predictive 
measure to determine if and when the decision-maker would use and take public opinion 
into consideration.  He also determined that for all belief systems, other than guardian, 
executive decision-making is contingent, not on what public opinion says now, but what 
it will say in the future.  Although his finding is inconclusive in regards to direct/causal 
                                                 
11 Foyle, 19. 
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influence of public opinion on foreign policy, his argument for the beliefs model and 
decision context provide the groundwork for further exploration in this thesis of 
subsequent incidents in the Clinton administration and new research into public opinion 
and foreign policy for the Bush administration (2000-present).    
Richard Sobel’s The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since 
Vietnam argues that, “public opinion constrains, but does not set, American foreign 
policy of intervention.”12  His argument centers around the concept that public opinion, 
since the Vietnam War, has limited options for policy-makers.13  To help prove his 
argument, Sobel uses a simple but straightforward method of case study analysis.  He 
reviews four of the “most prominent” foreign interventions (Vietnam War, Nicaraguan 
Contra funding controversy, Persian Gulf War, and the war in Bosnia).14  While not as 
robust as Foyle’s analysis,15 his methodological approach to each case is similar.  By 
using memoirs and personal accounts of the decision-makers, Sobel provides an initial 
history of the event, a review of executive policies, and public opinion for each conflict.   
This sets the background of understanding for each case.  From this point, Sobel 
concludes each case with a review of public opinion’s influence on the executive’s 
policy-making.  The conclusion in many ways is similar to Foyle’s.  Each intervention by 
the executive was conditional and based upon the decision context.  Sobel finds that 
“public opinion sets limits or constraints on the discretion that policymakers have in 
choosing from among possible policy options.”16   
In Chapter Four of his book, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance 
of National Security, Bruce Russett concludes that public opinion and its influence on 
foreign policy is conditional and lacks a “clear conclusion.”17  Russett outlines four 
                                                 
12 Richard Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 5. 
13 Sobel, 5. 
14 Sobel, 6-8. 
15 As a reminder, Foyle used three models and a determined set of variables (independent, dependent 
and constant) to review each case in addition to the history, executive opinion of public opinion, and public 
opinion. 
16 Sobel, 233. 
17 Bruce Russett,  Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), 88. 
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possible interpretations of the relationship between public opinion and policy:  1. public 
opinion is controlling; 2. public opinion is controlled by policymakers; 3. both public 
opinion and policymakers are irrelevant—leaders do not obey public opinion, but neither 
do they control it; and 4. opinion and policy interact: as each influences each other.18  To 
illustrate his point, he uses various examples and Gallup Poll results exemplifying each of 
the four possibilities listed above. Similar to other authors, Russett discusses the 
education of the public to help influence opinion to support the president’s policy, and 
conversely shows times when public opinion constrained the ability for decision-makers 
to act.  Although education of the public is an important tool of policy maker’s to 
influence public opinion, it is equally important to know what the public believes is the 
issue so the executive can target the education.  His selection of cases or examples is 
totally contingent on their ability to fit into each of the four explanations.  In his final 
summation, similar to Foyle and Sobel, he concludes that both public opinion and 
policymakers influence each other depending on the incident and situation (decision 
context).   
Finally, in his book Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media, and 
the American Public, Jon Western takes a different approach to influence on presidential 
decision-making.  Whereas the first three authors concentrated on whether public opinion 
affects the executive, Western discusses the role of elite advocacy groups.  He contends 
that, 
Elite political groups hold diverse beliefs about the world and the nature of 
the international system, and these views lead to similarly diverse ideas 
and expectations about the nature and severity of a given threat to the 
country and the costs and benefits associated with the use of military force 
… These elites then coalesce into one of four major advocacy groups 
[hardliners, reluctant warriors, selective engagers, and liberals] which 
promote their views for or against the use of force.  I hypothesize that the 
decision to use force or not is the result of the competition among these 
advocacy groups and their relative abilities to capture and mobilize public 
and political support for their views … advocacy groups whose views are 
                                                 
18 Russett, 87-88. 
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not shared by the president can influence presidential action by increasing 
public and political opposition to the president’s views.19 
In his argument, the public is a pawn to be used by various advocacy groups to support 
their beliefs.  Each advocacy group must weigh the “information flow and public 
predisposition”20 regarding the incident to decide how to best influence the public to the 
end goal.  The end state or decision by the administration is determined by four factors: 
1. the beliefs of the president and the degree of cohesion within his 
administration 
2. the relative distribution of information and collective action assets 
among the opposition groups 
3. the role of the news media 
4. the duration of the crisis.21   
How best to influence and use these four factors will determine the nation’s use of force. 
 Similar to both Foyle and Sobel, Western utilizes a case study analysis approach 
to illustrate the influence of public opinion.  His five cases are:  U.S. response to 
intervention requests in Dien Bien Phu, Lebanon, Grenada, Bosnia, and the war in Iraq.  
His analysis centers on the history, political beliefs for intervention by each advocacy 
group, and a review of policy decisions for each conflict based on the four factors 
mentioned earlier.    His findings are consistent and expansive with those identified by 
the three previous authors.  In summary, Western concludes: 1. competing beliefs by 
policy elites exist and matter – elites perceive and interpret crises and conflicts through 
their own world views; 2. decisions on intervention and war are the result of active and 
aggressive campaigns for or against a particular war; 3. public opinion can resist the 
persuasive efforts of the elites and advocacy groups; 4. information and its use to sway 
the public is now a universal commodity - all players must be careful when using 
information that is readily checked and disseminated by any party; and 5. unlike previous 
interventions where elites had a monopoly on information and could spin it to suit their 
purposes, the information of today is universal and provided and validated by the general 
                                                 
19 Jon Western, Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media, and the American Public 
(Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press), 4-5. 
20 Western, 5. 
21 Western, 5. 
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public.  As a result, the public develops an unrealistic expectation of forceful 
interventions.  Similar to each of the previous authors, Western considers beliefs of the 
president and situational context of the decision to be key factors in weighing the 
constraining affects of public opinion.  Equally revealing as a possible foreshadow of 
insights into Clinton’s case, he places significance on the news media in the executive’s 
decision-making. 
Since Vietnam, authors such as Douglas Foyle, Richard Sobel, Bruce Russett and 
Jon Western argue for the conditional constraining effect of public opinion.  Powlick 
summarizes the current wisdom:  “Public opinion becomes increasingly salient over time, 
as shown particularly by Vietnam and its long aftermath.  This has manifested itself 
generally in tighter constraints since Vietnam.”22  All four authors present compelling 
evidence for the constraining effect of public opinion from the side of the executive’s 
beliefs and context situation.  Their strengths are their ability to look into the mind of the 
decision-maker and identify the individual’s foundational beliefs about the constraining 
effects of public opinion that initially structured the policy-maker’s concept of correct 
foreign policy for a specific event.  Additionally, each author chose to review the 
decision context of the environment in which the foreign policy decision was to be made 
by the executive and discussed the use of education to mitigate the effect of unsupportive 
public opinion.   Their method can be summarized in a simple equation to get foreign 
policy constraint.  Foyle, Sobel, Russet, and Western have three common variables that 









                                                 
22 Powlick, 5. 
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 BE = Beliefs of the Executive 
 DE = Decision Context of the Executive = FC or Foreign Policy Constraint 
 P = Public Opinion 
 
 
Figure 1. Foreign Policy Constraint According to Experts 
 
Modifying any one of these will affect how much constraint there is on foreign policy, 
which will help provide some insight into the foreign policy decision of the executive.  
   
1.   What’s Missing?  Drill Down Into Public Opinion 
While beliefs and decision context of the executive and education of the public 
are important to help determine the constraining effects on foreign policy and use of 
force, equally important and somewhat missed is a similar drill down into public opinion.  
What are the current beliefs of the public and the decision context in which the public 
finds itself at the time of the incident?  How do these two interact and shape overall 
public opinion regarding the incident?  What does the executive target for education to 
influence these variables of public opinion?  In an effort to determine public opinion’s 
constraining effect on foreign policy, we must review not just the views of the executive 
in terms of beliefs and decision context, but also conduct a similar analysis of public 
opinion.   
Why is it important to take a closer look at the variables that affect public 
opinion?  Louis Klarevas and Bruce Jentleson offer some key insight into this question.  


















force.  These beliefs have an impact on the overall acceptance of a specific foreign policy 
objective.  As Klarevas summarizes it, according to Jentleson, 
… public support in the United States is likely to vary as a function of the 
objective of the military intervention.  He distinguishes three such 
principal policy objectives (PPOs).  Foreign policy restraint (FPR) 
involves the use of force ‘to coerce … an adversary engaged in aggressive 
actions against the United States or its interests.’ A second category, 
internal political change (IPC), involves ‘force used to engineer internal 
political change within another country whether in support of an existing 
government considered and ally or seeking to overthrow a government 
considered an adversary,’ or more generally ‘influencing the domestic 
political authority structure of another state.’  A third type of military 
intervention: humanitarian intervention (HI), or the ‘provision of 
emergency relief through military and other means to people suffering 
from famine or other gross and widespread humanitarian disasters.’23 
These can be tiered to provide a staircase of acceptability for a use of force policy among 




Internal Political Change 
 
Figure 2. Staircase of Public Support and Constraint 
 
Jentleson’s argument is bolstered by Klarevas who argues that support levels among the 
public can be augmented if policy-makers “sell operations as involving national interests, 
humanitarian or restraint objectives, and multinational assistance.”24 He goes on to state, 
“in general, support levels also tend to be higher for operations pursuing humanitarian 
assistance or foreign policy restraint—as opposed to internal political change.”25 
                                                 
23 Klarevas. For more details, see:  Bruce W. Jentleson, “The Pretty Prudent Public: Post-Vietnam 
American Opinion on the Use of Military Force,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1 (March 
1992), 49-74 and Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca L. Britton, “Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War 
American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 4 
(August 1998), 395-417. 
24 Klarevas, 433. 
25 Klarevas, 433. 





Legitimacy of policy in the eyes of the public is an important determinant of the level of 
constraint.  Whereas the public is more willing to accept and thus offers little constraint 
for humanitarian, multilateral, and direct vital interest missions, it is less likely to accept 
and thus provides a larger constraining force for operations to overturn a dictatorship or 
bring about some internal political change within another state.  Clearly, there is a need to 
ascertain the public’s belief of the operation/policy being advocated by the executive.   
Next, similar to the executive, a review of the decision context is needed.  Just as 
the decision context affects the executive’s decision-making cycle, so too does it affect 
the publics.  In times of crisis, or as John Mueller posits “…an event or an incident that 
relates to international relations, directly involves the U.S. and particularly the president, 
and is specific, dramatic and sharply focused,”26 the public is more inclined to allow the 
executive to act immediately and rally around the policy decision made regardless of its 
validity.  Nelson Polsby acknowledges this effect: “invariably, the popular response to a 
president during an international crisis is favorable regardless of the wisdom of the 
policies [the president] pursues.”27  This phenomenon is defined as “the rally around the 
flag” effect. 28 As the time frame between incident and decision lengthens, the public is 
more inclined to review the issue and require additional information to support a given 
policy decision.  Additionally, other factors, such as domestic concerns (how well the 
public perceives the country is doing economically, politically, and socially), may affect 
the public and their level of constraining affect on foreign policy.   
As a result, beliefs and decision context of the public need to be added to the 
simple equation created for Foyle, Sobel, Russett, and Western.  P or public opinion in 




                                                 
26 John E. Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: Wiley, 1973), 208-213. 
27 Nelson Polsby, Congress and the Presidency (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 10. 
28 Amy Gershkoff and Shana Kushner, “The 9/11-Iraq Connection: How the Bush Administration’s 
Rhetoric in the Iraq Conflict Shifted Public Opinion,” Princeton University, 15 April 2004, 
http://www.princeton.edu/~agershko/GershkoffKushnerIraqPaperMidwest.pdf#search='rally%20around%2
0the%20flag' (accessed 4 June 2006). 
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Where P =  
BP = Beliefs of the Public 





Figure 3. Foreign Policy Constraint with Added Public Breakout 
 
For policy makers, as in the original equation (Figure 1), education can still be applied to 
help influence public opinion, but can now be concentrated more clearly in specific areas 
of Bp and Dp versus just P or public opinion.  The breakout allows for a more 
concentrated and exact effort into a specific and definable education plan.  In sum, this 
equation simply shows the need to consider four variables when determining the overall 
constraining effect on foreign policy.  It also provides additional insight into the mind of 
the public. 
Foyle, Sobel, Russett, and Western reviewed three quarters of the model 
presented in Figure 1.  I will look at their portion as well as the breakout of public 
opinion beliefs and situation context in each case.  The contention of many writers is that 
public opinion since Bosnia is once again constraining policy makers and increasing their 
need to educate and keep the public informed.  By expanding upon the works of these 
authors and analyzing all four areas of the equation (Figure 3), the constraining effects of 
public opinion or possibly other areas can be illustrated.  In the end, the importance of 
each as a potential constraining force in foreign policy will be discussed to determine the 
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C.   METHODOLOGY 
A case study analysis from each presidency (Clinton and Bush) will be used to 
analyze how and whether public opinion influenced decisions in regards to foreign policy 
while dealing with issues in response to terrorist attacks (U.S. embassy bombings in 
Africa and 9/11) and Iraq’s WMD program.  Understanding that no two cases are 
identical, the cases chosen for this thesis bare the following similarities among both 
administrations.  The terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in Africa and attacks of 
September 11th 2001 occurred without notice and were considered a “crisis” situation 
(incidents marked by surprise with short reaction time), were perpetrated by the same 
group, took place on some form of U.S. sovereignty, and occurred during a time of 
domestic satisfaction.  Under both administrations, the U.S. use of force with Iraq 
occurred after repeated failures of independent weapons inspectors and overt obstruction 
by the Iraqi government, namely Saddam Hussein, to verify that state’s compliance with 
U.N. mandates against WMD.  Additionally, the Iraq issue had a long lead in time from 
incident creation to U.S. response and is considered a deliberate issue.   
Aside from the introduction and conclusion chapters (one and five), case study 
chapters (two and three) will cover one specific case for one president (example: chapter 
two will cover Clinton and embassy bombings).  These case study chapters will have 
identical subsections:  1. provide an explanation of the incident or crisis that confronts the 
president; 2. explain the public’s belief and decisional context for the incident/crisis; 3. 
explain the presidential beliefs regarding public opinion; 4. the executive response to 
public opinion; and 5. what the final policy outcome was and its effectiveness.  Chapter 
four will review the findings from Chapters two and three and test them against a 
subsequent conflict which each administration confronted.  Each case will cover a 
specific time range: the period before the incident to the initial U.S. response. 
Similar to Douglas Foyle’s methodology, I will provide an analysis of the public 
opinion belief system of each executive based on existing, publicly available sources of 
information.  I will utilize Douglas Foyle’s belief model (Table 1) to provide a clear and 
succinct definition for each decision-maker.  Additionally, I will expand upon the works 
of Foyle, Sobel, Russett, and Western and discuss the public’s beliefs and decision 
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context that surround each case.  This identification will provide insight into the 
importance and effect of public opinion on the decision-maker and, ultimately, foreign 
policy.  
 
D.   HYPOTHESIS 
 Public opinion regarding incidents affects each decision-maker differently.  The 
decisions made by the executive in regards to foreign policy and use of force are weighed 
down and constrained by the beliefs of the executive regarding the importance of public 
opinion on either policy formulation or policy implementation.   By reviewing public 
opinion and how it coincides with the beliefs of the executive in regards 
to the role that public opinion and decision context should play in policy formulation 
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II.   PRESIDENT CLINTON’S RESPONSE TO THE AFRICAN 
EMBASSY BOMBINGS 
These acts of terrorist violence are as abhorrent as they are inhuman. We 
will use all the means at our disposal to bring those responsible to justice 
no matter what, or how long, it takes. 
-- President Clinton's statement in the Rose Garden on August 729 
No matter how long it takes or where it takes us, we will pursue terrorists 
until the cases are solved and justice is done. 
-- President Clinton's Radio Address to the Nation August 830  
 
A.   INCIDENT EXPLANATION 
 
It was August 1998 and the Clinton administration had been in office for almost 
six years.  The electoral cycle was spinning up for the fall mid-term senate, house, and 
gubernatorial elections and the president was in the midst of an ongoing controversy 
regarding his personal actions with White House Intern, Monica Lewinsky.  Public 
opinion of the president at the time was favorable for his policies but not for his personal 
conduct with 62% disliking Clinton but 68% liking his policies.31  Over the previous six 
years military forces had been engaged in two large-scale operations. The first was as a 
President Bush legacy engagement in Somalia to provide assistance to UN forces and 
their mission ensuring food and supplies were attainable to the population.  The second, 
an action directed by President Clinton, in December 1997, utilized U.S. forces for the 
                                                 
29 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Embassy Bombings,” 
http://usinfo.state.gov/is/international_security/terrorism/embassy_bombings.html (accessed 26 May 06). 
30 President, Radio Address by the President to the Nation, "President's Radio Address on U.S. 
Embassy Bombings: Terrorists will be pursued until justice is done," The White House: Office of the Press 
Secretary, 8 August 1998, http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive_Index/Presidents_Radio_Address.html 
(accessed 26 May 06). 
31 Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “It's Still The Economy They Say,” 27 August 
1998, http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=82 (accessed 26 May 06). 
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purpose of acting as a “follow-on force”32 to NATO in the Balkans.  Both engagements, 
and particularly Somalia, would have profound lessons and provide keen insights into the 
presidential beliefs on public opinion of Clinton.  These lessons will be discussed in later 
sections. 
 Amidst the elections and personal controversies swirling around the 
administration, an egregious event took place on 7 August 1998.  Two truck bombs 
placed adjacent to the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, 
exploded within minutes of each other at 10:45 a.m. local time, 3:45 a.m. Washington 
time,33 leaving 224 dead (12 were American) and injuring 4,800.34  In Nairobi, the bomb 
“brought down half the embassy” and the explosion left several square blocks of 
downtown Nairobi ruined.35  In Dar-es-Salaam most of the embassy building and some 
adjacent buildings were destroyed.36  At the time of the explosions little was known of 
the bombing’s purpose or parties responsible.  Some thought the explosions were state 
sponsored and directed by the “fundamentalist Muslim government in Iran.”37  Others 
started to focus on a publicly little known group, al Qaeda, and its sponsor Osama bin 
Laden. Regardless of the responsible parties, the Clinton administration vowed to hunt 
down the perpetrators no matter how long it took or what sacrifices it would entail.   
These acts of terrorist violence are as abhorrent as they are inhuman. We 
will use all the means at our disposal to bring those responsible to justice 
no matter what, or how long, it takes.38 
                                                 
32 Jim Garamone, “Clinton Commits U.S. Troops to Follow-on Force,” Armed Forces Press Service.  
U.S. Department of Defense, http://www.pentagon.gov/news/Dec1997/n12191997_9712197.html 
(accessed 26 May 06). 
33 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Embassy Bombings,” 
http://usinfo.state.gov/is/international_security/terrorism/embassy_bombings.html (accessed 26 May 06). 
34 Associated Press, “US Embassy Bombing Death Toll Drops,” The New York Times, 8 October 
1998; and Majorie Miller and Dean Murphy, “The U.S. Embassy Bombings,” The Los Angeles Times, 9 
August 1998. 
35 Miller and Murphy, The Los Angeles Times, 9 August 1998. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Seattle Times News Service, “Iran Envoy Linked to Embassy Blasts?” The Seattle Times, 14 August 
1998, A3. 
38 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Embassy Bombings,” 
http://usinfo.state.gov/is/international_security/terrorism/embassy_bombings.html (accessed 26 May 06). 
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No matter how long it takes or where it takes us, we will pursue terrorists 
until the cases are solved and justice is done.39 
The question would soon arise, would the president make good on his promise to punish 
those involved, what type of action would this entail, and how would his response be 
impacted by either his or the public’s beliefs and decision context, which surrounded the 
incident.  
 
1. Intervening Period between Bombing and U.S. Response                        
(8 – 19 August 1998) 
 
The United States did not take action immediately following the bombings on 7 
August 1998.  The Clinton administration required several variables to be answered 
before action.  Although provided after the subsequent U.S. response, the criteria Clinton 
mentioned during his radio address to the nation on 22 August 1998 help clarify the 
variables that the administration focused on during the intervening days between crisis 
and U.S. response.   “From the moment we learned of the bombings our mission was 
clear: Identify those responsible; bring them to justice; protect our citizens from future 
attacks.”40  Key to this outlook was to find out clearly who had perpetrated the attacks 
and then formulate an appropriate response.  For Clinton, “beyond the public events, I 
spent most of my time with our national security team discussing how we were going to 
respond to the African attacks.”41 Clinton over the next few weeks delivered mostly 
televised and radio speeches both to the United States and international community 
                                                 
39 President, Radio Address by the President to the Nation, “President's Radio Address on U.S. 
Embassy Bombings: Terrorists will be pursued until justice is done,” The White House: Office of the Press 
Secretary, 8 August 1998, http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive_Index/Presidents_Radio_Address.html 
(accessed 26 May 06). 
40 President, The President's Radio Address, “Weekly Compilation of Presidential Document,” United 
States Government Printing Office, 22 August 1998, http://frwebgate3.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/waisgate.cgi?WAISdocID=7702722138+14+0+0&WAISaction=retrieve (accessed 27 May 06) 
41 Clinton, William J,  My Life (New York: Knopf, 2004), 798. 
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stressing the U.S. resolve to find and punish those responsible and bolster solidarity with 
those hurt by the bombings.42   
Although one could argue that this is expected of a president in a time of conflict, 
these actions and the use of the media to speak to the people emphasize the need to 
educate the American public and to keep them informed.  Early in Clinton’s presidential 
career he shared his opinion of his job as executive: 
If I had to say what I needed to do to improve as a leader, it would be to 
find ways to be able to share with the American people what I know to be 
the facts here, what we’re doing, and to give them some sense that I’m 
listening to them and they have some input, but that I’m moving the 
country in the right direction.43 
This shows Clinton placed emphasis on the need to inform the American people of the 
direction the administration was moving.  This reliance on education and communication 
with the public was reiterated at the end of his first term in office when he remarked, 
… that explaining to the American people what our interests, our values, 
and our policies are requires a more systematic and regular explaining.  In 
a time when the overall framework is not clear and when people are 
bombarded with information, I think a President has to do that with greater 
frequency …44  
Reviewing Foyle’s belief model, this behavior illustrates the positive need to ensure 
public opinion during policy formulation.  The clear intent was to ensure that when a 
decision was made, the public would accept the decision.  Tacitly, this emphasis on 
informing the public paints the picture of its importance to Clinton and the importance of 
the public.   
Although Clinton denied using polls to make decisions, he acknowledged taking 
them into account: 
                                                 
42 During the period 8 August 1998 through 19 Aug 98 (the time between the attacks and US response, 
Clinton made 26 remarks, speeches, letters and addresses to the US and international community (none 
were question and answer sessions, all were canned statements and speeches – annotated in William J. 
Clinton,  Public Papers of the President of the United States: William Jefferson Clinton 1998, Book II, 
(Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1999). 
43 George C. Edwards III, “Frustration and Folly: Bill Clinton and the Public Presidency,” in Colin 
Campbell and Bert A. Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham 
House, 1996), 255. 
44 Dan Goodgame and Michael Duffy, “Blending Force with Diplomacy,” Time, 31 October 1994, 35. 
 21 
I can tell you categorically that I do not use polls to decide what position 
to take … I have used polling information to try to make sure I understand 
where the American people are, what they know and what they don’t 
know, what information they have, and to determine what arguments 
might best support a position that I believe is the right position for the 
country.45 
Interestingly, this concern with public opinion was also apparent two years earlier during 
a similar incident.  In 1996, while in the midst of a presidential reelection year, the 
Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia were bombed by a terrorist group.  Immediately, 
Clinton’s “top political strategist, Dick Morris, was hard at work conducting polls to 
gauge the public’s reaction to the bombing. ‘Whenever there was a crisis, I ordered an 
immediate poll,’ Morris recalls. ‘I was concerned about how Clinton looked in the face of 
[the attack] and whether people blamed him.’”46  The public’s importance to the Clinton 
administration and to the top decision-maker becomes increasingly clear. 
 Satisfying the need to find culpable evidence to ascertain the identity of those 
responsible for the bombings, on 14 August 1998, “the CIA and FBI both confirmed that 
al Qaeda was responsible…”47 The Clinton administration had been aware of bin Laden 
and his criminal organization for a number of years and the link between al Qaeda and 
the embassy bombings was not unique.    Under Clinton’s watch, the CIA in 1996 created 
an exclusive station under the Counterterrorism Center to monitor bin Laden and his 
network.48  Clinton also makes reference to the three separate incidents in 1998 where 
bin Laden had threatened U.S. interest.  
In late February, bin Laden had issued a fatwa calling for attacks on 
American military and civilian targets anywhere in the world.  In May, he 
had said his supporters would hit U.S. targets in the Gulf and talked about 
bringing war to America.  In June, in an interview with an American 
                                                 
45 Richard Reeves, “Government by the Polls,” Greensboro News and Record, 21 December 1994, 
A15. 
46 Byron York, National Review White House Correspondent, “Clinton Has No Clothes: What 9/11 
revealed about the ex-president,” National Review, 17 December 2001, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/york/york-issue112901.shtml (accessed 28 May 2006). 
47 Clinton, My Life, 798. 
48 CBSNews.com, “Bin Laden Expert Steps Forward,” 60 Minutes Interview, 14 November 2004, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/11/12/60minutes/main655407.shtml (accessed 28 May 2006). 
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journalist, he had threatened to bring down U.S. military aircraft with anti-
aircraft missiles.49   
In fact, “the initial evidence indicated Osama bin Laden’s network had launched the 
attacks.”50 Clinton’s assessment was reaffirmed after the U.S. response when the 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Hugh Shelton, announced, “As many of you are 
aware, our intelligence community has provided us with convincing information based on 
a variety of intelligence sources, that Osama bin Laden’s network of terrorists was 
involved in the planning, the financing and the execution of the attacks on U.S. embassies 
in Kenya and Tanzania.”51  Secretary of Defense William Cohen reiterated, “There’s 
been a series of reports that we have analyzed, statements by Osama bin Laden himself, 
other information coming in as recently as yesterday about future attacks being planned 
against the United States. We are satisfied there has been a convincing body of evidence 
that leads us to this conclusion.”52  With confirmation of the threat and perpetrator of the 
bombings, Clinton and his staff pushed forward for finalization of the U.S. response. 
In the midst of determining a U.S. response to the bombings, on 17 August 1998, 
President Clinton admitted in taped testimony that he had an “improper physical 
relationship” 53 with White House intern Monica Lewinsky. On the same day he admitted 
before the nation that he “misled people” about his relationship.54  What role this had in 
delaying or determining the final response to the embassy bombing and whether it 
affected both his and the public’s belief and decisional context is worth exploring.  
 According to Clinton in his book My Life, “My team [national security council] 
was worried about one other thing: my testimony before the grand jury in three days, on 
August 17.  They were afraid that it would make me reluctant to strike, or that if I did 
order the attack, I would be accused of doing it to divert public attention from my 
                                                 
49 Clinton, My Life, 797. 
50 Clinton, My Life, 797. 
51 “Text of Cohen, Shelton Briefing on the Strikes,” USA Today, 20 August 1998. 
52 “Text of Cohen, Shelton Briefing on the Strikes,” USA Today, 20 August 1998. 
53 CNN.com, “Clinton Admits To 'Wrong' Relationship With Lewinsky,” Washington, 17 August 
1998, http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/08/17/speech/ (accessed 28 May 06). 
54 CNN.com, “Clinton Admits To 'Wrong' Relationship With Lewinsky,” Washington, 17 August 
1998, http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/08/17/speech/ (accessed 28 May 06). 
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problems…”55 According to public polls at the time, the public’s opinion of the president 
personally dropped 20 points due to his misconduct but their opinion of the president’s 
job remained strong.  The poll conducted by CNN immediately after his speech to the 
nation on 17 August 1998 showed the contrast:  
How Clinton Is Handling His Job as President 
  Approve        62% 
  Disapprove    32% 
  
 Opinion of Clinton 
  Favorable      40% 
  Unfavorable    48%56 
 
Although, the polls show the public drawing a distinctive line between personal and 
public life and work, it is uncertain how Clinton saw these incidents or how the public’s 
disapproval of Clinton personally affected his final decisions on how to strike the bin 
Laden network.   
 Clinton’s book, My Life, offers some insight of the events and decision-making 
process, “I told them [national security team]… if the recommendation was to strike on 
the twentieth, then that’s what we would do.  I said I would handle my personal 
problems.”57  He implies no relationship between his personal problems, public opinion 
and the decision to strike, but did this situation affect his outlook and the public’s?  Was 
public opinion a dominant constraining force in his final policy decision towards the 
embassy bombings or was it something else like his ongoing personal problems – a 
concept of decision context? 
  
2. U.S. Response 
 
After almost three weeks, President Clinton authorized action against Osama bin 
Laden and his al Qaeda network.  On 20 August 1998, 62 U.S. Navy surface ships and a 
                                                 
55 Clinton, My Life, 799. 
56 CNN.com, “Poll: More Americans Satisfied With Clinton's Explanation: But peoples' opinion of the 
president falls sharply,” http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/08/17/poll/ (accessed 28 May 06). 
57 Clinton, My Life, 799. 
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submarine in the Arabian Gulf and Red Sea carried out Operation INFINITE REACH.58  
These assets fired approximately seventy Tomahawk cruise missiles.59 The targets were 
alleged al Qaeda terrorist training camps at Khost, Afghanistan, and a pharmaceutical 
plant in Khartoum, Sudan, suspected of being a link in the chain of chemical weapons 
production.  The firing of 70 Tomahawk cruise missiles was the “most formidable U.S. 
military assault ever against a non-state sponsor of terrorism.”60  “For civilian leaders, the 
missiles appealed because they were accurate and there was minimal risk of U.S. 
casualties.”61   Immediately following the response, Clinton notified the American public 
of the U.S. action.  In his national address he stated, 
I ordered this action for four reasons: First, because we had convincing 
evidence these groups played the key role in the embassy bombings Kenya 
and Tanzania. Second, because these groups have executed terrorist 
attacks against Americans in the past. Third, because we have compelling 
information that they were planning additional terrorist attacks against our 
citizens and others with the inevitable collateral casualties we saw so 
tragically in Africa. And, fourth, because they are seeking to acquire 
chemical weapons and other dangerous weapons.62 
Similar to his presidential statement in the interim period between the bombings and U.S. 
response, Clinton kept the public informed of the action and reasons for the strike. 
According to Foyle this would imply not only a desire to ensure public opinion is 
informed prior to a foreign policy decision but also after a decision is made.  By working 
both sides of public opinion, Clinton the “Delegate,” as defined by Foyle, is developed.  
Before this assertion can be formally made though, some additional concepts need to be 
explored:  1.  what role did the public play in Clinton’s decision to use missiles versus 
                                                 
58 Bryan Bender, “Poor U.S. Intelligence May Have Led to Sudan Strikes,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 2 
September 1998. 
59 Steven Lee Meyers, “Attack Aimed 70 Missiles at Targets 2,500 Miles Apart,” New York Times, 21 
August 1998. 
60 William C. Banks, “‘To prevent and Deter’ International Terrorism: The U.S. Response to the 
Kenya and Tanzania Embassy Bombings,” National Security Studies (Syracuse University and Johns 
Hopkins University, 1999),  3, 
http://www.law.syr.edu/faculty/banks/terrorism/dummyfl/prevent_and_deter.pdf#search='khobar%20tower
s%20lack%20of%20response'. (accessed 26 May 06). 
61 Ibid, 14. 
62 President, “Address to the Nation by the President from Martha’s Vineyard, Massachusetts,” 20 
August 1998, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/strike_clinton980820.html (accessed  27 May 06). 
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other conventional or unconventional methods?; 2.  understanding that the public had 
made a distinction between his personal and professional life, what effect did the ongoing 
scandal have on Clinton, his decisions, and timing to use force?; and 3.  what 
constraining factors, if any, were presented by public opinion which may have affected 
the policy of force that was chosen? 
 
B.   PUBLIC OPINION TOWARDS EMBASSY BOMBINGS 
 
Judging the impact of these bombings on the public is difficult, because there is a 
lack of media attention and public query by agencies such as Gallup.  The Pew Research 
Center conducted a poll shortly after the bombings, from 7-11 August 1998, that found 
that approximately 64% of the public had monitored the details of the bombings.63  Not 
an unlikely number, but this single figure appears to be the extent of the public’s query 
by news agencies prior to the U.S. response.  What is remarkable is the disproportionate 
number of polls asking the public about the Lewinsky scandal versus the bombings of 
American embassies in Africa. From my research, the number of polls asking opinions in 
the Lewinsky case and Clinton’s standing with the public far outweighs any polls to 
assess the U.S. response to the terrorist attacks on the embassies in Africa.  According to 
the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut,64 during 
the period 7 August – 1 September 1998, 21 studies were conducted by various polling 
agencies across the United States.  Of these, the majority -- 13 -- concerned the Clinton 
scandal. 65 
There were two polls that mixed questions about Clinton/Lewinsky and the terror 
attacks and U.S. response and two directly on opinion about the cruise missile strikes.   
Among these, even the CBS News/NY Times polls, which discussed the scandal amidst 
the attack were skewed in favor of the scandal – for example: of the 48 questions asked 
                                                 
63 Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Lewinsky Testimony A Yawn,” 13 August 
1998, http://people-press.org/reports/print.php3?ReportID=83 (accessed 24 May 06). 
64 The Roper Center collects poll data and surveys from across the nation and stores them on their 
searchable database 
65 The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, search string: 7 August – 
1 September 1998. http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-
bin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/Catalog40/Catalog40.htx;start=HS_StartQuery1 (accessed 15 May 06). 
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the first 44 concerned the president and the ongoing controversy, the last 4 discussed the 
missile strikes.66  The vast majority of media activity at the time was concentrated on 
judging the public’s reaction to Clinton, the scandal, and Clinton’s 17 August testimony 
where he admitted to an improper relationship.  In the face of attacks on U.S. 
sovereignty, the media’s preoccupation with the scandal does injustice to the impact and 
importance that should have been made of the embassy bombings.  This created a public 
education and knowledge void and a dearth of information measuring public reaction to 
the embassy bombings and subsequent response.  But, sad as this concentration on the 
personal life of Clinton may seem, it provides a keen insight into one aspect that affected 
public opinion and potentially Clinton at the time.  Clinton’s improper relationship may 
have impacted the public’s view and knowledge of the attacks and their importance to 
U.S. security.  As a result, the beliefs of the public and decision context may have been 
skewed by this and other factors ongoing in the United States.  Because public opinion is 
not clear, it will be increasingly important to take a closer look at the decisional context 
and beliefs of the public that may have influenced the public and its assessment of the 
incident. 
 
1.   Decision Context 
 
The public’s decisional context (DP) in the United States at the time of the 
embassy bombing was anything but simple.    U.S. public opinion was focused on several 
areas all of which complicated the public’s decision and opinion in regards to the 
embassy bombings.  First, from the outset of the administration, Clinton was elected for 
domestic and economic reasons.  The first President Bush, despite winning the Gulf War 
in minimal time and with minimal casualties, was not considered to be a domestic 
president, but saw his role as leading in the international foreign policy arena.  The public 
soured by recession, elected Clinton on the foundation of “It’s the economy, stupid!”   
Taking a lesson from this, Clinton observed, 
                                                 
66 The Roper Center, “CBS News and The New York Times Poll # 98008D: Missile Attack/Scandal,” 
19-20 August 1998, http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-
bin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/Catalog40/Catalog40.htx;start=summary_link?archno=USCBSNYT1998-98008D 
(accessed 15 May 2006). 
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You know, the country will not permit a president to engage in foreign 
policy to the exclusion of dealing with the domestic problems.  But the 
country might permit a president to engage in domestic problems to the 
exclusion of foreign policy, until some wheel runs off somewhere, and 
then it’ll be obvious that that was an error as well.67 
As a result, Clinton promised to focus on domestic and economic issues like “a laser 
beam”68 to help improve the U.S. economy.  The public opinion environment of the 
country provided more support for a focus on domestic policies than for an outward focus 
on foreign policy.   
Reviewing the 1995 (1990-1994 time period) and 1999 (1995-1998 time period) 
American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy documents by the Chicago Council on 
Foreign Relations (CCFR), reemphasizes the domestic focus of public opinion.  
According to the 1995 version,  
Crime and unemployment are considered the biggest problems facing the 
country by the public. Foreign policy related problems now constitute the 
smallest number of overall problems since 1978 for the public and the 
smallest ever among leaders. The preferred goals of foreign policy address 
matters directly related to local concerns.69 
When asked, “What do you feel are the two or three biggest problems facing the country 
today?” neither the public nor the leadership listed national security concerns, as shown 







                                                 
67 Jim Hoagland, “Image Isn’t Everything,” Washington Post, 31 May 1994, A17. 
68 PBS.com, “The Presidents: William Jefferson Clinton,” 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/presidents/42_clinton/index.html (accessed 15 May 2006). 
69 John E. Reilly, ed., American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1995, The Chicago Council 
on Foreign Relations, 7, 
http://www.ccfr.org/publications/opinion/American%20Public%20Opinion%20Report%201995.pdf 
(accessed 30 May 2006). 
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The Public The Leaders 
1. Crime (42%) 1. Crime (33%) 
2. Unemployment (20%) 2. Economy: unspecified (23%) 
3. Health care/insurance (19%) 3. Budget deficit (20%) 
4. Drug abuse (18%) 4. Education (15%) 
5. Poverty: hunger, homelessness (15%) 5. Dissatisfaction with government (15%) 
6. Education: improving schools (12%) 6. Immorality (13%) 
7. Economy: unspecified (10%) 7. Health care/insurance (13%) 
8. Dissatisfaction with government (9%) 8. Unemployment (11%) 
9. Budget deficit (9%) 9. Racism (7%) 
10. Immorality (8%) 10. Foreign relations/policy: unspecified (7%) 
 
Table 4. Public versus Leader List of Concerns70 
 
Foreign policy or other international issues were listed 10th for the Leaders and not 
present for the Public.  The concerns of the public created an environment and decision 
context inundated by domestic concerns.  Early in the Clinton presidency the public had 
set the contextual framework for the administration.  Domestic policies and concentration 
on the health of the nation would rule many of the decisions to be made.  Concentration 
at home would decrease the public’s understanding and insight into potential intervention 
problems.  This in turn would reduce the public’s emphasis and constraining effect when 
international issues arose. 
One year after the embassy bombings, CCFR released the 1999 report.  The mood 
of the public was more upbeat and extremely supportive of Clinton’s internally focused 
policy agenda.  “The United States was enjoying its greatest economic success in 
decades.  The stock market was at an all-time high, unemployment was under 5% and the 
massive federal budget deficit was replaced by an estimated $50-100 billion surplus.”71  
The mood and outlook for the public was positive and the desire not to rock the boat was 
strong.  Compared to the atmosphere in 1994, the internal focus was even more 
concentrated.  As a reflection of general public interest in foreign affairs, interest in local 
news ranked highest with 60% and international news and issues concerning countries 
                                                 
70 Reilly, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1995, 11. 
71 John E. Reilly, ed., American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999, The Chicago Council 
on Foreign Relations, 2, 
http://www.ccfr.org/publications/opinion/American%20Public%20Opinion%20Report%201999.pdf 
(accessed 30 May 2006). 
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outside the United States the lowest at 29%.72  Similar to the 1995 report, the public was 
asked about the two largest problems facing the nation.  The results present two 
interesting context issues.  First, domestic concerns and focus are still numbers 1-10, 
validating the idea that the public’s decision context was one of domestically focused 
attention and awareness.  Second and more revealing, number two on the public’s list and 
number five on the leaders’ list is a new topic, “The President/Bill Clinton.”73  The 
decision context for the public at the time of the embassy bombings was 1. internal 
domestic focus to ensure that the economy’s resurgence continued and 2. a general 
fascination with presidential impropriety. 
Unlike the improved economic conditions that the United States enjoyed in 1998, 
use of force since the Clinton administration took office had involved repeated failure 
and indecision, which created another contextual setting for the public.  The public drew 
an understanding of the Clinton administration’s ability and dedication to force during 
several specific incidents prior to the embassy bombings.  Somalia, as one example, 
helped frame the decision context for the public for future engagements.  During the U.S. 
involvement in Somalia, an action begun by Clinton’s predecessor as assistance to a UN 
humanitarian mission, the public saw an incident that changed forms and policies.  The 
Clinton administration failed to provide any policy guidance.  As Berman and Goldman 
point out, 
As 1993 progressed, Operation Restore Hope, the shipping of food and 
medicine to starving Somalis, became a UN mission more intent on 
peacekeeping and nation building than on humanitarian assistance.  
Throughout the summer and into the early fall, the Clinton 
administration’s plan for Somalia seemed confused.74 
The confusion over Clinton’s foreign policy spread to the public and was compounded 
with the death of 18 servicemen in the attempt to capture warlord Mohammed Farrah 
                                                 
72 Reilly, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999, 6. 
73 Reilly, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999, 7. 
74 Larry Berman and Emily O. Goldman, “Clinton’s Foreign Policy at Midterm,”  in The Clinton 
Presidency: First Appraisals, ed. Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 
1996), 304. 
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Aideed.75  The end result was low approval among the public for a conflict which rated at 
the lowest end of tolerance among the public’s threshold for use of force and military 
engagement.  The UN mission and use of American troops had evolved into a nation-
building or internal political change action.  As discussed earlier in the introduction, this 
action rated lowest in approval in public opinion’s staircase of public support and 
constraint (Figure 2).  As a result,  
U.S. public opinion grew critical and questioning.  In turn, congressional 
critics of the mission demanded explanations and a focal point for blame.  
Confronting a crisis it had not anticipated, President Bill Clinton’s 
administration responded in a way that epitomized its conflicted view of 
using military force … it proclaimed within days that U.S. military  
personnel would be pulling out of Somalia after a decent interval of a few 
months.  The lesson was clear: the administration regarded the military 
mission as a failure.76 
Somalia, the first opportunity for the Clinton administration to show its foreign policy 
prowess, failed and helped shape the public’s concept of use of force under Clinton and 
ultimately affected the decision context for the embassy bombings.   
 The last issue that shaped the public decision context concerns Clinton’s 
inappropriate relationship with Monica Lewinsky.  According to the 1999 CCFR, the 
“scandal involving President Clinton and a White House intern shifted the focus of 
national attention and became almost an obsession for the American Press and the 
Washington establishment for the entire year [1998].”77  Even before the scandal, Bert 
Rockman observed, “It is not clear that the various sexual scandals that have been 
reputed have had any direct impact on the Clinton’s fortunes, but they have added an aura 
of suspicion and distrust of Clinton.”78  The media and public were pre-occupied with 
                                                 
75 Scharnhorst, “Keeping the Peace in the 21st Century: A Look at U.N. Peacekeeping and its 
American Support,” http://coweb.cc.gatech.edu:8080/PubPolicy/356 (accessed 30 May 2006). 
76 Robert F. Baumann and Lawrence A. Yates with Versalle F. Washington, “My Clan Against the 
World: US and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994,” (Combat Studies Institute Press: Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas), http://www-
cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/clan.pdf#search='US%20mogadishu%20and%20somalia%20public%
20opinion' (accessed 4 June 2006). 
77 Reilly, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999, 3. 
78 Bert A. Rockman, “Leadership Style and the Clinton Presidency,” in The Clinton Presidency: First 
Appraisals, ed. Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1996), 333. 
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this issue and it arguably helped frame the decision context for the embassy bombings.  
In the end, the embassy bombings, while important crises for the United States, were 
overwhelmed by ongoing issues within the United States.  The public’s focus was 
elsewhere. 
 
2.   Beliefs 
 
  The decisional context variables in the previous section make it difficult to 
ascertain through polls and statements the actual beliefs of the public (BP), because the 
public’s and the media’s attention were focused on the improper relationship of Clinton 
versus the embassy bombings.  A review of articles available in Lexis/Nexis illustrates 
this point.  Utilizing the power search function, a search of the New York Times, 
Washington Post and Seattle Times for the period from 7 to 19 August revealed that the 
public’s belief system was being inundated by other issues by a factor of almost 3 to 1.  
 











77 66 34 170 
 
Table 5. Periodical Comparison (Embassy Bombings and Clinton 
Relationship)79 
 
This preoccupation created an information void within the media in which actual public 
insight into the embassy bombings prior to the U.S. response is not measured.  Compare 
this with coverage of the October 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole; over a similar 12-day 
period after the incident an opposite media response is recorded.   
 
 
                                                 
79 Lexis/Nexis Power Search using the following keywords: Clinton and Relationship, Embassy 
Bombings.  Timeframe: 8/7/98 to 8/19/98 (time frame based on period between attacks and US response 
where belief system and discussion should be occurring to help formulate US response policy.) 
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Articles 19 25 20 64 
U.S.S. Cole 
Bombings 71 58 29 158 
 
Table 6. Periodical Comparison (Embassy Bombings and U.S.S. Cole)80 
 
The African embassy bombings did not generate coverage by the media of the public’s 
ideas concerning the proper course of U.S. action in response.  Reviewing the actual 
articles that the three newspapers carried about the embassy bombings, the overwhelming 
majority discussed the ongoing investigations and the after effects/damage of the 
bombings.  Public opinion was absent.  Trying to determine whether the U.S. public saw 
this action as a threat to U.S. vital interests and whether or not the United States should 
act alone or in a multilateral fashion is short of actual hard evidence.    
 Additionally, the beliefs of the public may have been affected by the decisional 
context of the U.S. domestic situation.  Occurring during a time of increased economic 
prosperity and growth, the beliefs of the public regarding appropriate action or concern 
into the embassy bombings may have been affected.  When pollster Andrew Kohut 
discussed Clinton’s situation, he did not even mention the embassy bombings:    
A similar delayed effect could reverse initial opinion today with regard to 
Mr. Clinton. If the economy and bull market begin to sour, the public 
could eventually condemn the president for a scandal that diverted 
Washington’s attention while the nation’s prosperity withered away.81 
With little media focus, the public’s attention and concern for the embassy bombings was 
diminished and unrecorded.   Unless education was introduced to reengage the public, 
these conditions might be seen to diminish the constraining effects of public opinion.  If 
no one is paying attention, a president should be free to act as he chooses.  The paradox 
will come when we see how Clinton viewed these effects. 
                                                 
80 Lexis/Nexis Power Search using the following keywords: Cole, Timeframe: 10/12/00 to 10/24/00 
(time frame based on 12 days from incident – same number of days that elapsed between embassy 
bombings and US response) 
81 Andrew Kohut, “Clinton and the Court of Public Opinion,” The New York Times, 17 August 1998, 
Section A, 15. 
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In view of the dearth of public information during the intervening period, a review 
of after action polls can help suggest the impact of the bombings on the public (a 
complete review of the decision to use U.S. missile strikes will be made in section C and 
D).  While the public supports U.S. action for incidents that threaten vital interests and 
are in the best interest of the United States, other actions are looked at less approvingly 
and public constraint is more pronounced upon decision-makers.  According to polls 
taken after the United States launch of cruise missiles at two select targets in Afghanistan 
and Sudan, 66%82 or the majority of Americans approved of the U.S. strikes.  While 
support for the strikes may be viewed as a rally around the flag effect since poll data was 
taken on the day of the U.S. strikes, reviewing additional question data from two polls 
provides more insight into the incident and its effect on the beliefs of the public.  USA 
Today/CNN and CBS News Polls taken on 20 August 199883 asked directly whether the 
U.S. actions constituted a reaction to U.S. national interests or were an attempt to divert 
attention from the Lewinsky scandal. 
Gallup/USA Today-CNN (8/20): “Why do you, personally, think Bill 
Clinton ordered today’s military strike—SOLELY because he felt it was 
in the best interests of the country or IN PART to divert public attention 
away from the Monica Lewinsky controversy?” (Emphasis added)  
 
Best interests of U.S. - 58%  
Divert attention - 36%  
Don’t know, Other (volunteered) - 6%  
 
CBS News (8/20): “Do you think the timing of these attacks had more to 
do with U.S. military judgment as to when and how to respond, or do you 
think the timing of these attacks had more to do with taking the public’s 
mind off of President Clinton’s troubles?”  
 
Best U.S. military judgment - 55%  
Divert attention - 27%  
Both (volunteered) - 4%  
Don’t know - 14% 
 
                                                 
82 George Gallup Jr., The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1998 (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly 
Resources, Inc.,) 1999, 201. 
83 U.S. Information Agency, “Majority of Americans Support Strikes Against Terrorist Sites,” by. 
Alvin Richman,  Office of Research and Media Reaction, 25 August 1998,  http://www.usembassy-
israel.org.il/publish/press/security/archive/1998/august/ds2831.htm (accessed 5 June 2006). 
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With a majority of the public seeing the actions as in the U.S. best interest, the public can 
be seen as believing that the embassy attacks were against the national interests of the 
United States and thus constraint on action by the executive would be minimized.   
Additionally, in George Gallup’s, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1998, a 
chronology of 55 events “is provided to enable the reader to relate poll results to specific 
events, or series of events, that may have influenced public opinion.”84  This chronology 
provides insight into what Gallup and others believe may have influenced the beliefs of 
the public during 1998.  The listing of events includes the following: 
 
Event Subject 
Clinton Controversy = 27 (17 out of 32 from 1 Jan – 20 Aug 1998) 
Iraq Situation = 12 
Embassy Bombings in Africa = 1 
U.S. financial exuberance = 1   
Clinton Fundraising Issue = 1 
FDA and Viagra = 1 
India Nuclear Testing = 1 
Microsoft Anti-trust = 1 
Senate Rejects Smoking Settlement = 1 
Gunman Kills 2 police Officers in Washington = 1 
United Auto Workers Strike = 1   
House Approves Campaign Reform = 1 
McGwire Breaks Maris record = 1 
Wye Memorandum signed = 1 
Hurricane Mitch Destruction = 1 
Shuttle Discovery and John Glenn = 1 
Livingston resigns because of affair = 1 
Sensitive info given to China = 1 
 
Table 7. Events that Influenced Public Opinion85 
 
The embassy bombings only received one mention.  In contrast, almost half the events 
(27 out of 55) identified as issues impacting public opinion for the year concerned the 
                                                 
84 George Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1998 (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly 
Resources, Inc), 1999, xvii. 
85 Each category is a subjective title I provide to encompass the various items Gallup lists.  His list 
includes a total of 53 dates and subsequent subjects that helped influence public opinion.  George Gallup, 
Jr., The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1998 (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc), 1999, xvii-
xxiv. 
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Lewinsky scandal.  This single ongoing issue may have significantly affected the 
decision context for the public.    
 Taken in an aggregate the combination of the sound domestic situation of the 
United States (create a less constraining public opinion belief), reduced media attention 
due to ongoing Clinton controversy (less constraining), and after action polls of the U.S. 
response showing the action was in the best interest of the country (less constraining), 
reveals a belief structure for the public that would allow the administration and president 
the leeway to act.  The constraining environment of the public’s belief system would 
have been diminished.  
 
3.  Summation of Public Opinion 
When reviewing DP or the public’s decision context and BP or the beliefs of the 
public, three major issues affected the environment within which the public interpreted 
the embassy bombings.  The first was the overall emphasis on domestic issues in the 
public’s attention.  This created a less constraining effect on foreign policy for the 
Clinton administration.  Essentially, as long as the economy was growing and prosperity 
within the United States was sustained, the public’s reactions to foreign policy decisions 
were likely to be more lax.   
Second, the Clinton scandal created a media monopoly within the United States.  
The public, media, and Washington were absorbed into the happenings of the scandal and 
the coverage garnered by it overwhelmed all other potential media events, namely the 
embassy bombings.  One would generally expect after an attack such as those conducted 
in Africa, that polls would be taken and studied to determine what the public thinks and 
what actions it expects of the executive.  The scandal was absorbing the majority of the 
press and public’s attention.  Also, the scandal did little to affect Clinton’s good public 
satisfaction percentages for job performance.  Domestic performance and desire to ensure 
the continued internal success of the U.S. economy helped to minimize the effects of the 
scandal, thus decreasing its constraining ability on the president and his decisions.  
Additionally, the pure fact that the scandal monopolized the media led to a less educated 
public in terms of the implications of the embassy bombings thus decreasing the 
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constraining effects of the scandal and possibly the effects of Clinton’s failure in previous 
foreign policy/use of force engagements. 
Finally, and counterintuitive to the first, is the expected more constraining aspect 
of previous failures of the Clinton administration in the area of military interventions.  
Somalia, as one example, showed the failure of Clinton foreign policy and “waffling”86 
indecisiveness of its abilities in the international arena.  Given earlier statements by 
Clinton and his emphasis on the domestic over foreign policy, this should not be a shock.  
But one would expect that the ineptness of Clinton in this area would elicit a more 
constraining effect on foreign policy from the public.  Taken in combination and acting 
within an aggregate of DP, the assumption would be that the constraining effect was 
overwhelmed by the loosening of constraint from the other two issues.  Additionally, in 
the face of the greater latitude allocated to Clinton by the public from the emphasis on 
domestic and scandal awareness, his poor track record within the foreign policy/use of 
force realm may have been a greater limiter to Clinton in his decision context than within 
the public.  In sum, in order of priority for the public: 
P = DPBP 
DP 
Focus on Domestic = less constraining effect 
Scandal = less constraining effect 
Previous Engagements = more constraining effect 
 
DP = less + less + more 
DP = less constraining effect 
 
 BP 
 Good economy = less constraining effect 
 Less media focus on bombings/less public awareness = less constraining effect 
 Best/vital interest = less constraining effect 
 BP = less + less + less 
 BP = less constraining effect 
 
 Overall 
 DPBP = less constraining 
                                                 
86 Term is used throughout Campbell and Rockman’s book when discussing the administration's 
foreign policy abilities and use of force. 
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The result of the three areas which affect both DP and BP was to create an overall less 
constraining effect on P or public opinion.  Taken by itself, this would have provided the 
president ample space to allow his personal preferences to guide the response to the 
embassy bombings.  A review of the presidential decision context and beliefs is required 
to see the full foreign policy constraint picture. 
 
C.   CLINTON ADMINISTRATION’S VIEW OF PUBLIC OPINION 
REGARDING EMBASSY BOMBINGS 
 
While the public and media were caught up in the presidential scandal, the 
country economically was in favorable conditions.  Many Americans, while turning a 
negative eye to Clinton’s personal qualities, approved of his policies domestically.  For 
Clinton, the year 1998 was a time of personal turmoil and professional success.  Although 
Clinton and his advisers would state in newspaper and magazine articles that during the 
intervening period between the embassy bombings and U.S. response, Clinton spent the 
majority of his time with his advisers deciding actions and the U.S. response versus 
concentrating on his personal issues, the opposite may be true.  
In their enduring efforts to portray Mr. Clinton as not being distracted by 
the Lewinsky investigation, White House officials today cast the president 
as overseeing the latest developments in the bombings in Africa. But they 
were quick to assert that he could stay in charge even while traveling 
because of the advanced communications systems aboard Air Force One. 
Mr. Clinton suggested in Louisville that teams in Africa were successfully 
tracking clues to the bombings. “They are searching and finding 
evidence,” he said. But otherwise, his public comments on the bombing 
were restricted to asking for a moment of silence in honor of the dead, 
stating the nation’s resolve in the face of terrorism, and vowing to bring 
the “murderers” to justice.87 
Reviews of the archived statements, both written and spoken, of the president paint a 
contrasting picture of the importance of public opinion and his personal issues to the 
development of foreign policy.  A review and summation of these sources will elucidate 
                                                 
87 Katherine Q. Seelye, “Uneasy About Timing of Fund-Raisers, Clinton Shortens Trip,” The New 
York Times, Section A, Page 15, Column 1, 11 August 1998. 
 38 
the real, potentially constraining decisional context (DE) and beliefs (BE) of the executive 
within which the president was operating during the embassy bombings.   
The Public Papers of the Presidents – William J. Clinton books one (January – 
June) and two (July – December) for 1998, provide every remark, news conference, 
statement, letter, communication and speech the president produced for calendar year 
1998.  Each product contains important insights into the beliefs of the president and 
administration and the decisional context within which they operated.  Although 
important, all sources are not equally valuable.  Significant differences were noted 
between news conferences, where there were question and answer sessions between the 
president and reporters/media sources, and remarks, letters, and statements of the 
president.  The latter were carefully scripted while the former were impromptu statements 
and answers by the president and represent a more accurate and personal reference point 
from which to gather information about the overall beliefs of the president.  For this 
reason, I concentrated my review on the 75 (volume one) and 48 (volume two) sources 
contained under the heading “Interviews with the News Media.”88  
 
1.   Decision Context 
After reviewing each of the 123 sources identified under “Interviews with the 
News Media,” various attributes of the decision context of the president (DE) became 
clear.   Appendix A contains a complete listing by volume number, date, president’s 
comments, context of comments, media question heading, and event title of the 
applicable statements by Clinton.   As I reviewed this data, some common themes clearly 
emerged from the speeches and statements made by Clinton, and emphasis by the media 
on certain key items.  The public opinion belief system of Clinton, which will be 
reviewed in the next section, is illustrated through the actual words within answers to 
questions the president used during the various media sessions.   
The core context grouping that seems to have had significant impact upon Clinton 
and his decision-making ability was the scandal surrounding his inappropriate 
                                                 
88 William J. Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents: William J. Clinton 1998, Book 1 and Book 2 
(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999). 
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relationship.  Although Clinton and his advisers will publicly deny the impact of the 
scandal, media attention and statements by Clinton point to a contrasting conclusion.    Of 
the 30 statements made by Clinton directly discussing the public and their significance, 
21 were centered on his “personal turmoil.”  The statements by Clinton all share a 
common theme:  the importance of going back and doing the work for the American 
people that he was hired to do.  Interestingly, Clinton used this phrase only when the 
media confronted him about his personal problems during question and answer sessions.  
Clinton appeared to be talking directly to the American public, attempting to reassure 
them the scandal would not affect his ability to do the work he was “hired” to do.  These 
statements reveal a contextual framework muddied by personal issues.   As Clinton 
continually emphasized his role as a hired delegate of the people, one cannot miss the fact 
that the majority of question and answer sessions with the media during 1998 served a 
dual purpose.  Primarily, these sessions allowed the media to grill the president about his 
personal conduct and impending/ongoing legal issues, and only secondarily to discuss 
pertinent world issues.  From a decision context framework, the conclusion drawn would 
be opposite what Clinton and his advisers espoused; the scandal would have an effect on 
Clinton during the embassy bombings incident. 
For example, on 6 February 1998, “The President’s News Conference with Prime 
Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom” contained 12 media questions 
encompassing Clinton’s personal turmoil (personal integrity and responsibility, rightwing 
conspiracy, possibility of resignation, Paula Jones civil lawsuit, independent counsel’s 
investigation, and Monica S. Lewinsky) compared to 8 questions about foreign policy 
issues (situation in Iraq, U.S. aircraft accident in Italy, and UK domestic reforms).89  The 
importance and coverage the media provided to the personal issues of the president 
would have played an increasingly constraining effect on the president by imparting a 
false importance to the president of the public’s perception of the scandal.   
Aside from the insights garnered from the direct statements by the president about 
decision context, also telling are the actual exchanges with the media during the time of 
                                                 
89 William J. Clinton, Public Papers of the President: William J. Clinton, Book 1 1998 (Washington 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), 184-193. 
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the embassy bombings and the U.S. response.  While the president continued to provide 
vetted remarks and speeches, the number of opportunities for the press/media to ask 
questions with candid presidential responses dropped to zero between 27 July and 2 
September 1998.90   There were no news conferences immediately before, during or 
immediately after the periods from the embassy bombings to the U.S. response.  Also, 
occurring within the intervening period of 8 to 19 August 1998 was Clinton’s 
congressional testimony on 17 August where he admitted to an inappropriate relationship 
and lying to cover it up.   Additionally, considering that Clinton averaged 9.1 Question 
and Answer (Q&A) sessions per month for 1998, it is uncharacteristic of the 
administration to have zero Q & As for the month of August. 
 






January 10 3 
February 5 3 
March 14 3 
April 12 5 
May 10 3 
June 14 0 
July 7 3 
August 0 0 
September 8 5 
October 13 5 
November 12 7 
December 5 4 
TOTAL 110 41 
 
Table 8. Clinton’s Media Question and Answer Sessions by Month91 
 
Reviewing other time periods (Table 9) marked by aggression against the U.S., 
news conferences and question and answer sessions with the executive were the norm.   
                                                 
90 Clinton, Public Papers of the President:  William J. Clinton, Book 2 1998, 1338-1536. 
91 Data compiled from Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents:  William J. Clinton, Book 1 and 2 
1998. 
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Date Crisis Title News Conference 
(Yes/No) 
26 June 1993 
28 June 1993 
U.S. Strikes on Iraq Address to Nation 
on the Strike on 
Iraqi Intelligence 
Headquarters 
Remarks and an 
Exchange with 
Reporters Prior to a 
Cabinet Meeting 
Yes 
26 June 1996 Khobar Towers 
Bombing 
Remarks on the 
Terrorist Attack in 




17 December 1998 Missile Strikes on 
Iraq 
Remarks on the 
Missile Strikes on 




12 October 2000 U.S.S. Cole 
Bombing 
Remarks on the 
Attack on the U.S.S. 
Cole and the 




Table 9. Comparison of Crisis Periods92 
 
These sessions provided an opportunity for the executive to voice his concerns and 
resolve to protect the United States and punish those responsible.  Why, during a month 
where U.S. interests were directly attacked, did Clinton hide from the world and opt for 
vetted statements over media question and answer sessions?  Unlike the statements from 
Clinton, the conclusion that can be drawn is that the scandal and media emphasis placed 
on this event outweighed other coverage, specifically the embassy bombings.  This shows 
the scandal affected Clinton’s ability to confront other issues as illustrated by the lack of 
attention drawn to the embassy bombings through direct presidential/media sessions.  The 
combination of Clinton’s perception of personal issues, public and media attention, and 
desire to maintain a sound economy led to an increasing constraining effect.  Specifically, 
                                                 
92 Data consolidated from speeches taken from Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents:  William J. 
Clinton, Book 1 1993, Book 1 1996, Book 2 1998, Book III 2000/2001. 
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the president felt constrained in the ability to go before the public to make the case for 
use of force, which in turn placed limits on the ability to choose a forceful response. 
 
2.   Beliefs 
 
 Key to the discussion of public opinion’s potentially constraining effect on 
presidential decision-making is the review of the beliefs (BE) held by the executive in 
regards to the importance of public opinion in the foreign policy arena.  Foyle’s two by 
two matrix shown in Table 1 asks two questions.  Is it desirable for input from public 
opinion to affect foreign policy choices and is public support of a foreign policy 
necessary?   
 Before examining the case of the embassy bombings and use of force with 
Afghanistan, it is important to provide the baseline of Clinton’s beliefs in regards to 
public opinion in general. In Clinton’s first term Garry Wills noted, “Clinton is an omni-
directional placater.  He wants to satisfy everyone, which is a surefire way to satisfy no 
one.”93  Having been elected to focus on the domestic concerns of the United States, it 
should come as no surprise that the president’s leadership style and beliefs were 
internally focused.  The need to satisfy the American public was high on Clinton’s list of 
priorities.  Clinton remarks, “My premise was that the American people were hungry for 
a president who showed that he knew that something had to be done here to address our 
problems at home and that had been long neglected.”94  As a result, the ability to enact 
sound and consistent foreign policy was diminished.   An assessment by Berman and 
Goldman concluded, “An internal focus implies that less attention need be devoted to 
thinking systematically about, and devising strategies to respond to, challenges that 
originate outside the nation, let alone to devising strategies that shape the external 
environment … In this sense, the problem is that … Clinton has chosen to follow rather 
than lead.”95   
                                                 
93 Garry Wills, “Clinton’s Troubles,” New York Review of Books, 22 September 1994, 7. 
94 Ann Devroy and R. Jeffrey Smith, “Clinton Reexamines a Foreign Policy Under Siege,” 
Washington Post, 17 October 1993, A1, A28. 
95 Berman and Goldman, 298. 
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Following rather than leading public opinion was central to Clinton’s presidency 
and belief system.  In an introspective statement about his leadership and belief style, 
Clinton stated, “I’ve got to be more like John Wayne.”96  The comparison to John Wayne 
as the out front, rigid and dynamic leader who sets the example for others to follow, is a 
direct contrast to the belief system and style of Clinton.  By following the public’s wishes 
and looking inward toward domestic issues, Clinton’s foreign policy choices and efforts 
were impacted.  
There seems to be agreement that Clinton’s style is at once ad hoc and 
overly cautious.  He relies very heavily on the advice of his foreign policy 
team, but also responds readily to domestic public opinion.  Thus, the 
impression exists of a president who is unsure and inconsistent on foreign 
policy, and who is even conducting foreign policy with only domestic 
goals in mind.  Clearly, Clinton aims to please.97 
To enact change based on the people’s will or the concentration on public opinion prior 
to the formulation of U.S. foreign policy, paints the picture that input from public opinion 
does affect foreign policy formulation of the administration. For Foyle, this would 
constitute a Yes on the “Y” axis of Table 1. 
 Clinton’s emphasis on public opinion affected not just policy formulation but also 
policy implementation.  In 1994, Clinton observed that “any sustained endeavor 
involving our military forces requires the support of the people over the long run.”98  By 
itself, Clinton’s statement provides insight into the potential constraining effects of public 
opinion on policy enactment.  If military forces are to be used, the public needs to be 
behind the policy.  
Clinton learned this lesson early on.  The example for Somalia was used earlier to 
illustrate the public’s decisional context. Similarly, Clinton learned of public opinion’s 
effect when support for military forces fell after the death of 18 and wounding of 78 U.S. 
                                                 
96 Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge:  The Clinton Presidency (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 58. 
97 Berman and Goldman, 298. 
98 William Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents:  William J. Clinton, 1994 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1995), 1576. 
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service members while trying to change the internal regime of Somalia.99  The initial 
position of the administration, which had garnered general support of the public, was to 
supply troops for the humanitarian aide of Somalis.  Prior to the 3 October 1993 deaths, 
46% of the public disapproved of the presence of U.S. troops in Somalia and 43% 
approved.  The end result, as the operation turned to internal political change, was 
declining and failing support and public acceptance.  After the deaths and wounding of 
U.S. service members in Somalia, public opposition moved to 69% with 43% of the 
public wanting the forces withdrawn immediately.100  As support and public opposition 
turned against Clinton and the campaign, “the domestic criticism took Clinton by 
surprise.”101  Clinton remarked to his advisers, “How could this happen … no one told 
me about the downside.”102 Public pressure was placed upon Congress and Clinton’s 
public approval ratings for how he was handling the issue plummeted, falling from 51% 
to 31% from June to October 1993.103  Foyle concluded that, “Congressional reactions to 
the deaths in Somalia were fueled in large part by pressure from the public.  Throughout 
the U.S. intervention in Somalia, Congress paid close attention to the polls, and 
congressional support for intervention dropped along with public support.”104   Clinton 
and his advisers looked to different policy solutions within Somalia and finally decided 
on the eventual pullout based on timelines associated with a gradual withdrawal.  
Clinton’s belief system regarding the levels of support the American public would extend 
for casualties in regime change environments was founded in Somalia and extended to 
other engagements.   
The shock and impact of public opinion weighed heavily on the final policy 
outcome of Somalia.  As a result, public opinion impacted policy implementation; Foyle 
                                                 
99 U.S. Congressional Research Service, “The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold 
War World: Toward Self-Deterrence?,”  by. Stanley R. Sloan, Senior Specialist in International Security 
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102 Drew, 317, 326. 
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characterizes this as a positive effect on the x axis of his table (Table 1) and the 




Is public support of a foreign policy 
necessary? 
  YES NO 
YES Delegate Executor Is it desirable for 
input from public 
opinion to affect 
foreign policy 
choices? 
NO Pragmatist Guardian 
 
Table 10. Clinton’s Public Opinion Belief Structure 
 
Further evidence of Clinton’s delegate belief system can be found by reviewing 
the statements taken from his speeches and interactions with reporters in Appendix A.  
These direct, personal statements provide a significant window into his thoughts on his 
role as president.  During a discussion with reporters on 11 October 1998, Clinton 
remarked, “They [congress] shouldn’t be worried about whether the president is here or 
not … I’m worried about what they do when they are here.  They kill everything that the 
American people want.  And that’s what they’ve got to get to work on, to do the things 
people want done.”105  Additionally during remarks and exchanges with reporters on 24 
March 1998 in Africa, Clinton reemphasized his role and duty to the public, “I’m glad to 
be doing the business of the United States and the people … I think most Americans want 
me to do the job I was elected to do.  And so I’m going to try and do what most people 
want me to do.”106  Throughout Clinton’s presidency and specifically throughout 1998, 
he referred to doing the people is business and being hired by the American people to do 
a job.  Implicit within these statements is Clinton’s commitment to do the job that the 
                                                 
105 William Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents:  William J. Clinton, Book II 1998 (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), 1776. 
106 William Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents:  William J. Clinton, Book I  1998 (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), 425. 
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American people want done.  In other words, Clinton believes he is the public’s delegate, 
hired to do what the people want.  
 
3.   Summation of President’s View of Public Opinion 
 
While the public did not exert an overly constraining effect on Clinton’s decision-
making ability (DPBP = less constraining), Clinton may have imposed a more restrictive 
environment (decisional context and beliefs) upon himself because of the scandal.  From 
a decisional context perspective (DE), the uncharacteristic lack of media sessions and 
direct statements made by the president concerning the need to “get back to the job the 
public had hired him to do” provide insight into the apparent importance Clinton may 
have thought the scandal had for the public by virtue of the attention it received from the 
media.  The end result would have created a more constraining decision-making 
environment for Clinton and limited his perceived options and made him more tentative 
to act.  
Because the country was sound economically and domestically people were 
satisfied with the job Clinton was doing, one would expect a less constraining 
environment from which to make decisions.  Because of other issues, namely his personal 
problems and media attention, ongoing at the same time, this proved false.  The 
statements made by Clinton to the public during 1998 exhibit a need to communicate to 
the people his commitment to continue to do their bidding.  Specifically, he felt the need 
to relay that his errors would not impact them on the domestic front.  The conclusion I 
draw is that Clinton actually felt constrained by the good economy, to continue it, and to 
ensure that the one good thing he had going for him stayed sound.  Clinton’s career was 
in the hands of the people.  Had the economy and domestic front of the United States 
been poor, the chances of Clinton being impeached were higher.  As Kohut remarked in 
the New York Times, 
A similar delayed effect could reverse initial opinion today with regard to 
Mr. Clinton. If the economy and bull market begin to sour, the public 
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could eventually condemn the president for a scandal that diverted 
Washington’s attention while the nation’s prosperity withered away.107  
Clinton in the Presidential Papers remarked on the need to:  
 
… still keep the economy going … and that’s got to be my focus in these 
closing days.  What happens to me I think ultimately will be for the 
American people to decide.  I owe them my best efforts to work for them, 
and that’s what I am going to do.108 
In the end, the decisional context of the scandal and good domestic conditions combined 
to provide for a more constraining environment for the president. 
As the “ultimate example of a public presidency, one based on a perpetual 
campaign to obtain the support of the American people,”109 the identification of Clinton’s 
belief system (BE) is founded on his lessons from previous incidents, his ongoing 
personal issues, and his role as delegate of the people.  Taking a lesson from Somalia 
early in his career, Clinton’s belief system centered on the understanding that the people 
would not accept casualties for certain conflicts.  In fact, his response to his advisers 
(expressed earlier) illustrates a desire not to have backlash from the public.  As a result, 
this belief from the lesson learned in Somalia would create a more constraining effect and 
limit policy options for Clinton.   
As discussed in Clinton’s decision context, the bombings occurred during a time 
of increased personal and political tension for Clinton.  The scandal the president was 
immersed in created an atmosphere of heightened public awareness that put at risk 
survival in office for the president.  In his book, My Life, as an example, the discussion 
into his personal beliefs of the embassy bombings and U.S. reaction was kept to five 
pages while being sandwiched and absorbed within the discussion of his personal 
problems for eight pages.  His personal issues absorbed media attention and thus focus by 
the public and were pervasive throughout the bombing incident.  As journalists noted at 
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the time, “despite polls showing a lack of public concern about the investigation, ratings 
still soar and the public and network appetite for commentary is surprisingly large.”110  
Utilizing the same Lexis/Nexis search (Table 5) conducted for public opinion beliefs (BP) 
in the previous section reveals a majority of articles during the time from embassy 
bombings to U.S. response were written about the Clinton scandal.  Clinton was aware of 
the media’s heightened awareness and ironically the fact that he was so much in the 
spotlight for the scandal may have clouded his beliefs of what the pubic thought.  As a 
result, Clinton’s beliefs of the situation and public opinion and his role as delegate would 
have created a more constraining effect on his decision-making abilities. 
DE 
Clinton perception of public attention to personal issues = more constraining 
Clinton need to maintain sound U.S. economic environment = more constraining 
DE = more + more 
DE = more constraining 
 
BE 
 Clinton’s beliefs garnered from Somalia = more constraining 
 Clinton’s beliefs of the importance the scandal played = more constraining 
 Clinton as Delegate of the people = more constraining 
 BE = more + more + more 
 BE = more constraining 
 
 Overall 
 DEBE = more constraining 
 
D.   CLINTON ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE TO PUBLIC OPINION 
 
  Reviewing the summary data from both public and presidential beliefs (Section B 
and C) will reveal the need the administration felt to provide a response to public opinion, 
if any.  Generally, if public opinion is viewed as constraining, there will arise a need, by 
the executive, to somehow influence or attempt to influence the public.  The end goal of 
this influence would be to reduce the constraining or unsupportive effect of the public.  
The results of the previous sections show: 
 
                                                 
110 Jill Abramson, “The Nation: When Too Much Isn't Enough; All Monica, All the Time: A Viewers' 
Guide,” The New York Times, 9 August 1998, Section 4; Page 1; Column 1. 
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  Public       Executive 
DP = less constraining effect    DE =  more constraining 
BP = less constraining effect    BE = more constraining 
 
 DPBP = less constraining    DEBE = more constraining 
 
     Overall 
    DPBP = less constraining 
    DEBE = more constraining 
 
Reviewing the data from previous sections, the public does not appear to have been a 
significant constraining factor in a direct fashion.  The economy was sound and 
domestically the areas that the public “hired” Clinton to clean up and fix were doing well.  
The public, while subjected to large amounts of coverage of Clinton’s indiscretion, had 
placed a separation between his public and private life and continued to poll favorably for 
the job he was doing while in office.  The one facet of the public that may have been a 
constraining factor was the public’s desire to use force only when necessary (opposite of 
Somalia), but this more constraining contextual area is neutralized by the view of the 
public that the embassy bombings were a threat to the United States and it was in the best 
interest of the United States to strike back at the perpetrators of the bombings.  Overall, 
the public did not act to constrain Clinton and as a result one would not expect the 
administration to expend a lot of resources educating the public in an effort to minimize 
their already tacit supportive position. 
The interesting aspect of this incident really lies in the inference to be made of 
Clinton’s own assessment of the public and the belief/decisional context he found himself 
in during the time of the bombings.  While the public separated the job he was doing for 
the country and the scandal, Clinton may have believed the opposite.  His role as public 
delegate and the lessons he learned from previous engagements of U.S. foreign policy 
compounded the issue.  Clinton saw the need to garner public support for issues, both in 
formulation of ideas/policy and implementation.  George Edwards adds, “Obtaining 
public support, then, was inevitably going to be a constant preoccupation of the Clinton 
administration.”111  Clinton’s need to maintain a sound economy especially during a time 
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of personal turmoil, where media coverage pervaded the airways and newspapers, 
skewed his perception of the importance the public placed on the scandal.  This created a 
more constraining atmosphere for Clinton, where he felt he needed to earn the people’s 
trust back.   
What I can do is to do my job for the American people.  I trust the 
American people.  They almost always get it right and have for 220 years.  
And I’m working in a way that I hope will restore their trust in me by 
working for the things that our country needs.112 
In essence, Clinton felt he was beholden to the people of the United States for his job and 
his actions needed to be consistent with what the American people wanted in order to 
keep his position.  Clinton’s remarks to reporters reinforce this concept, “What happens 
to me I think ultimately will be for the American people to decide.”113  In the end, it 
wasn’t the overt actions of the public that constrained Clinton, but his beliefs and 
decision context. 
   
1.   What Did the Administration Do to Affect or Change Public Opinion, 
if Needed? 
 
  From my research into the embassy bombings and subsequent U.S. response, the 
Clinton administration did nothing to change the opinion of the public in order to enact 
its policy decision.  This was a result of the various issues addressed above.  First, the 
public’s belief and decisional context lent itself to a less constraining atmosphere for the 
Clinton administration.   Generally, the administration would need to change or educate 
the public when the constraining effect of the public was greater.  This wasn’t the case. 
Next, the one area that proved more constraining for the public, lessons from previous 
interventions was negated by the public’s belief that the embassy bombings posed a 
threat such that the subsequent U.S. response was in the best interest of the United States.  
Finally, Clinton’s own issues seem to have overwhelmed the public’s less constraining 
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effects and any need to enact change would come from his own beliefs and decision 
context. 
  The public opinion constraint perceived by the Clinton administration was greater 
and commanded more attention by Clinton.  In this situation, I would expect the 
administration to implement programs or decisions to reverse the perceived constraining 
effect of the public.  For the Clinton administration, education of the public through 
communication was the program of choice.  Clinton learned in his first year as president 
the importance of communication.  “What I’ve got to do is to spend more time 
communicating with the American people about what we’ve done and where we’re 
going.”114  For foreign policy, Clinton commented that one of his major changes in 
handling foreign policy was in explaining it to the public.115  In a discussion with 
reporters in April 1998, Clinton reaffirmed the need to educate the public to make 
changes and spur action, “So we have to-we really need to continue this effort we’re 
making this calendar year to educate the public and to get the ideas out there … and then 
I think what you’ll see-is very a rapid action early next year.”116  
 As I look at the time from initial incident to U.S. response, it is interesting to note 
that although the public’s constraining effect was small and any response would be made 
through Clinton’s own perception of the need for communication, Clinton spoke to the 
American people only twice from 7 – 19 August 1998.  Both times the medium was a 
Radio Address to the Nation.  As shown previously, the standard for incidents and 
responses like this was through news conferences (Table 9) where the president could 
personally communicate directly to the people.  Whether or not scripted communication 
via radio twice over a period of 12 days constitutes sufficient education or perceived 
education of the public by the Clinton administration is not known.  My own conclusion 
is the Clinton administration did not feel a need to educate the public to create the final 
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policy solution.  The public’s already less constraining attitude provided the 
administration the necessary room to pursue the policy of choice it felt most desirable.   
 Clinton’s use of radio versus news conference is reflective of his beliefs and the 
decision context in which he found himself.  While he did communicate to the public in 
the intervening period, he did not use the traditional means or the frequency that I would 
have expected that was justified by his own perception of the public.  He may have 
ultimately been hampered by his own personal issues.  Use of force in response to the 
embassy bombings would be a result of the less constraining public outlook and the 
administration’s perception of the public. 
 
E.  POLICY RESPONSE TOWARDS EMBASSY BOMBINGS 
 
 In response to the embassy bombings in Africa, the United States on 20 August 
1998 launched a series of tomahawk cruise missiles at locations in Afghanistan and 
Sudan.117  “U.S. officials say the six sites attacked in Afghanistan were part of a network 
of terrorist compounds near the Pakistani border that housed supporters of Saudi 
millionaire Osama bin Laden.  In the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, the El Shifa 
Pharmaceutical Industries factory—which U.S. officials say was housing chemical 
weapons—was also attacked.”118 
                                                 
117 Although this thesis will review the military options, the Clinton administration also implemented 
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Figure 4. Clinton’s Response Pictorial119 
 
Justification made by Clinton during his “Address to the Nation on Military Action 
against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan” on 20 August 1998, included the 
following.  On Afghanistan, Clinton said, 
Our forces targeted one of the most active terrorist bases in the world.  It 
contained key elements of the bin Laden network’s infrastructure and has 
served as a training camp for literally thousands of terrorists from around 
the globe.  We have reason to believe that a gathering of key terrorist 
leaders was to take place there today, thus underscoring the urgency of our 
actions.120 
On the Sudan site, Clinton said, “Our forces also attacked a factory in Sudan associated 
with the bin Laden network.  The factory was involved in the production of materials for 
chemical weapons.”121A counter action in response to the attacks on U.S. sovereignty is 
understandable and expected.  The question of effectiveness is important to determine if 
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the response was correct and, if not, what limited its effectiveness.  This review should 
provide insights into any potential constraining influences on the final policy outcome.   
 
1.   Was the Policy Response Effective? 
  
 According to polls taken after the U.S. cruise missile response, the public was 
satisfied with the results and policy decision of the president. Most polls show at least 
70% of the public approve these military strikes.  
Los Angeles Times (8/22): Generally speaking, do you approve or 
disapprove of the decision to launch missile strikes against terrorist camps 
in Sudan and Afghanistan? 
 
Approve - 75% (54% “strongly”)  
Disapprove - 16% (5% “strongly”)  
Don’t know - 9%  
 
Newsweek/PSR (8/20-21): Do you support or oppose the military action 
the U.S. has taken against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan? 
 
Support - 73%  
Oppose - 12%  
Don’t know - 15% 
  
CBS News/NY Times (8/20): Do you approve or disapprove of the United 
States taking this military action (retaliating for the U.S. Embassy 
bombing in Africa by striking at terrorist facilities in Afghanistan/Sudan)? 
 
Approve - 70%  
Disapprove - 16%  
Don’t know - 14%  
 
Gallup/USA Today-CNN (8/20): As you may know, earlier today the 
United States launched military attacks against terrorist facilities in the 
countries of Afghanistan and Sudan. Do you approve or disapprove of 
those attacks? 
 
Approve - 66%  
Disapprove - 19%  
No opinion - 15%122 
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With public acceptance of the strikes, a review of their effectiveness is needed.   
Although initial battle assessments of the strikes showed that they had hit and 
destroyed their targets, the actual battle assessments of the damage and influence on their 
intended targets would be questioned in the days and weeks to come.  As discussed 
earlier, Clinton had made the determination on 20 August that enough information had 
been obtained to link the bombings in Africa to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda.  As a 
result, he ordered the attack with the stated purpose of destroying terrorist leaders, their 
camps, and a chemical weapons facility.  Eventually it would be learned that “neither Bin 
Ladin nor any other terrorist leaders were killed,” and “the decision to destroy the plant in 
Sudan became controversial. Some at the time argued that the decisions were influenced 
by domestic political considerations, given the controversies raging at that time.”123  The 
physical targets were destroyed, but no terrorist leaders were killed and future evidence 
would call into question the validity of the claim that the factory in Sudan had a role in 
chemical weapons.  In addition, bin Laden, the principal target and leader of the 
organization the United States was attempting to hurt learned a lesson from the U.S. 
response.  
In view of these failures of the U.S. use of force, the question evolves to one of 
how the specific policy option of cruise missiles was chosen over that of other options 
and was Clinton influenced to choose the missile option by any of the beliefs and 
decisional context at the time.  Finding an answer to this question has proven difficult.  
An answer can be inferred from Clinton’s past experiences with use of force where he 
learned the public’s uneasiness for using military members and the backlash for 
casualties (Somalia).  He also had a track record for using cruise missiles, launching them 
on no less than seven occasions including the strikes discussed here (864 missiles against 
Iraq, Serbia, Afghanistan, and the Sudan).  His heavy use of this tactic earned him the 
“aptly dubbed, ‘Cruise Missile President’ by the western media.”124  The choice of cruise 
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missiles over U.S. troops or CIA agents may have been influenced by the situational 
context and beliefs of the time.  Bob Woodward summarizes Clinton’s foreign policy 
approach in times of action, “the natural pattern [during the eight years of Clinton] when 
challenged or attacked had been a ‘reflexive pullback’—caution, safety plays, even 
squeamishness.  The Clinton weapon of choice was the standoff cruise missile.”125   The 
scandal exacerbated this stance.  Clinton may not have wanted a more hands-on and 
potentially human resource costly operation during his scandal, and would not want to 
jeopardize the public’s support for his domestic policies.  As a delegate, he would have 
wanted to ensure he maintained the support of the public even though the constraint from 
the public on his policy choice was limited.  
The direct public constraining effect on Clinton during the time of the bombings 
and subsequent U.S. strike was minimal.  Clinton, as a delegate of the people, was 
constrained by his perception of the public’s beliefs and his own belief and decisional 
context.  The combination of the scandal, his perceived notion of the importance it played 
in the eyes of the public, and his role as delegate influenced his final policy decision to 
use cruise missiles to limit the casualties and fallout from the public.  The perceived 
constraining effects of the public ultimately limited the executive’s decision-making 
ability.   The deterrent nature of this phenomenon will be again illustrated in the next 
chapter. 
                                                 
125 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 20. 
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III.   PRESIDENT BUSH’S RESPONSE TO THE 11 SEPTEMBER 
2001 TERRORIST ATTACKS 
They had declared war on us, and I had made up my mind at that moment 
that we were going to war. 
-- Thoughts from President Bush upon Notification of Attacks126 
 
President Clinton was never directly affected by the constraining influence of the 
public.  His personal perceptions of the public and his delegate view of his role as 
executive combined to influence the foreign policy decisions he made in regards to the 
embassy bombings in Africa.  This chapter will review the actions of another president 
during a time of conflict.  Similar to Clinton, President Bush will be affected by decision 
context and indirectly affected by the perceptions of public opinion during a time of 
crisis.  Interestingly, unlike Clinton those perceptions will not be the president’s, but 
those of Bush’s advisers.  Public opinion perception by executive decision-makers and 
decision context will ultimately constrain the foreign policy choices of the president. 
 
A.   INCIDENT EXPLANATION 
 
 In November 2000, President Bush was elected to office amidst a presidential 
election controversy.  The Bush administration had lost the popular election to Vice 
President Al Gore 50,456,002 to 50,999,897 votes but had won the deciding electoral 
vote 271 to 266.  This slim margin, the narrowest in U.S. history,127 ushered in the 
Republican Party and a president whose public focus may not have been as keen as 
Clinton’s. 
                                                 
126 Woodward, 15. 
127 Information concerning votes and electoral college results obtained through, Federal Election 
Commission, "2000 Official Presidential General Election Results," 
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm (accessed 3 August 2006), of the 54 presidential 
elections, including 2000, the Bush/Gore election was the closest both in popular and electoral. 
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 Running on a campaign which promised to provide better education, universal tax 
breaks and being “not Bill Clinton,”128 the Bush administration enjoyed a strong 
confidence rating from the public during its first 100 days.  As Andrew Kohut of the Pew 
Research Center for the People and the Press points out, “He is doing very well with the 
public … the average [of the polls] is about 60 percent saying they approve of him [with 
27% disapproval] -- and that’s pretty good in absolute terms—very comparable to what 
his father got 12 years ago, to what President Clinton got eight years ago. In fact it’s 
better than President Clinton got eight years ago because the disapproval ratings are 
lower.”129  Bush was seen as an honest and low-maintenance leader who didn’t come 
with baggage already in place.  The public looked to him to clean up the White House 
and make it respectable again after the controversy and scandal that tainted the previous 
eight years of the Clinton administration.130 
 Analyzing the 77 polls measuring the public perception of Bush’s performance 
through 10 September 2001, the administration enjoyed a steady 55% or better approval 
rating.131 His efforts both domestically with education, social security/Medicare and tax 
reform and internationally where he “spurned the international effort to reduce global 
warming, called off talks with North Korea about its missiles, bombed Iraq, expelled 50 
Russian spies”132 and managed a potential disaster when a U.S. spy plane was forced 
down in China positively affected his presidency and provided room for Bush to 
maneuver politically.  Like Clinton, who rode on a wave of confidence and approval for 
his efforts domestically prior to the embassy bombings, Bush’s actions, discipline, and 
behavior helped foster a positive atmosphere within the country.  This positive 
                                                 
128 PBS.com, “A News Hour with Jim Lehrer,” 27 April 2001, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/shields&gigot/april01/sg_4-27.html (accessed 3 August 2006). 
129 PBS.com, “A News Hour with Jim Lehrer,” 27 April 2001, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/shields&gigot/april01/sg_4-27.html (accessed 3 August 2006). 
130 PBS.com, “A News Hour with Jim Lehrer,” 27 April 2001, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/shields&gigot/april01/sg_4-27.html (accessed 3 August 2006). 
131 Pollingreport.com, “President Bush: Job Ratings,” http://www.pollingreport.com/BushJob1.htm 
(accessed 3 August 2006). 
132 “Bush: The first 100 days,” 30 April 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1302232.stm (accessed on 2 August 2006) 
 59 
atmosphere created an equally favorable context from which Bush was able to make 
decisions.   
On 11 September 2001, “an airliner traveling at hundreds of miles per hour and 
carrying some 10,000 gallons of jet fuel crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade 
Center in Lower Manhattan and a second airliner into the South Tower.  Both towers 
collapsed less than 90 minutes later.  That same morning, a third airliner slammed into 
the western face of the Pentagon while a fourth airliner crashed in a field in southern 
Pennsylvania. It had been aimed at the United States Capitol or the White House, and 
was forced down by heroic passengers armed with the knowledge that America was 
under attack.”133  These terrorist attacks left “more than 2,600 people dead at the World 
Trade Center, 125 at the Pentagon, and 256 on the four planes. The death toll surpassed 
that at Pearl Harbor in December 1941.”134  This single act by a terrorist group marked 
the biggest one day loss of American life in U.S. history.   
Following the attack, it was learned that operatives from al Qaeda, the same 
terrorist organization who attacked the American embassies in Africa in 1998, were 
responsible.  Their current base of operations was Afghanistan, a country controlled by 
the Taliban.  While the Taliban did not financially support al Qaeda, the state did provide 
room for the terrorist organization to exist, train, and flourish.    
The Bush administration, floating on acceptable public ratings and focused 
domestically and only marginally internationally, now had to react.  Policy prior to 9/11 
was focused on issues other than protection from non-state terrorists.  As the 9/11 
Commission Report reemphasized, “Terrorism was not the overriding national security 
concern for the U.S. government under either the Clinton or the pre-9/11 Bush 
administration. The policy challenges were linked to this failure of imagination. Officials 
in both the Clinton and Bush administrations regarded a full U.S. invasion of Afghanistan 
as practically inconceivable before 9/11.”135 Faced with no direct foreign policy to 
implement immediately following the hostile act on U.S. territory, questions soon arose. 
                                                 
133 U.S. Government Printing Office, “9-11 Commission Report:  Executive Summary,” 9-10, 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/execsummary.pdf (accessed 4 August 2006). 
134 9-11 Report, 10. 
135 9-11 Report, 18. 
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How would the new president react?  What policy options would President Bush focus on 
and how would he use U.S. force against terrorism? 
 
1.   Intervening Period between Attacks and U.S. Response                      
(11 September – 7 October 2001) 
 
As the World Trade Center Towers were struck, Bush was “reading to second 
graders at the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida.”136  Anthony 
Card, Bush’s chief of staff, was the first to pass along the news of the terrorist attacks.  
As the words were related to Bush, his first thoughts were, “They had declared war on us, 
and I had made up my mind at that moment that we were going to war.”137  These 
thoughts provide insight into the executive’s belief system and possible role he would 
play in his administration and the intervening period from 9/11 until the U.S. response.   
Unlike Clinton or his administration, which conducted immediate polls to 
ascertain public opinion, Bush, without concern for public opinion at the outset of his 
policy decision, had determined the course of action he wanted to take in response to this 
crisis.   He had defined the policy option, war, he wanted to pursue and made a firm 
decision as to the broad implication of such a policy.  According to Foyle, Bush would be 
preliminarily classified as a “Guardian,” because public opinion plays little to no role in 
the formulation or implementation of policy.  The executive does what he thinks is 
correct.  
  
  Is public support of a foreign policy 
necessary? 
  YES NO 
YES Delegate Executor Is it desirable for 
input from public 
opinion to affect 
foreign policy 
choices? 
NO Pragmatist Guardian 
 
Table 11. Preliminary Representation of Bush’s Public Opinion Belief Structure 
                                                 
136 Woodward, 15. 
137 Woodward, 15. 
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Reinforcing this conclusion, Bush defined his role as president as “the calcium in 
the backbone … if I weaken, the whole team weakens.” The president saw himself “as an 
agent for change—that he must state a new strategic direction or policy with bold, clear 
moves.  And because it would be a policy of the United States, the only superpower, the 
rest of world would have to move over, would adjust over time.”138  The emphasis on 
bypassing public opinion, self determining what he felt was the correct course of action, 
and implementing change that others would eventually accept provides an initial 
interpretation of Bush’s belief system.  His beliefs would be facilitated by the confidence 
and expectations the public showed both pre and post 9/11 
With a pre-attack job approval rating of 55%, Bush already had room to maneuver 
and make changes to policy.  After the attacks, according to CNN and USA Today Poll 
data from 11 and 14-15 September 2001, the country was even more positive about the 
president and his ability to handle the situation: 
How confident are you in President Bush’s ability to handle this 
situation—are you very confident, somewhat confident, not very 
confident, or not confident at all?139 
 
 Total N: 629      %     N      
Very confident     44.59   280  
Somewhat confident     33.15   208  
Not very confident     11.06   70  
Not confident at all     7.51   47  
Don’t Know/Refused     3.68   23  
 
Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his 
job as president?140 
 
 Total N: 1032      %     N       
 Approve      85.97   888  
 Disapprove      9.65   100  
 Don’t Know/Refused    4.38   45 
                                                 
138 Woodward, 259, 281. 
139 Gallup Brain, “New York City and Washington D.C. Terrorist Poll,” The Gallup Organization, 11 
September 2001, http://brain.gallup.com/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=P0109034 (accessed 3 
August 2006). 
140 Gallup Brain, “Terrorism Reaction Poll #2,” The Gallup Organization, 14-15 September 2001, 
http://brain.gallup.com/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=P0109035 (accessed 3 August 2006). 
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The executive’s approval rating remained in the 86-90% range through crisis response on 
7 October 2001.141  As discussed in the introduction of this thesis, the 30% boost in  
approval rating of the president or “rally around the flag” is common during times of 
conflict and provides the executive the environment to implement policy without fear of 
initial blowback from the public.   
Equally significant to the decisional context and belief system of the executive are 
the expectations of the public of the president in this situation.  While visiting the ruins of 
the Twin Towers, Bush was overwhelmed by support from the populace.  Statements 
shouted by the people such as “Whatever it takes” and “Don’t let me down!”142 added to 
the already large space Bush was allowed to maneuver.  Expectations were high and the 
situational context provided leeway to the extreme end of the use of force spectrum.  
Bush perceived that the people wanted action, hostile action, against the terrorists and 
those that harbored them.  “I had a responsibility to show resolve.  I had to show the 
American people the resolve of a commander in chief that was going to do whatever it 
took to win.  No yielding.  No equivocation. No, you know, lawyering this thing to 
death…”143 
While the elevated approval rating does initially provide the executive room to 
maneuver, the effect is finite.  It is for this reason that Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of 
Defense, wanted to press with the counterattack on al Qaeda’s forces.  During a war 
cabinet meeting for the initial run-up to the U.S. reaction, Rumsfeld noted, “The sooner 
they acted the more public support they would have if there’s collateral damage.”144  
Public opinion, through Rumsfeld’s words, is shown to have an impact on support for 
policy.  These words provide the first insight into the true importance of public opinion 
for the Bush administration.  While Bush may initially be categorized as a Guardian 
                                                 
141 A review of the four polls listed in the Gallup Brain, from the period 11 September – 7 October 
2001 show approval ratings of 86%, 90%, N/A, 87% respectively, 
http://institution.gallup.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/documents/decadebreakout.aspx (accessed 3 August 
2006). 
142 Woodward, 69-70. 
143 Woodward, 96. 
144 Woodward, 32. 
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through his immediate response to the attacks, the effect that public opinion had on other 
cabinet members may have conversely affected Bush and the policy choices for use of 
force the executive implemented against al Qaeda and their hosts from Afghanistan, the 
Taliban.   The interpretation of Bush as a Guardian may be premature. 
 
2.   U.S. Response 
 
For 25 days, from the initial statement that the country would go to war in 
response to the terrorist act, Bush and his war-making cabinet struggled with the proper 
U.S. response because there was no “off-the-shelf military operations plan.”145  JCS 
Chair General Shelton provided three options: 
1. Strike targets with cruise missiles 
2. Strike targets with cruise missiles and manned bombers 
3. Strike targets with cruise missiles, bombers and on the ground forces.146 
Fearing that the administration would be looked upon by the public as “Clintonesque”147 
and showing “palpable disgust at the mere mention of cruise missiles only,”148 Bush and 
his war making cabinet debated the merits of each option and ultimately chose the third.   
Bush told his NSC staff on 17 September 2001, “We’ll attack with missiles, bombers, 
and boots on the ground.  Let’s hit them hard.  We want to signal this is a change from 
the past.  We want to cause other countries like Syria and Iran to change their views.  We 
want to hit them as soon as possible.”149  
With covert CIA operatives already within Afghanistan rallying the Northern 
Alliance, Bush and his NSC staff began the extended process of establishing basing rights 
in the surrounding countries to initiate operations and combat search and rescue (CSAR).  
Despite numerous operational problems establishing CSAR, which delayed operations for 
                                                 
145 Woodward, 80. 
146 Woodward, 79-80. 
147 Woodward, 174. 
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almost two weeks, on 7 October 2001,150 air and ground forces began the campaign 
which ultimately splintered al-Qaeda and dispersed the Taliban.  
As the airliners and terrorists struck their targets, Bush developed a specific 
policy option without the input of public opinion.  War, the use of force policy 
established by Bush at the outset of the incident, came to fruition, but why?  Was it 
because Bush pushed through this option because it was the right thing to do, regardless 
of what the public thought or is there evidence that public opinion provided the support 
for the executive to make and win his air and ground force decision?   
Early in this chapter, Bush was tentatively categorized as a “Guardian,” as defined 
by Foyle.  Is this initial assessment valid?  Before this assertion can be formally made, 
some additional concepts need to be explored:  1. what role did the public play in Bush’s 
decision to use option three; 2. did decisional context and public opinion create an open 
environment from which Bush was allowed to maneuver and select the options he felt 
most needed; 3. what constraining factors, if any, were presented by public opinion which 
may have affected the policy of force that was chosen; and 4. despite an outward 
appearance of being the “toxic Texan,”151 a guardian who makes decision based on what 
he feels is right despite what others think, how did public opinion play into his chosen 
policy with al Qaeda and the Taliban of Afghanistan? 
 
B.   PUBLIC OPINION TOWARDS TERRORIST ATTACKS 
 
 Unlike the Clinton years where public opinion regarding the embassy bombings 
was sparse, public opinion before and after September 11th is well documented in news 
releases and poll statistics.  From general polls regarding the public’s view on the 
economy, how President Bush was performing both domestically and internationally, and 
who was more liked, former President Clinton, Hillary Clinton, or President Bush, poll 
results cover the gamut and provide a comprehensive understanding of the very accepting 
and open decisional context and beliefs of the public at the time of 9/11.   
                                                 
150 Discussion of CSAR and its limiting factors starting the campaign in Afghanistan was a constant 
topic during Woodward’s book pages 119-195. 
151 Woodward, 44. 
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1.   Decision Context 
 
The decision context (DP) of the public after 9/11 was extremely compliant and 
accepting of the president’s actions and initiatives.  Several key areas affecting the 
public’s environment stand-out: most notably, the new president honeymoon period, 
economic conditions of the country, and the shock and severity of the attack.    
The presidential honeymoon period is “distinguished by high approval, low 
disapproval, and a relatively high no opinion register among those awaiting some 
evidence of presidential performance.”152  While most research into the honeymoon 
period centers on its effect on subsequent elections and the news media’s leniency on the 
president, a more detailed review of prior administrations offers a glimpse into its impact 
on decisional context in relation to the public.   
Looking back through public polls from the 1945 election of President Truman to 
the present, each new executive enjoyed an initial period of favorable public opinion.   
From President Ford and Clinton, who had the smallest grace period, 4 months, due to a 
very poor economy and rising inflation on the previous and public backlash for Somalia 
on the latter to Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy who enjoyed public approval ratings 
above 50% for much of their tenure, every president begins his first few months with a 










                                                 
152 Russell D. Renka, “Bill Clinton's Unfulfilled Potential,” Southeast Missouri State University, 1 
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Executive Year Sworn Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul 
GW Bush 2001 58 58 62 53 55 57 
Clinton  1993 59 53 54 45 39 42 
GHW Bush  1989 61 56 55 58 69 66 
Reagan 1981 55 67 67 68 59 60 
Carter  1977 71 70 63 66 63 62 
Ford*  1974 70 66 52 47 42 37 
Nixon  1969 59 60 65 60 62 63 
Johnson  1963 73 77 74 77 75 75 
Kennedy 1961 72 73 78 77 74 75 
Eisenhower 1953 68 66 73 73 67 68 
Truman 1945 52 No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data 
* Ford months are September, October, November, December, January, February 
Table 12. Question - Do you approve or disapprove of the way XX is handling 
his job as president? (% Approve) 153 
 
What’s more interesting and illustrative of the honeymoon period are elections where 
presidential party changes occur when the incumbent president has ending public 
approval ratings below 50%.  Reviewing all elections from Truman through George W. 
Bush, this situation occurred 5 times.   
 




Initial Public Approval %
Lyndon Johnson (D) 44% Richard Nixon (R) 59% 
*Richard Nixon (R) 24% Gerald Ford (R) 70% 
Gerald Ford (R) 37% Jimmy Carter (D) 71% 
Jimmy Carter (D) 31% Ronald Regan (R) 55% 
George H. W. Bush (R) 49% Bill Clinton (D) 51% 
*This was Republican to Republican, but the effect is still the same 
 
Table 13. Public Approval Rating Reversals154 
 
                                                 
153 Methodology:  A review of all initial monthly polls (some months have multiple polls) from the 
month after executive is sworn in until the December prior January change over reveals public approval, 
Gallup Brain, The Gallup Organization, http://brain.gallup.com/ (accessed 5 August 2006). 
154 Methodology: Review the final December poll figures for the incumbent (in some cases the month 
is different due to impeachment-Nixon left office in Jul, Ford took office in August) and the initial 
February poll figures for the newly elected executive, the honeymoon period is clearly demonstrated. 
Gallup Brain, The Gallup Organization, http://brain.gallup.com/ (accessed 5 August 2006). 
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The new president is given the benefit of the doubt or a clean slate and allowed to prove 
or in some cases fail in the job.  As time goes by, the public, educated to his true 
performance, will reflect their disapproval or approval in the public opinion polls.  
President Bush’s initial eight months prior to 9/11 are no different.  Although 
Clinton ended his tenure with a high job approval of 59%, the scandals that rocked his 
presidency created an atmosphere similar to the relief the public felt when a low approval 
president ended his tenure.  Some 56% of survey respondents reported that they were 
glad the Clinton was out of the White House due to the improprieties and reduced image 
that he had brought to the office; in contrast, Bush was expected to lead with dignity and 
bring the presidency back to professionalism.155  Statistics provided by a joint CNN/USA 
Today poll in August 2001 show a 55% job approval rating with 35% disapproving of the 
job the president was doing.  Equally telling is the fact that 55% of those polled felt that 
the first six months of the president’s tenure were a success, with 32% citing it as a 
failure.156  As a result of the honeymoon period, the decision context among the public 
was positive for Bush regardless of the economic challenges the country was enduring. 
Domestically, according to respondents of the CNN/USA Today Poll, the United 
States economy was turning slightly, and fears of a recession were apparent within the 
population as early as February 2001.157  When asked by Gallup to identify the most 
important problem facing the country at the time, the economy ranked number one out of 
62 possible choices.  Interestingly, national security ranked 29th and terrorism wasn’t 
even listed.158  The economic welfare of the public was first on the minds of the people.  
                                                 
155 Gallup Brain, “February Wave 1,” The Gallup Organization, Question 30,  9-11 February 2001, 
http://institution.gallup.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=P0102005 
(accessed 6 August 2006). 
156 Gallup Brain, “August Wave 1,” The Gallup Organization, Questions 1 and 10, 3-5 August 2001, 
http://institution.gallup.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=P0108027 
(accessed 5 August 2006). 
157 Gallup Brain, “February Wave 1,” The Gallup Organization,  9-11 February 2001, 
http://institution.gallup.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=P0102005 
(accessed 6 August 2006). 
158 Gallup Brain, “Gallup Poll Social Series - Values and Beliefs,” The Gallup Organization, Question 
4, 10-14 May 2001, 
http://institution.gallup.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=P0105017 
(accessed 7 August 2006). 
 68 
Of those polled in the 16-19 August 2001 Gallup Poll,159 the general feeling was that the 
economic conditions in the United States were worse today but would be better off in a 
year (66%=better off, 31%=worse off/same).   When asked about current conditions, the 
public’s outlook soured: 
How would you rate economic conditions in this country today—as 
excellent, good, only fair, or poor? 
%     N    
Excellent       2.40   24  
Good        34.36   348  
Only fair       49.19   498  
Poor        13.62   138  
 
Right now, do you think that economic conditions in the country as a 
whole are getting better or getting worse? 
 %     N    
Getting better       26.89   272  
Getting worse       59.43   602  
Same (vol.)       10.66   108  
 
Arguably, the decision context of the public should have been negatively tainted by the 
poor economic outlook of the public.  Ironically, Bush’s approval ratings remained above 
50%.  Why?  The key to this question is to understand that the signals for recession 
started back in October 1999 when the rate of growth of the gross domestic product 
(GDP) of the United States fell from eight to two percent.  The GDP rebounded in 
January 2000 but continued to fall every quarter thereafter.160  The executive, through 
programs such as the universal tax relief and concentration on Medicare and social 
security, provided the public advance notice of his intentions and understanding of the 
state of the U.S. economy.  His get-well plan was created to head off public opinion and 
concern over the economy.  Realizing that the recession started over a year before Bush 
came to office and feeling only a slight tightening of the belt, the public didn’t tie Bush to 
the problem.  Additionally, the public optimistically felt the economy and their personal 
                                                 
159 Gallup Brain, “Gallup Poll Social Series - Work and Education,” The Gallup Organization, 
Questions 4, 5, 6, and 8, 16-19 August 2001, 
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situation would be better off in one year.  With 62% of the population optimistic on the 
economy,161 the potential constraining effect of the economy was softened.  The 
combination of Bush inheriting the economic condition and voicing proactive programs 
to curb the issue helped maintain a favorable and optimistic decision context from which 
to make policy.  This positive environment would be augmented with the attack of 9/11.  
 The 9/11 attacks were devastating for the United States and its citizens. Often 
referred to as the worst attack on U.S. soil since Pearl Harbor, the attack generated an 
enormous groundswell of nationalism.   
Wal-Mart reported that sales of American flags increased by more than 
tenfold. College football teams made plans to decorate their helmets with 
American flag decals. At least some military recruiting stations were 
experiencing what one officer described as a “patriotic swell” of potential 
enlistees. And long lines formed at blood banks from New York to 
Bakersfield, a response that prompted the American Red Cross to ask 
would-be donors to hold off for now.162 
The public’s emotions provided the Bush administration the mandate and policy 
decision-making room to make foreign policy decisions.  Douglas Foyle explained the 
true impact of the attacks when he wrote, “September 11 appears to have had the largest 
influence on public attitudes.”163   The fervor encompassed every facet of American 
society.  In various media polls, “respondents expressed by whopping margins their 
support for a military response.  In Fulton, Mo., vengeance was a common theme in 
conversations: ‘Most everybody is willing to put a bullet in someone’s head once they 
find the person who did it.’”164  The public went so far as to advocate aggressively 
pursuing devastating action against the entire country that may have sponsored the 
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terrorists.  In Atlanta one grandmother’s sentiment was shared by others, “I’m hoping we 
wipe these people out, and if we need to, wipe out the country that is hosting [them]. Just 
get rid of them all ... If we make a statement and bomb that country to smithereens, it 
might scare a lot of the other terrorists off.”165   
 Public opinion polls immediately following the attacks mirrored the statements 
from the general public and reinforced the open decision context.  When asked in the 14-
15 September 2001 CNN/USA Today Poll, 73% of the public stated the United States 
was at war, and 88% said the United States should take military action in retaliation to 
the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.  However, 73% responded with 
caution to how the United States should respond, stating the U.S. should take military 
action only against terrorist organizations responsible for the attacks, even if it takes 
months to clearly identify them.166 Additionally, the often constraining aspect of civilian 
and military deaths and duration of the conflict was mitigated in the public’s willingness 
to accept thousands of U.S. casualties in a long war. 
Question 22 Long  Short  Don’t Know
Do you think the war will long or short? 92% 6% 2% 
Question 23 Difficult Easy Don’t Know
Do you think the war against terrorism will be a 
difficult one, or a comparatively easy one? 94% 5% 1% 
Question 25 Support Oppose Don’t Know
Would you support or oppose the U.S. continuing 
a campaign against terrorism if you knew that 
5,000 U.S. troops would be killed? 
76% 16% 8% 
Question 26 Support Oppose Don’t Know
Would you support/oppose the U.S. continuing a 
campaign against terrorism if you knew that an 
additional 5,000 U.S. civilians would be killed by 
future terrorists? 
84% 12% 4% 
Table 14. Public Opinion Questions Prefacing War in Afghanistan167 
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Discussing the change in casualty constraint, Douglas Foyle writes, September 11th was a 
“’transitive moment’ which increased the public’s willingness to accept military 
casualties.”168 These results remained unchanged through the 25 days it took for the 
United States to take action against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.   
The combination of a new president dealing with weak economic conditions, 
which were inherited and addressed directly by his programs, and the devastating nature 
of the terrorist attack, created a decisional context that was very low in terms of public 
constraint.  The elevated public opinion polls, as Polsby and Mueller addressed earlier in 
the introduction concerning the rally around the flag effect, allowed the executive to draw  
the decisive decision-making capital he needed to make policy towards the incident. As 
with the decision making context, the beliefs of the public would be similarly affected by 
9/11.  
2.   Beliefs 
 
Reviewing the decisional context clearly draws light to many of the beliefs of the 
public (BP).  The mere fact that the public was willing to lose over 5,000 military or 
civilian members illustrates the severity of this attack to the public and the nation.  
Because al Qaeda attacked the United States on its soil and caused so much death and 
destruction, defeat of terrorism became a vital interest to the public.  Public approval 
polls discussed earlier and sentiments towards direct, decisive military action validate this 
notion.  Similar to the interpretation of Jentleson’s staircase (Figure 2), threats to vital 
interest and the state’s pursuit of actions securing these interests rests at the top of 
favorable public opinion and diminished constraint.  Similarly, discussing casualty 
aversion and vital interests, James Klurfeld of Newsday writes,  
 
The dilemma then was when to use military force when the nation’s vital 
interests were not at stake but there were lesser interests—humanitarian or 
economic, for instance—involved. Powell correctly understood that the 
American public was not going to accept the deaths of a large number of 
its young when the nation itself was not directly challenged. Nor should it. 
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But all that changed Sept. 11. The post-Cold War period ended that 
morning. It isn’t that Powell’s Doctrine is wrong; it is that it is irrelevant. 
There are very few who doubt that the nation’s vital interests are at stake 
in the war against terrorism. In one spasm of terrible violence, 
approximately 6,000 people were killed … Sept. 11 was an attack directly 
on the United States—on not only the nation’s economic well-being 
(which is what Saddam Hussein threatened in the Gulf), but on its very 
way of life. And just as the people understood that its vital interests were 
not at stake before (with the exception of the Gulf), they understand they 
are now. 169 
The public, recognizing the threat to the nation as a clear attack on U.S. vital interests, 
was willing to provide the support, confidence, and lives to the executive.   
Additionally, the public provided a range of targets for the executive to attack.  
Reviewing the 21-22 September CNN/USA Today Poll reveals the percentage of public 
focus on targets and goals of U.S. action:  1. Destroying terrorist targets within 
Afghanistan=91%; 2. Destroying terrorist operations outside of Afghanistan=84%; 3. 
Capturing or killing Osama bin Laden=85%; 4. Removing the Taliban government from 
power within Afghanistan=68%; and 5. Removing Saddam Hussein from power in 
Iraq=68%.170   These targets illustrate the belief structure of the public concerning 
responsible parties to the 9/11 attacks.  Upon initial review, the public’s focus on specific 
targets may be viewed as a constraining force for the executive.  Reviewing the areas 
closer reveals a very broad target set allowing attacks outside Afghanistan where 
terrorism in general is found and to a lesser degree, open belief that Iraq is an important 
target.  The administration would use this belief and initial public acceptance to pursue 
the future actions discussed in the next chapter. 
With one terrible action, al Qaeda solidified the will of the American people and 
opened the war chest of the United States.  All military options regardless of casualties or 
severity (aside from nuclear, chemical, and biological) were available.  The public 
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identified a target set and acceptance of risks associated with pursuit of those targets.  
The beliefs of the public would combine with the decision context to provide the 
executive all the room he would initially need to pursue the use of force. 
 
3.   Summation of Public Opinion 
 
 Reviewing the public’s decision context (DP) and belief system (BP), several key 
areas present themselves as important factors when summarizing the constraining effect 
of public opinion during the 9/11 crisis.  The public’s decision context and belief system 
were influenced by three variables: the honeymoon period, state of the U.S. economy, 
and the direct impact of 9/11.  First and most important was the direct impact the 
devastation of 9/11 brought to the public.  In response to the death and destruction caused 
by al Qaeda and indirectly by the Taliban, the public levied their ultimate support and 
provided an atmosphere with little foreign policy constraint on the executive.  The 
public’s view of the attack as threat to U.S. vital interests absolved any historic constraint 
due to U.S. casualties, time, and target.  Public opinion opened the door and provided an 
atmosphere of absolute acquiescence to the executive as long as force was used.   
Next, although at the time of the attacks the public acknowledged the threat of 
recession within the United States (52% responded that the United States was currently in 
a recession171), the 2001 economic condition of the country did not provide an 
atmosphere of constraint for the public.  Rather, the optimistic outlook of the public 
combined with immediate program solutions for the economy delivered by the president 
minimized the domestic issue.  Without too much personal constraint or damage, the 
public felt that its economic future was bright and thus any normal constraint born 
through domestic pressures was mitigated.   
Finally, the president, in office for only eight months of his first term, was 
provided the room to work and make his mark by the public.  Each new president, even 
for just a few months, is provided the opportunity, the benefit of the doubt, by the public 
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through strong job approval ratings to begin their tenure.  This honeymoon period 
combined with the other two variables reduced the potential constraining quality that 
public opinion would provide. 
 
P = DPBP 
DP 
Honeymoon period = less constraining effect 
Economy = less constraining effect 
9/11 impact = less constraining effect 
 
DP = less + less + less 
DP = less constraining effect 
 
 BP 
 Vital interest = less constraining effect 
 No aversion to casualties = less constraining effect 
 No aversion to conflict length = less constraining effect 
 Target Set = less constraining effect 
 
 BP = less + less + less + less 
 BP = less constraining effect 
 
 Overall 
 DPBP = less constraining 
 
In essence, the public arguably gave the president a blank check allowing the executive to 
pursue whatever means with whatever force to secure America.  In a continuum of 
constraint, the factors presented in both the decision context and belief sections 
culminated in the least constraining influence on the executive for use of force possible. 
 
C.   BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S VIEW OF PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING 
TERRORIST ATTACKS 
 
Unlike Chapter II, which utilized the actual statements and speeches of President 
Clinton in his book, My Life, and the Public Papers of the President of the United States 
(1992-2000), President George W. Bush is still in office and all notes and quotations are 
generally sequestered until the president leaves office and signs out the documents.  As a 
result, it is difficult to extract the executive’s actual thoughts and beliefs regarding the 
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public.  Reports by other members of the administration, through their own accounts or 
through works by intermediaries and trusted individuals are required to construct the 
executive’s understanding regarding the importance of public opinion.  Through direct 
quotations of the president and other war cabinet members, Bob Woodward’s 
contemporaneous notes taken during 50 National Security Council172 and other meetings 
illustrate how public opinion weighed on the executive and help fill the gap of 
information during the time between 9/11 and the U.S. response.   
From the outset of his tenure, Bush held public opinion in guarded regard.  While 
campaigning in 2000, Bush attempted to separate his decision-making from public 
opinion, remarking, “I don’t need polls to tell me how to think. If elected president, I will 
not use my office to reflect public opinion.”173  A very guardian-like statement, but was 
he true to his word or was this statement just boisterous talk of a candidate before the true 
nature of the executive’s job took hold?  As the executive’s interpretation of decision 
context and belief system is reviewed, the following questions will also be pondered:   
 
• Was public opinion important or a necessary facet for foreign policy, 
and especially use of force, for the executive? 
• If the executive acknowledged that public support is important for 
policy, would he still pursue his own agenda if he could not affect 
opinion favorably? 
• Are there circumstances so extreme that any constraining effect is 
overridden, allowing the executive free rein on policy options? 
 
1.   Decision Context 
 
The Bush administration’s decision context (DE) was influenced by several 
factors:  the public’s context, the role of his advisers, and crisis management.  The first 
                                                 
172 Woodward, xi. 
173 Frank Newport, “Public Malaise, Economy, Iraq, Impeachment, Base Closings,” Gallup’s Editor in 
Chief’s Pulse of the Nation, August 2005, http://poll.gallup.com/nationsPulse/default.aspx?a=08012005 
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facet needs little further explanation.  Simply stated, the public’s views provided a less 
constraining effect for the executive’s decision context.   
With public opinion open, the second factor, role of Bush’s advisers, appears to 
play more to the context and decision-making of the executive and requires further 
discussion.   
President Bush was elected to office with little foreign policy experience.  His 
years as the governor of Texas provided ample domestic experience, but provided little to 
augment any broader international expertise.  As Ian Urbina noted during the 2000 
campaign: 
Foreign policy is clearly Bush’s Achilles’ heel.  Unlike his father, Bush is 
a relative neophyte who lacks the experience … [quoting Reagan 
administration veteran Robert Kagan] ‘His foreign policy team will be 
critically important to determining what his policies are.  He’ll have to 
listen a lot more to his advisers for grand thinking that Reagan did.’174 
To make up for this deficiency, Bush surrounded himself with experts from both 
academia and government.  From Condoleeza Rice, Russia specialist and Stanford 
University Provost175 and Colin Powell, prior Armed Forces Chief of Staff, to Dick 
Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, who had both served in high level positions in prior 
presidential administrations, Bush supplied the foreign policy experts for what he lacked.   
While every president values expert advice to balance their own ideas and 
judgment, it is the extent to which Bush relied upon their advice that created the initial 
ripples of potential constraint.  Bush relied on this “small circle of advisers who alone are 
the people whose views he respects and trusts”176 almost exclusively.  As he stated on 
September 15th at Camp David while working through the policy options to respond to 
the 9/11 attacks, “When they give advice, I trust their judgment.”177 Ron Suskind offers 
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further insight into Bush's decision-making character and importance of this inner circle 
in his book The One Percent Doctrine.  
He's not a president who sees much value in hearing from a wide array of 
voices--he has made that clear.  His circle of truly trusted advisers is small 
… But he's a very good listener and an extremely visual listener.  He sizes 
people up swiftly and aptly, watches them carefully, and trusts his eyes.  It 
is a gift, this nonverbal acuity, that he relies on in managing the almost 
overwhelming duties of the presidency … He may not have a great deal of 
experience, especially in foreign affairs, before arriving in the job, but--
because of his trust in these interpretive abilities--he doesn’t view that as a 
deficit.178 
Bush was a president who made instinctive calls based on the advice of his select 
advisers.  His reliance on this small group affected his policy-making process.   
 The normal path of vetting policy by experts in various departments was absent 
due to Bush's reliance on a small circle of advisers.  The traditional policy process "of 
policy shops in various departments creating reports and then revising them as issues 
worked their way up from committees of assistant secretaries to deputies and finally to 
principals of the NSC--seemed to be viewed as more perilous than productive."179   As 
the circle of adviser narrowed so too did the breadth of information and advice.  Suskind 
summarizing a common complaint by Secretary of State Powell and Deputy Secretary of 
State Richard Armitage explained the detrimental nature of Bush's reliance on limited 
advisers, "the policy process was broken; that to not fix it would cause peril; that the 
president would be denied the balanced counsel he needed and deserved."180  Bush's 
reliance on his advisers to offset his foreign policy weaknesses effectively narrowed the 
policy process to include the advice and words of a few chosen individuals.  By not being 
vetted in its entirety through the experts in the committees, the policy advice presented by 
his "small circle" was potentially biased, including, ironically, by their interpretations of 
public opinion.   Although Bush denied the effects of public opinion, his advisers and the 
policy advice they supplied were affected. 
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 As Bush and his cabinet were weighing the options, he began to sense the impact 
that public opinion could have on his advisers.  One avenue of potential influence 
involved media coverage.  Addressing the “hand-wringing” attitude he saw, Bush 
proclaimed, “I don’t need the editorial pages.  I don’t—the hyperventilation that tends to 
take place over these cables, and every expert and every colonel, and all that, is just 
background noise.” He knew, however, that members of his war cabinet paid attention.  
“We’ve got these very strong people in the National Security Council who do get affected 
by what people say about them in the press.”181  Even though these comments directly 
concerned the press, they point to a possible vehicle for public opinion to influence 
policy.  They show that Bush’s advisers were concerned with the administration’s 
domestic standing.  The effect public opinion had on Bush’s advisers would play a role in 
his decisions on use of force. 
War or the use of force was the U.S. answer to the 9/11 attacks.   As the president 
and his advisers were considering the options, the public had provided only one real 
requirement: the policy option and response needed to be applied against the perpetrators 
of the crime (see section B for poll numbers).  Ironically, although the public appeared 
openly less constraining, the need to satisfy the public and the perception of the future 
constraining effects of the public and the consequences of certain policy options seemed 
to create conflicting cross currents of policy between the principals.  This ultimately 
influenced the executive’s decision-making context.  An indirect feedback loop to the 
executive through the principals’ perception of the future public constraints was created. 
The indirect influence of public opinion was first felt in administration 
discussions about whether to go after Iraq right away.  Upon guidance from the 
administration,  
… before the attacks, the Pentagon had been working for months on 
developing a military option for Iraq.  Everyone at the table believed Iraqi 
President Saddam Hussein was a menace, a leader bent on acquiring and 
perhaps using weapons of mass destruction.  Any serious, full-scale war 
against terrorism would have to make Iraq a target—eventually.  Rumsfeld 
was raising the possibility that they could take advantage of the 
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opportunity offered by the terrorist attacks to go after Saddam 
immediately.182   
As Rumsfeld sought to “get something going in another area, other than Afghanistan, so 
that success or failure and progress isn’t measured just by Afghanistan,”183 other 
principals argued to keep the target set narrow.  Acknowledging the need to take Hussein 
out at some point, Powell, Cheney, and Tenet countered to keep the strategy focused on 
Afghanistan.  “Let’s not make the target so broad that it misses the point and fails to draw 
support from normal Americans.  What Americans were feeling was that the country had 
suffered at the hands of al Qaeda.”184  
 Each side’s recommendation took into account the public’s perception and the 
potential future effects that might be experienced with the choice.  For Rumsfeld, the lack 
of actionable targets and infrastructure in Afghanistan led to the potential of a 
“quagmire,”185 something he knew the public would not accept.  Bush’s other advisers 
understood the importance of direct tie to the perpetrators of the crime, a tie that was 
supported through public polls, which advocated action only against the terrorists who 
conducted the attacks regardless of time it took to identify them. 
Which comes closer to your view:186    %     N     
The U.S. should take military action immediately 26.40   119 
against known terrorist organizations, even if it 
is unclear which terrorists are responsible for the attacks  
 
The U.S. should take military action only against 72.74   328 
terrorist organizations responsible for the attacks, 
even if it takes months to clearly identify them  
 
Don’t Know/Refused     0.86  4 
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While both Bush and Rumsfeld were focused on accomplishing the mission and 
attacking al Qaeda and the Taliban, an underlying influence to their decisional context 
was their expectations about public perceptions.  Although seemingly open and 
acquiescent, public opinion or the thought of what the public wanted would ultimately 
influence the executive and principals as they chose between tactics and targets.  As 
Powell remarked to Rumsfeld’s suggestion to target other areas (Iraq), “Any action needs 
public support.  It’s not just what the international coalition supports; it’s what the 
American people want to support.  The American people want us to do something about 
al Qaeda.”187  In the end, the United States opted for a response targeted solely against al 
Qaeda and Taliban targets.  Bush tailored his use of force policy to that desired by the 
public.   
Finally, the decision context associated with crisis management led to specific 
decisions by the executive.  Although the public acknowledged the need to ensure targets 
were accurate regardless of time frame, Bush and his principals interpreted the 
environment differently.  Again, Rumsfeld set the stage, “The sooner we act, the more 
public support we would have if there’s collateral damage.”188 The message is subtle; act 
now while the emotions still run high and the public will be more lenient in case there are 
mistakes.  Concerns of public acceptance by a principal run through the choice of when 
to act.   The need for immediate action won out. 
The principals surrounding Bush self-regulated based on their perceptions of 
future public constraints.   Public opinion, regardless of its openness, still provided a 
constraining effect to the decision context within which Bush found himself.  Rather than 
directly affecting the executive, this time it was found tangentially through the advice 
from his principals.  Although at one point Bush told his strategic advisor, Karl Rove, as 
Rove was attempting to explain to him the current polling information, “Don’t waste my 
time with it.  My job is not to worry about the political consequences, and I don’t,”189 
public opinion and the will of the populace still had a constraining impact on the 
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decisions of the executive through how it affected the advice from his principals.  The 
combination of the public’s wishes as perceived by his advisers and the need to act 
quickly in time of a crisis led to some constraining impact on the executive’s decision-
making. 
   
2.   Beliefs 
 
 Unlike Clinton, Bush’s belief system (BE) is not straight forward.  Through 
statements and documents provided to Woodward, Bush is painted as an individual who 
is solely interested in doing what he feels is right.  As he describes the war effort, his 
“attitude all along was, if we have to go it alone, we’ll go it alone …”190; it all came 
down to what was the right thing to do.  He describes himself as “not a textbook player, 
I’m a gut player,”191 a decision maker who doesn’t feel the need or the desire to answer 
to polls. Bush is a very interesting case.  On the outside it appears that his decisions, both 
pre and post policy formulation, are not swayed by the public.  This would place Bush 
within the Guardian context of Foyle’s two by two matrix (Table 1).  Looking deeper 
reveals another possibility. 
Inherent in the guardian is the desire to formulate and enact policy regardless of 
public opinion.  As demonstrated at the onset of 9/11, Bush did not require public input to 
formulate policy.   But Bush did require or at least attempt to obtain public acceptance 
prior to policy enactment.  This counters the original premise of Bush the Guardian.  
Reviewing Woodward’s text, a central theme runs through many of the conversations and 
quotations attributable to the president.   Bush felt he had to “prepare the American 
people”192 and “convince them that this war will be fought with many steps.”193  
Speaking in the Oval Office, Bush remarked,  
I knew full well that if we could rally the American people behind a long 
and difficult chore, that our job would be easier.  I remember presidents 
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trying to wage wars that were very unpopular, and the nation split … the 
job of the president is to unite the nation.  That’s the job of the president.  
And I felt like, that I had the job of making sure the American people 
understood.  They understood the severity of the attack.  But I wasn’t sure 
if they understood how long it was going to take and what a difficult 
process this would be.194   
Through continual conversations/education with the public prior to hostilities 
commencing, Bush worked through the issues to gain public acceptance of the policy to 
be used.   This facet, along with the corollary provided in the previous section on decision 
context and public opinion’s subtle effect on Bush’s principals, paint the executive as 
more of a Pragmatist than a Guardian.  His emphasis on ensuring the public understands 
the policy and the desire to unite the nation suggest a need to ensure public acceptance of 
policy to be successful. 
 
  Is public support of a foreign policy 
necessary? 
  YES NO 
YES Delegate Executor Is it desirable for 
input from public 
opinion to affect 
foreign policy 
choices? 
NO Pragmatist Guardian 
 
Table 15. Bush Public Opinion Belief Structure 
 
3.   Summation of President’s View of Public Opinion 
 
The public provided room for the Bush administration to maneuver and choose 
the most applicable policy option to address the terror attacks of 9/11.  Defined earlier, 
the less constraining aspect of the decision context and belief system of the public (DPBP) 
left the executive with the positive environment to decide which use of force option was 
most applicable.  The only requirement levied, according to Roger Ailes, former media 
guru for Bush’s father and current head of Fox News, was for a strong response against 
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the specific threat.195  This message was relayed through Karl Rove: “the American 
public would tolerate waiting and would be patient, but only as long as they were 
convinced that Bush was using the harshest measures possible.  Support would dissipate 
if the public did not see Bush acting harshly.”196 
Similar to Clinton, the direct public atmosphere played a limited role while the 
perception of the public’s possible constraining impact affected the administration’s 
foreign policy and the executive’s decision context (DE).  Unlike Clinton, where the 
Lewinsky scandal and the public’s perception impacted directly on the executive, Bush 
wasn’t the primary recipient of the constraining influence.  His principals, the experts 
with whom Bush surrounded himself to provide the foreign policy advice, were most 
directly impacted by the potential idea of public constraint and backlash against certain 
policy options.  As a result, the policies advised by the principals and ultimately set forth 
by the executive were in line with public desires.  The decision context of the executive 
amounted to a more constraining atmosphere, which ultimately affected policy. 
Equally, the beliefs of the executive (BE) in light of the public’s influence on 
policy also constrained the executive’s decision-making.  The strong desire to educate the 
populace, coupled with the need to unite the country behind policy, illustrate an executive 
who values the need to have solid public understanding for policy enactment.  This 
identifies the executive as a Pragmatist in Foyle’s presidential beliefs model.  As a 
Pragmatist, the executive is constrained by the need to ensure public acceptance and 
understanding for sound policy.  Policy in lieu of this support would lead to a divided 
country, especially in times of conflict.  Bush, as described in the preceding section, 
stated that he considered it his job to unite the country behind its actions prior to using 
force.  DE and BE combined to create a constraining effect on the decision-making ability 
of the executive.  Like Clinton, this effect was more self imposed than externally 
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DE 
Public’s context = less constraining 
Public’s perceived effect through Bush’s advisers = more constraining 
Perceived need to quickly act due to crisis management = more constraining 
DE = less + more + more 
DE =  more constraining 
 
BE 
 Bush’s desire to educated the people = more constraining 
 Bush as pragmatist = more constraining 
 
 BE = more + more 
 BE = more constraining 
 
 Overall 
 DEBE = more constraining 
 
D.   BUSH ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE TO PUBLIC OPINION 
 
  Reviewing the summary data from both public and presidential beliefs (Section B 
and C) will reveal the need the administration felt to provide a response to public opinion, 
if any.  Generally, if public opinion is viewed as constraining, there will arise a need, by 
the executive, to somehow influence or attempt to influence the public.  The end goal of 
this influence would be to reduce the constraining or unsupportive effect of the public.  
The results of the previous sections show: 
 
  Public       Executive 
DP = less constraining effect    DE = more constraining 
BP = less constraining effect    BE = more constraining 
 
 DPBP = less constraining    DEBE = more constraining 
 
     Overall 
    DPBP = less constraining 
    DEBE = more constraining 
 
The public does not appear to have been a significant constraining factor in a direct 
fashion.   
9/11 is a situation unlike many others.  The United States was directly attacked 
within the continental United States by foreign terrorists bent on destroying America.  
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The result was a public adamant for retaliation against the perpetrators of the crime.  This 
provided the executive with the room to pursue whatever policy choice deemed necessary 
as long as it hit just the attackers and those who protected the terror group.  Bush and his 
administration couldn’t help but follow through and commit the United States to action 
per the public’s stated desire.  Because the public departed from its frequent constraining 
effect at the outset and opened the field for the executive, the question becomes not so 
much how does the president respond to public opinion but how the views of the public 
help sway the executive’s decision making and ultimate course of action.  In other words, 
did Bush or his administration change their strategy as a result of public opinion or did he 
acknowledge what the public thought, attempt to educate the public and if that failed 
continue with what he felt was right?  In this case, the combination of all the factors 
discussed above leads to the conclusion that the main impact of public opinion was the 
indirect influence on the executive’s principals.  A reverse feedback loop was created, 
which ultimately affected the decisions of the executive.   
 
1.   What Did the Administration Do to Affect or Change Public Opinion, 
if Needed? 
 
Normally, when the polling or research results indicate a less constraining 
atmosphere on the executive, the need to affect or change public opinion by the executive 
should be diminished.  This may be the case when both public and executive decision 
context and belief are less constraining, but what happens when one is more 
constraining?  As indicated in this case and in Chapter 2, while the public was less 
constraining, the executive’s perception of the public was more constraining.  As a result 
of the perceived impact of the public to the executive and his principals, the need to 
influence the public remained a necessity.  In response to any perceived constraining 
effect by the public and his role as Pragmatist, Bush recognized the importance of public 
opinion and keeping the public educated to the situation.  He continually emphasized the 
need to communicate with the public to ensure sound policy and a united stance.  Boyer 
emphasized this key component in his article “Parallels in Courage,” when he writes, 
“Crisis management is a matter of legitimacy, not legality, and requires knowing whether 
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your policies enjoy not only popular support but also understanding.  U.S. presidents 
must be able to tap the various currents of U.S. public opinion, to link policies to values 
while addressing citizens’ fears, and to envision how policy proposals will be 
implemented.”197 
Throughout September and the months following the attacks of 9/11, Bush made 
daily public announcements and declarations to the American people regarding the war 
on terror and the need to punish those who committed the crimes against the United 
States.  In the month of September (11 September-30 September), Bush spoke and made 
himself accessible to the news media 27 times.198  The common theme for each address 
was the War on Terror and U.S. resolve to use force to pursue the attackers.  
Understanding the need to have public support for policy enactment, Bush pushed for the 
public’s education about the situation.  Unlike Clinton who was absent from the news 
media for much of the period between the embassy bombings and the U.S. response, 
Bush,  as a piece of his policy enacting strategy, communicated to the American people 
and ensured their support.   
 
E.   POLICY RESPONSE TOWARDS TERRORIST ATTACKS 
 
  On 7 October 2001, the United States launched both a land and air war to destroy 
al Qaeda and Taliban targets in Afghanistan.  Operation Infinite Justice, later named 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), began several weeks early with CIA and Special 
Forces operating within Afghanistan with Northern Alliance forces.  These covert 
operators were there to lay the ground work with local forces for the removal of the 
Taliban and transfer of power within Afghanistan.  As Michael O’Hanlan, Senior Fellow 
of Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, summarized, 
Afghans, Americans, and coalition partners cooperated to produce a 
remarkable military victory in Afghanistan.  The winning elements 
included 15,000 Northern Alliance fighters (primarily from the Tajik and 
Uzbek ethnic groups), 100 combat sorties a day by U.S. planes, 300–500 
                                                 
197 Michael C. Boyer, “Parallels in Courage,” from Cold War History, Vol. 2, No. 3, April 2002. 
198 The White House, Presidential Archives for September 2001, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/ (accessed 25 September 2006). 
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Western special operations forces and intelligence operatives, a few 
thousand Western ground forces, and thousands of Pashtun soldiers in 
southern Afghanistan who came over to the winning side in November. 
Together they defeated the Taliban forces, estimated at 50,000 to 60,000 
strong, as well as a few thousand al Qaeda fighters.199 
The coalition came together to initially punish and destroy the forces, which had brought 
death and destruction to the United States.  O’Hanlan goes on to say that OEF was “a 
masterpiece of military creativity and finesse.”200  
 
1.   Was the Policy Response Effective? 
 
Polls taken immediately after the U.S. response indicate beliefs that the operation 
was a success (90.32% approved of the military action)201 with adequate force used and 
acceptance of the time that passed after 9/11.   
The U.S. should have launched military action before now, the U.S. 
waited the right amount of time to take military action, or, the U.S. should 
have waited longer before taking military action; [FORM B] The U.S. 
should have waited longer before taking military action, the U.S. waited 
the right amount of time to take military action, or, the U.S. should have 
launched military action before now?202 
%     N    
The U.S. should have launched    14.09   94 
military action before now  
The U.S. waited the right amount    72.02   483 
of time to take military action  
The U.S. should have waited longer   9.23   62 
before taking military action  
Don’t know/refused     4.65   31 
 
                                                 
199 Michael E. O’Hanlon, “The Flawed Masterpiece,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2002), Vol. 81, 
#3, 47-63. 
200 O’Hanlon, 47. 
201 Gallup Brain, “U.S. Military Strike on Afghanistan Reaction,” The Gallup Organization, Question 
1, 7 October 2006, 
http://institution.gallup.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=P0110038 
(accessed 16 August 2006). 
202 Gallup Brain, “U.S. Military Strike on Afghanistan Reaction,” The Gallup Organization, Question 
5, 7 October 2006, 
http://institution.gallup.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=P0110038 
(accessed 16 August 2006). 
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The Taliban were disrupted and removed from power within Afghanistan and al Qaeda 
bases were destroyed with its members scattered, captured, or killed.  Each point was a 
mark for the administration as well as the public.  The action, as the public wanted, was 
harsh and responsive to the threat.  The targets were narrowly defined to those who had 
taken the actions against the United States on September 11th.  Over time, the situation in 
Afghanistan has grown worse, with the Taliban staging a resurgence.  With respect to the 
focus of the research of this thesis, however, what matters is whether public opinion 
hindered military effectiveness.  The answer is a clear no.  The initial results of the policy 
chosen by the executive were a success.  Limiting the conflict to the Taliban and al 
Qaeda within Afghanistan was important to the legitimacy of the operation in the eyes of 
the public, and this preference did not hurt U.S. effectiveness in the war on terror. 
The deck was stacked in favor of the executive in the case study of 9/11.  After 
reviewing the decisional context and belief system of both the public and the executive, it 
is apparent the public had little interest in constraints and opened the door wide for the 
executive. Although direct constraining effects of the public are not apparent, an indirect 
influence existed through public constraints perceived by the principal advisers to the 
president.  This perceived influence of the public helped constrain policy choices and 
ultimately decisions of action by the executive.  Additionally, the pragmatist belief 
system of the president helped constrain his decision-making by creating an interest in 
ensuring public support through continued education of the public.    These modest 
constraints had two practical effects:  they ruled out the possibility of going after Iraq 
first and they increased the sense of urgency about beginning operations in Afghanistan 
as soon as possible. 
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IV.   A STEP BACK:  IRAQ AS A CORROBORATING CASE 
Faced with a direct attack on U.S. interests, the cases of Clinton/Embassy 
Bombings and Bush/9-11 offer a unique observation.  Aside from the determination that 
Clinton and Bush’s beliefs most resemble those of Delegate and Pragmatist respectively, 
public opinion did not directly affect the decisions of the executive.  An indirect 
relationship between the executive or his principals and the public was created through 
how they interpreted the potential reaction of the public.  This interpretation led to a self 
regulating and thus constraining influence on foreign policy decisions of the president 
and an increased desire by the executive to educate and communicate to ensure proper 
public support for policy being enacted.   
In order to validate these findings a brief look at additional foreign policy 
decisions made by both Clinton and Bush towards crises following those presented in the 
case studies is necessary.  Iraq’s non compliance towards UN mandates to allow weapons 
inspectors to audit its WMD program supplies the appropriate situation for both 
presidents.  The specific conclusions to be validated include: 
 
President Clinton 
1. Little direct constraint from the public to influence executive  
 decision making on foreign policy  
2. President Clinton’s belief structure = Delegate 
3. Self-constraining perception by the executive on the impact or  
influence public opinion would have on certain decisions.  This led 
to the executive feeling more constrained when it came to making 
specific foreign policy decisions 
President Bush 
1. Little direct constraint from the public to influence executive  
 decision making on foreign policy  
2. President Bush’s belief structure = Pragmatist 
3. Self-constraining perception by the executive and/or his principals  
on the impact or influence public opinion would have on certain 
decisions.  This led to the executive feeling more constrained when 
it came to making specific foreign policy decisions 
 
This chapter contains a brief introduction of the conflict situation followed by 
sectional breakouts for each of the three conclusions addressed above.  Utilizing similar 
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techniques employed in Chapters 2 and 3, the foreign policy decisions made to confront 
Iraq’s non-compliance will be explored to determine consistency in constraint. 
 
A.   PRESIDENT CLINTON AND IRAQ 
 
 For much of the 1990s, the United States and the world were preoccupied with 
Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s suspected program to produce weapons of mass destruction.  
Following the Gulf War in April 1991, “the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) 
[working in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)] was 
established to ensure Iraq was free of weapons of mass destruction and to establish a 
long-term monitoring program to see it remained free of prohibited weapons.”203  Over 
the course of 7 years (1991-1998), UNSCOM and IAEA conducted “several thousands of 
inspections at over 1,000 facilities.”204  What they found was beyond their initial 
expectations.  Iraq had a “Manhattan-Project like nuclear weapons program, which 
employed thousands of scientists and explored many avenues of producing weapons-
grade material.”  Over the course of these seven years, “inspectors destroyed 38,500 
munitions, 480,000 liters of chemical agents, and 1.8 million liters of precursor 
chemicals.”205  On the surface, the inspections appeared to be successful.  The troubling 
aspect that has plagued executives from the Clinton and Bush administrations stems from 
the 31,600 chemical munitions, 550 mustard gas bombs, and 4,000 tons of chemical that 
are unaccounted for206 and the efforts by Iraq after 1993 to impede the total destruction 
of their WMD program. 
Consistently throughout the seven years of inspection, Iraq attempted to thwart 
the inspector’s efforts while maintaining its nuclear and biological/chemical presence.   
 
                                                 
203 U.S. Department of State, “Timeline of Iraq: 1932-2003,” 
http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive_Index/Timeline_of_Iraq_19322003.html (accessed 25 September 
2006). 
204 U.S. Congressional Research Service,  “Iraq: U.N. Inspections for Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 
by Sharon A. Squassoni, 7 October 2003, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/25382.pdf (accessed 
26 September 2006). 
205 Squassoni, 7. 
206 Squassoni, 7. 
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Explored in detail in the, “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on 
Iraq’s WMD,” Charles Duelfer, the Special Advisor to the Director of Central 
Intelligence, writes, 
Iraq attempted to balance competing desires to appear to cooperate with 
the UN and have sanctions lifted, and to preserve the ability to eventually 
reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction. Iraqi behavior under 
sanctions reflects the interplay between Saddam’s perceived requirements 
for WMD and his confidence in the Regime’s ability to ride out 
inspections without full compliance, and the perceived costs and longevity 
of sanctions.207  
Iraq’s duplicitous strategy, which attempted to balance both a perception of compliance 
while retaining their WMD capability, ultimately failed.  UNSCOM and IAEA quickly 
saw through the façade as materials and equipment were moved in plain view of the 
inspectors and requested installations were barred from inspections.208   
American inspectors quickly became targets of Iraq’s defiance.  In November 
1997, the situation boiled to a head as Iraq expelled U.S. members of the UNSCOM 
team.  In January 1998, “Iraq effectively barred U.N. arms inspectors led by an American 
from working,”209 while other inspectors not affiliated with America continued their 
efforts.   Shortly after the American-led team left Iraq, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
brokered a deal with Iraq to allow full access by UN inspectors to suspected Iraqi 
weapons sites.  The agreement fell apart in October 1998 when Iraq abruptly halted any 
further cooperation with UNSCOM and “suspended all arms inspectors and monitors.”210  
Finally, in November 1998, “Iraq reneged on a promise to permit UNSCOM to resume its 
                                                 
207 Charles Duelfer, “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD,” Vol 
1, 30 September 2004, 47, http://www.foia.cia.gov/duelfer/Iraqs_WMD_Vol1.pdf (accessed 26 September 
2006). 
208 For additional information see CRS report by Squassoni and Stevens, Wall, and Dinlenc report 
page 11-13. 
209 CNN.com, “Clinton: Iraq has abused its last chance,” Timeline, 16 December 1998, 
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1998/iraq/timeline/top.exclude.html (accessed 26 September 2006). 
210 CNN.com, “Clinton: Iraq has abused its last chance,” Timeline, 16 December 1998, 
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1998/iraq/timeline/top.exclude.html (accessed 26 September 2006). 
 92 
inspections.” 211   As a result of the continued defiance by Iraq towards the UN mandate 
to allow inspections of its WMD programs, President Clinton ordered the deployment of 
military forces for Operation DESERT FOX.  On 16 December 1998, utilizing a 
combination of cruise missiles and bombers, “U.S. and U.K. forces engaged hundreds of 
Iraqi targets, in order to deprive Iraq of the capability to produce and use weapons of 
mass destruction and to wage further offensive military operations.”212 
The defiance to UN mandates by Iraq spanned seven years with little action by the 
international community to halt its progress.  In 1998, the UN publicly condemned these 
“flagrant violations”213 and went so far as to threaten the “severest consequences”214 for 
their continued action.  Action against Iraq was long overdue.  Comparing the answers to 
the following questions to the insights garnered from the previous chapters will 
potentially validate the findings and lead to policy implications.  Is there evidence that 
Clinton’s delegate belief structure influenced the foreign policy decision to use force?  
Was public opinion lax and relenting to decisions made by the executive?  Did the 
executive self constrain his decisions based on perceptions of an anticipated public 
opinion response?    
 
1. Little Direct Constraint from the Public 
 
In the months preceding the U.S. strike in Iraq, the public and media were still 
preoccupied with the personal issues of the president.  Similar to the embassy bombings, 
the public’s beliefs and decisional context were mired in the on goings of an issue that the 
public had already showed little interest in.  Poll data taken during the months of 
September, October and November 1998 overwhelmingly provide continuous coverage 
of the personal saga.  Of the 14 polls from Gallup, CNN and USA Today, 13 were either 
                                                 
211 Paul Schott Stevens, Andru E. Wall and Ata Dinlenc, “The Just Demands of Peace and Security:  
International Law and the Case against Iraq,” The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, 10, 
http://www.fed-soc.org/War%20on%20Terror/iraqfinal--web.pdf (accessed 25 September 2006). 
212 Stevens, Wall, and Dinlenc, 10. 
213 U.S. Department of State, “Security Council Resolution 1205,” 5 November 1998, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/18091.pdf (accessed 21 September 2006). 
214 CBS News.com, “UN Endorses Iraq Resolution,” 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/1998/03/02/world/main4016.shtml (accessed 21 September 2006). 
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entirely devoted to questions regarding the December impeachment hearings and 
Clinton’s issues or partially exploratory in this subject.  Only the mid-November poll 
contained questions regarding Iraq and the progressing tensions and possible action 
facing the United States in regards to Iraq’s defiance of the UN.215   
Similar to the embassy bombings, the public was satisfied with the state of the 
U.S. economy and their lives as a result.  In November 1998, with 66% approving of the 
job Clinton was doing as president and 66% voting against impeachment, the public 
expressed its support of the president despite his personal shortcomings.216   Although 
the media was still focused on the sensationalism of the president’s personal situation, the 
public’s concern and constraint was minimized by the sound economy and separation 
made between public and private life.  As a result, similar to the Clinton’s case study 
chapter, the public offered little initial constraint towards action in the Iraq crisis.   
November polls also provided further insight into the limited public constraint.  
As the only poll in the country for the three months preceding the U.S. response in Iraq, 
the public’s opinion illustrated an open constraint context for the executive.  When asked 
whether the United States should continue to pursue diplomacy and sanctions or use 
military force to pressure Iraq to comply with the U.N., public opinion stood firmly with 
the military option. 
As you may know, United Nation’s inspectors have been in Iraq to 
investigate that country’s weapons producing capacity. Iraq has 
announced that it would NOT allow these investigations to continue at 
certain sites. Which would you prefer the United States do right now to 
resolve the current situation involving Iraq: 
 
Continue to use diplomacy and sanctions to pressure Iraq into complying 
with the United Nation’s inspections; or take military action, along with 
other countries, to force Iraq into complying with United Nation’s 
inspections 
 
                                                 
215 Poll data analysis taken from the Gallup Decade Breakout located at Gallup Brain, The Gallup 
Organization, http://institution.gallup.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/documents/decadebreakout1990.aspx 
(accessed 23 September 2006). 
216 Gallup Brain, “November Wave 1,” The Gallup Organization, Questions 1 and 4, 13-15 November 
1998, 
http://institution.gallup.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=P9811043 
(accessed 26 September 2006). 
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%  N    
Continue to use diplomacy and sanctions  35.61  191 
to pressure Iraq into compliance with the  
United Nation’s inspections 
  
Take military action, along with other   60.36   324 
countries, to force Iraq into complying217 
 
As 60% of those responding indicated a desire for military action with other countries, 
the Clinton administration was provided insight into the expectations of the public.  
Interestingly, when poll questions removed the mention of “along with other countries,” 
public support dropped to 52% for military operations by the United States alone with 
42% in support of further sanctions and diplomacy.218  Despite the wording, the message 
remained clear and unconstraining; the majority of the public supported a military 
confrontation with Iraq to force it to comply with UN inspectors. 
 As the executive weighed the overall U.S. response, the public provided 
additional information about certain options that might be involved in a U.S. military 
response.  When polled about previous U.S. responses to aggression and crises that the 
administration had pursued, the public was asked about the effectiveness of U.S. missile 
(tomahawk) attacks.  In response, 66% stated that such tactics failed to achieve the 
desired goals with 30% opined that missile attacks made significant achievements.219  
Clearly, the sole use of cruise missiles by the executive was an option that the public 
frowned upon.  Use of ground troops was an additional negative for the public.  In a 
February 1998 Time/Yankelovich poll, the public was split 46% in favor and 44% 
opposed to using ground troops to attack sites which Iraq may have used to develop 
                                                 
217 Gallup Brain, “November Wave 1,” The Gallup Organization, Question 20,  13-15 November 
1998, 
http://institution.gallup.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=P9811043 
(accessed 26 September 2006). 
218 Gallup Brain, “November Wave 1,” The Gallup Organization, Question 21,  13-15 November 
1998, 
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219 Gallup Brain, “November Wave 1,” The Gallup Organization, Question 23,  13-15 November 
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weapons of mass destruction.  Not surprisingly, the public favored by two thirds an air 
strike option combining aircraft and missiles.220   
Additionally, when asked the goal of a United States attack on Iraq, the public 
voted 70% to 25% in favor of removing Saddam Hussein from power versus the assumed 
objective of pressuring Iraq to comply with UN inspectors.221  From poll data, the 
executive response, if public opinion was taken into account, would entail a combined 
military operation where weaponry not exclusive to cruise missiles was used to target 
Saddam Hussein. While targeting Saddam Hussein did not become a military objective, 
the use of force other than cruise missiles was embraced by the Clinton administration.   
 As the November poll was conducted and the February 1998 poll was reviewed, 
Clinton and his administration had ample time to consider their relevance prior to 
launching any U.S. response.  With little constraint on the economic and private fronts, a 
solid expectation by the public for military action was formed.  Expressing broad support 
for military action, the public moved its opinion to the less constraining end of the 
foreign policy spectrum where diplomacy and sanctions could give way to force.  
Although public opinion was less constraining on the big picture policy response, it did 
insert itself marginally in the tactical expectations of the executive decision.  With an 
open policy spectrum and little constraint other than tactical force expectations by the 
public, would Clinton be true to his “delegate” categorization and follow the expectations 
of the people in terms of tactics in the U.S. response? 
 
2. President Clinton’s Belief Structure = Delegate 
 
Clinton’s belief structure was previously defined as Delegate.  As a result, public 
opinion is considered important for both policy formulation and successful 
implementation.  With public opinion allowing room to maneuver, but expecting some 
form of military air strike in response to Iraq’s defiance, Clinton’s choice of foreign 
policy options is telling.  
                                                 
220 U.S. Information Agency. “Opinion Analysis:  U.S. Public Views Military Strikes Against Iraq.” 
11 February 1998. http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1998/02/11/opinion.htm (accessed 26 September 2006). 
221 Gallup Brain, “November Wave 1 Poll,” Questions 23, 24. 
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Throughout November 1998, Clinton stressed to the American public that “all the 
options are on the table”222 when confronting Iraq.  As the president indicated his desire 
to work through the situation diplomatically, he also acknowledged the possible need for 
military force.  Addressing the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Pentagon staff, Clinton 
remarked, “And if we can find a diplomatic way to do what has to be done, to do what he 
promised to do at the end of the Gulf War, to do what should have been done within 15 
days of the agreement at the end of the Gulf War, if we can find a diplomatic way to do 
that, that is by far our preference.”223 From continued diplomacy to military air strikes, 
the administration worked each option to determine the viability with the American 
public.  Howard Kurtz noted the importance of public opinion and consensus of action in 
the Clinton administration when he wrote, “All modern presidents took polls, but in the 
Clinton administration they were virtually a religion.”224 “When Clinton went before the 
press to argue this or that position, he was, in most cases, leading where he knew the 
public would follow.”225   
As Clinton married various attributes of airpower to reflect public expectations, 
his decision not to pursue Saddam Hussein is extremely telling.  With a 70% mandate by 
the public to topple Hussein as part of the operation, Clinton’s decision to ignore this 
option superficially goes against his Delegate belief system, or does it?  From past 
military confrontations, as discussed in Chapter II, Clinton learned that the public was 
risk averse when it came to casualties.  The backlash he received in Somalia for the 19 
U.S. casualties created a limiting precedent for future action.  Several statements by 
prominent members of Clinton’s inner circle explain the executive’s decision, which 
ultimately mirrors his Delegate beliefs.  In an interview with Nathan Guttman of the 
Ha’aretz Daily, former Secretary of Defense William Cohen remarked, “… the Clinton 
                                                 
222 U.S. Information Agency,  “Berger to Consult US Allies in Europe on Iraq,” by Wendy S. Ross, 
USIA White House Correspondent, 5 November 1998, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/1998/98110503_nlt.html (accessed 27 September 
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223 William Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents:  William J. Clinton, Book I 1998 (Washington, 
DC: US Government Printing Office, 1998), 231. 
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administration felt that its hands were tied in dealing with Iraq. To stop Saddam, we 
would have had to call up forces like we have today. Would this have been politically 
possible? Would we have been able to have called up 150,000 soldiers on the ground? 
Would the American public have supported this? The answer is apparently not.”226 
Additionally, at the National Press Club, Sandy Berger, Clinton’s National Security 
Advisor, ruled out the use of ground troops to dislodge Saddam from power due to public 
constraints when he remarked, “that it would require the commitment of hundreds of 
thousands of U.S. troops. I do not believe that the costs of such a campaign would be 
sustainable at home or abroad ... the reward of success would be an American military 
occupation of Iraq that could last years.”227  Although the public expressed the desire to 
topple Hussein’s regime, Clinton, learning from the past a public opinion constraint with 
respect to casualties, associated the removal of the dictator with use of ground forces and 
casualties.  As a result, Clinton, backed by his education of public aversion to casualties 
and the previously addressed split in public opinion on the use of ground troops, opted for 
an airpower policy. 
Understanding the public’s desire and expectations, the Clinton administration 
chose options that mirrored public opinion.  As one of the two necessary conditions in a 
Delegate belief system, input by the public was received through public opinion polls in 
November 1998 and earlier in February.  Aside from the expressed desire to target 
Hussein, the U.S. response on 16 December fell directly in line with public expectations.   
Seeking public acceptance and understanding of his decision, Clinton launched an 
explanatory media campaign outlining all steps he made coming to the decision to use 
military force.  On 16 December 1998, in his “Address to the Nation Announcing 
Military Strikes on Iraq,” Clinton explained “why I have decided, with the unanimous 
recommendation of my national security team, to use force in Iraq; why we have acted 
now; and what we aim to accomplish.”228  The education continued as he spoke with 
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reporters on 17 December, sent letters to congressional leaders on 18 December, 
addressed Arab Nations on 19 December and addressed the nation through the 
President’s Radio Address and special report on television also on 19 December 1998.229  
Despite public opinion polled earlier in November already in favor of military strikes, 
Clinton educated the public to support his decisions.  With all options on the table, the 
decision to use air strikes as a specific policy decision by the executive circumstantially 
validated the initial requirement of the Delegate belief system while the education 
process used to validate the decision illustrated the second criteria.  Clinton as Delegate 
was again illustrated. 
 
3.  Self-constraining Perception by the Executive 
 
Unlike the embassy bombings where the act against the United States was 
unexpected, the situation in Iraq unfolded over many years.  The public and executive 
had the opportunity to watch it develop from the initial UN mandate to the see-saw 
compliance efforts of the Iraqi government.  The education of the public was cumulative 
over many years and the experience gained through countless media stories and separate 
actions taken by the United States and its partners allowed for increased understanding by 
the populace of the situation.   
The executive was also allowed foresight into public understanding.  Although 
there was only one poll taken in the three months prior to the U.S. action against Iraq in 
December, polls were conducted during previous times Iraq reneged on the UN mandate 
(February 1998) or when U.S. action against Iraq was required.230  In all, since 1993, the 
public and executive were drawn into and lived through the Iraq situation on a continual 
basis.  This resulted in a situation in which public opinion had solidified and was well 
known. 
                                                 
229 Information taken from a review of the correspondence Clinton had 17-19 December 1998, located 
in William Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents:  William J. Clinton, Book II  1998 (Washington, DC: 
US Government Printing Office, 1998), 2182. 
230 For a complete timeline of actions taken by the UN, the US and Iraq see: Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Iraq Special Collection, “Chronology 
of UN inspections: Derived from an October 1998 UNSCOM document,” 
http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/uns_chro.htm (accessed 1 October 2006). 
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Because the public was educated and their opinions were sought prior to action 
taken by the executive, a clear distinction is drawn for the case of Iraq.  The difference 
between crisis and premeditated policy implementation is significantly affected by the 
ability of the public to learn of the issues ahead of the formal action.  The ability of the 
executive to take the pulse of U.S. public opinion prior to policy formation or 
implementation helps to preclude any self-constraining perception of the public’s 
constraint on the executive.  Unlike the embassy bombings where self constraint marked 
the majority of decisions by the executive, self constraint by the executive as a result of a 
perception of public opinion not reflected in the poll data is absent.   
The variables are similar, less constraining public and Delegate belief system of 
the executive, but the increased constraint placed on the executive by himself or his 
principals was not present.  Through poll data and past practices, the executive was 
educated on the desires and expectations of the public.  The administration knew that the 
public would support the use of force but that casualty aversion precluded the use of 
ground troops.  The Delegate executive knows what the public expects and has time to 
judge the response most inclined to ensnare the support of the populace versus acting 
only upon internal guesses about public opinion during a crisis situation.   In the end, self 
constraint by the decision-maker is not validated in this case. 
   
4. Summary of Findings 
 
While validation can be made of the first two conclusions as they exist within the 
Clinton/embassy bombings and Clinton/Iraq WMD examples, the third conclusion can 
not be validated.  A distinction is drawn in the circumstances that surrounded the 
embassy bombings versus the Iraq WMD strikes.   There is a relationship between beliefs 
of the president, decisional context (presidential support, economy, and others factors), 
and the exercising of self constraint based on perceptions of public impact on foreign 
policy.  During a crisis, as illustrated by the embassy bombings, time to educate and 
analyze public acknowledgement of the solutions to the conflict is limited.  As a result, 
the executive will incur self constraints based on assumptions of public constraint.  The 
case of Iraq and WMD showed a different pattern.  As time and education allow public 
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interaction and opinion to be expressed, decisions are constrained based on direct and not 
simply inferred limits imposed by the public.  If the executive is prone to look for public 
insight prior to policy creation and there is no information indicating constraint or limits 
by the public, the executive will set internal constraints based on perceived public 
reaction.  Constraint is created in either situation.  The distinction between sudden crisis 
actions and deliberate policy where time is available will move the constraint to either 
limits imposed by the public or self constraint by the executive.  For Clinton and Iraq the 
constraints were created not by the self perception of the executive, but by the 
expectations set by a populace educated and expressive over time. 
 
B.  PRESIDENT BUSH AND IRAQ 
 
Following U.S. efforts after 9/11 to destroy the Taliban and al Qaeda operations 
in Afghanistan, the Bush administration turned its sights to Iraq.  Initially, the 
administration focused its attention on possible ties between al Qaeda and Iraq.  Amy 
Gershkoff and Shana Kushner write: 
[The] Bush administration successfully convinced them [American public] 
that a link existed between Saddam Hussein and terrorism generally, and 
between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda specifically. Framing the war on 
Iraq in this way connected it intimately with 9/11, leading to levels of 
support for this war that stretched nearly as high as the levels of support 
for the war in Afghanistan.231 
Speaking to the nation on 28 January 2003, President Bush also linked the organizations: 
“Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people 
now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including 
members of al Qaeda. Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his 
hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own.”232  Despite a 2001 report 
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by CIA Deputy Director, John McLaughlin which stated, “We have no evidence of any 
active Iraqi terrorist threat against the United States,”233 the administration pursued the 
terrorism angle and augmented it with an education campaign by Bush and his advisers to 
show continued WMD production by Iraq.  Douglas Foyle theorizes, “With the main 
fighting in Afghanistan completed, the administration shifted its approach.  It attempted 
to persuade public opinion to support the use of force in Iraq, principally by using 
references to weapons of mass destruction to prime public opinion.”234  In the same State 
of the Union speech where Bush linked Iraq with support of terrorism, he pushed his 
agenda further and urged action against Iraq to stop its pursuit of WMD: 
The world has waited 12 years for Iraq to disarm. America will not accept 
a serious and mounting threat to our country, and our friends and our 
allies. The United States will ask the U.N. Security Council to convene on 
February the 5th to consider the facts of Iraq’s ongoing defiance of the 
world. Secretary of State Powell will present information and intelligence 
about Iraqi’s legal—Iraq’s illegal weapons programs, its attempt to hide 
those weapons from inspectors, and its links to terrorist groups.235  
Having decided on the policy for Iraq, the Bush administration pursued an overt effort to 
educate U.S. and world public opinion.  Richard Haass, the Director of Policy Planning at 
the State Department, observed in Nicholas Lemann’s article for The New Yorker, “I 
don’t think the American public needs alot of persuading about the evil of Saddam 
Hussein ... Also, I’d fully expect the President and his chief lieutenants to make the case.   
Public opinion can be changed.”236  As a result in fall 2002, “the administration 
embarked on an integrated public relations effort to bring on board the American public, 
the United Nations, and congress.”237  
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The circumstances and initial entrance of the United States into Iraq offer an 
opportunity to review past findings of public opinion and its effect on the executive.  
Similar to Clinton and Iraq, Bush’s decisions and actions during the initial stages of the 
conflict will be evaluated against the findings of the two major case studies presented in 
Chapters 2 and 3.  The ultimate answer sought is simple.  What if any effect did public 
opinion have on the Bush decision to pursue a use of force policy within Iraq?   
 
1. Little Direct Constraint from the Public  
 
As the Bush administration made the initial policy decisions to attack Iraq in 
response to its flaunting of U.N. mandates and sketchy link to terrorism, general public 
opinion provided moderate constraint.   According to poll data taken 20-24 January 2003, 
prior to the President’s State of the Union address on 28 January,  
When specifics of the Iraq situation are mentioned, public doubts about 
administration policy really come to the fore. By about two to one in the 
NBC poll, the public favors giving weapons inspectors more time, rather 
than taking immediate military action. Also by two to one (63 percent to 
29 percent), the public believes we should take military action only with 
the support of the UN, rather than act without that support (that’s up from 
a margin of 55 percent to 35 percent in December). By margins of about 
fifty points, they think the Bush needs to produce more evidence about 
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, both for our allies and for the 
American public, before launching military action.238 
Unlike the U.S. response to 9/11, the public in the pre-conflict stages to Iraq had time to 
digest the situation.  “Both the Congress and the public wanted to know why Iraq had to 
be confronted and why the old policy of containing Saddam could not be continued.”239  
Iraq was not a crisis situation where immediate reactive policy needed to be enacted and 
pursued.  As a result, immediate acceptance of executive policy did not occur.   Public 
opinion, lacking clear knowledge over why force was required in Iraq and how it fit into 
the use of force policy used in Afghanistan, created a constraint on the executive.  
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Reviewing Klarevas’ hypothesis discussed in the introduction, there was not a clear 
understanding and linkage to vital national interest or foreign policy restraint nor was 
there a consensus that this action would be a multilateral operation.  The uncertainty of 
the public pre-war is further explained by reviewing Daniel Yankelovich’s “The Rules of 
Public Engagement.”  According to Yankelovich, before fully committing to any action, 
the public follows a seven step process:  
1. Awareness of problem 
2. Urgency 
3.  First response 
4.  Resistance 
5.  Choice work 
6.  Initial acceptance 
7.  Full commitment.240   
This cycle and more specifically where the public is at in the cycle is important to 
understand how to direct the public to a given course of action or decision.  Stages 1 
through 7 were covered quickly by the public in the case use of force in Afghanistan.  
The public clearly saw the need to react after 9/11 and sped through these 7 steps to full 
commitment.  In the case of pre-war Iraq, the public was between stages 4 and 5.  When 
the administration pursued further action and started making the case for an Iraq 
operation, public opinion and acceptance was resistant due to lack of knowledge or 
understanding concerning the reasons for the policy.  The uncertainty resulted in the poor 
polls and more importantly a recipe of expectations from which the administration 
needed to work.   
The Bush administration reacted to this recipe and supplied the public with more 
information about WMD and pursued its policy agenda with the UN to garner support.  In 
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the end, the constraints or limitations imposed by the public necessitated the increased 
media and education campaign the administration pursued.  
In developing a plan to raise public opinion to counter the low percentage of 
support, the Bush administration followed Yankelovich’s three rules for overcoming 
resistance.  They allocated time and attention to countering the resistance, brought the 
conflict into the open, and created conditions for public resolution.241  The public was 
given a vital national interest focus and reason to use force as a foreign policy restraint 
when weapons of mass destruction and terrorism were tied to the Iraqi regime in various 
speeches.  The President’s Address to the Nation on 17 March 2003, on the eve of the 
war, again summarized these themes: 
Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that 
the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal 
weapons ever devised. This regime has already used weapons of mass 
destruction against Iraq’s neighbors and against Iraq’s people …The 
regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. It has a 
deep hatred of America and our friends. And it has aided, trained and 
harbored terrorists, including operatives of al Qaeda.242 
The administration made these arguments not only to the U.S. public, but also to the 
world as indicated by Secretary Powell’s speech before the UN: 
Iraq’s behavior shows that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing 
their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction … Terrorism 
has been a tool used by Saddam for decades. Saddam was a supporter of 
terrorism long before these terrorist networks had a name, and this support 
continues. The nexus of poisons and terror is new. The nexus of Iraq and 
terror is old. The combination is lethal.243   
With 49 countries committed to the coalition,244 each of the three aspects of Klarevas’ 
hypothesis was answered.  Iraq was tied to U.S. national interests in an operation to 
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produce foreign restraint using a multinational force.  As a result, public opinion for U.S. 
use of force in Iraq rose to 77% between January and March 2003 from the low point of 
31%.245  Strengthening the public’s acceptance and reducing the constraints for use of 
force within Iraq was the main purpose of both speeches.  While the constraint placed 
upon the executive’s initial decision was high from the public due to a broader time scope 
from which the public was able to monitor the policy, by reviewing polls and adjusting an 
education program public constraint was reduced paving the way for policy 
implementation. 
 
2. President Bush’s Belief Structure = Pragmatist 
 
As a Pragmatist, Bush needed public support for policy implementation.  The 
administration’s policy of invading Iraq was decided early on without public input.  In 
the book, Price of Loyalty, by Ron Suskind, newly appointed Secretary of Treasury Paul 
O’Neill commented on the premature focus on Iraq by the Bush administration and 
specifically the Secretary of Defense.  “From the start, we were building the case against 
Hussein and looking at how we could take him out and change Iraq into a new country.  
And, if we did that, it would solve everything.  It was all about finding a way to do it.  
That was the tone of it.” 246  As Bush listened to the advice pushed by his NSC advisers, 
he adopted the attack mindset. “Fine.  Go find me a way to do this”247 would be the Bush 
policy effort to handle Iraq, but not initially understood by the public.     
As Bush listened to his advisers, he set his mind to pursue actions against Iraq.  
As the Pragmatist, he satisfied one end of the beliefs matrix:  his policy decision was 
made in a public opinion void.  Despite formulating policy without direct input from the 
public, Bush recognized the need for public support for policy implementation.  Douglas 
Foyle elaborates, “Despite President George W. Bush’s oft-repeated claim that he makes 
policy ‘based upon principle and not on polls and focus groups,’ the administration 
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focused closely on public opinion throughout the period [time prior to policy 
implementation].”248  In sum, support to actually adopt Bush’s policy of aggression 
against Iraq was needed to overcome the initial reluctance of the public.  This one aspect 
would initially constrain the efforts of the Bush administration.  
To reverse the constraint, the administration adopted an agenda focused on 
multiple educational processes.  Direct discussions with the public via State of the Union 
addresses and UN testimonies by Powell responses in part to poll figures explaining the 
limitations the public had with a military confrontation with Iraq.  While there is no direct 
evidence or testimony by the principals explaining the rationale of their education outlets, 
inference can be made when considering polls in mid January and subsequent discussions 
and efforts made by the executive which mirrored the expectations of the public.   
During the months of September 2002 through February 2003 (just before 
Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced), Bush took every chance he had to discuss Iraq 
and further his policy of actions.  
 
MONTH TOTAL SPEAKING 
ENGANAGEMENTS 
SPEECHES WHERE IRAQ 
SITUATION WAS TOPIC 
September 2002 50 35 
October 2002 51 39 
November 2002 48 31 
December 2002 25 11 
January 2003 30 13 
February 2003 32 20 
 
Table 16. Bush Speaking Topics (September 2002 through February 2003) 249 
 
It did not matter if Bush was speaking at an elementary school discussing American 
History and Civics, discussing education in Rochester, Minnesota, or stumping for 
Republican senate candidates, Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s actions towards WMD and 
terrorism were constant topics in Bush’s speeches.  Of the 236 speeches made by Bush 
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over the course of the six months preceding the Iraq War, 149 or 63% were dominated by 
Iraq information (see Table 16).   
Several interesting observations can be pulled from this data.  First, a shift 
occurred in September 2002.  Up to 12 September 2002, Iraq and the WMD issue were 
not at the forefront of topic conversation.  Even in Bush’s 11 September “Remarks to the 
Nation” and “Remarks to the Pentagon,” neither Iraq nor Saddam Hussein was 








1-12 September 2002 8 11 
13-30 September 2002 27 4 
 
Table 17. Dissection of September 2002 Speeches by Bush 
 
Rather, the war in Afghanistan and U.S. Homeland Security/Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) were discussed in 16 of 19 speeches during the first 12 days of 
September.  Starting 13 September, a day after Bush addressed the U.N. General 
Assembly on Iraq, presidential discussion topics switched.  Saddam Hussein and the 
country’s continued defiance of U.N. mandates became a constant topic for the 
administration replacing to a greater degree the war in Afghanistan.  Iraq rose in 
prominence in all of Bush’s speeches.  Why?  On 10 September 2002 with only 27% of 
the country agreeing that the administration had clearly explained the need for U.S. 
action in Iraq, Bush needed to press for a program of greater education to win public 
support for his policy of force.251  Foyle similarly concludes the administration decided 
to “launch the campaign to capture the public’s attention around 11 September 2002.”252  
Recognizing the need to educate the public, the president, while making a speech on 5 
September in Kentucky, announced he would “be working closely with our United States 
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Congress and the American people to explain the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to 
world peace.”253 The switch in topics by the Bush administration helped educate the 
public of its policy decision prior to implementation.  The view of Bush as a Pragmatist, 
who required public acceptance of policy to implement use of force, is thus validated in 
the Iraq case. 
 
3. Self-constraining Perception by the Executive 
 
Similar to Clinton, Bush was not self-constrained by his own perceptions of the 
public’s reaction to use of force in Iraq.  Unlike his response to 9/11, Bush had time and 
public opinion data well prior to the United States implementing his policy approach.  
Time allowed the administration to weigh its options and develop a media campaign to 
educate the public and turn public opinion in favor of a military option to force Iraq to 
comply with U.N. mandates.  As discussed previously, the transition made by the 
administration in September 2002 to concentrate on public education of Iraq versus 
Afghanistan represents a shift in focus and emphasis by the administration.  The poll 
numbers taken at the time (27%) indicated a clear lack of understanding by the American 
public of the importance the administration placed in force to resolve issues with Iraq.  
Additionally, public poll data also indicated the desire for an international coalition and 
support by the U.N. prior to U.S. action.  With 52% of the public agreeing that the United 
States should wait to invade until U.N. teams find proof of WMD, 254 56% voicing that 
the United States should not invade unless there is a U.N. vote authorizing action, and 
57% claiming the United States should not invade unless U.S. European allies have 
provided support,255 guidelines and limitations for public support were being offered 
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months prior to actual invasion and policy implementation. The perceptional need to self 
constrain created by a crisis situation was negated by the wealth of public information 
and time available to the executive to digest the formula for gaining public support.    
 
4. Summary of Findings 
 
As retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey said on NBC’s Meet the Press, “… Armies 
don’t fight wars, countries fight wars. So without the support of the American people, 
this thing [war in Iraq] will come to a grinding halt rather quickly.”256  Similarly, public 
support is required prior the executive’s implementation of force.  Bush felt this effect in 
the months prior to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.  The need to educate a public that did 
not see the rationale for committing combat arms in Iraq was illustrated by the polls and 
change of speech topic by the executive starting in September 2002.  Reviewing the 
conclusions and observations gained from the two case studies of Bush, the common 
conclusion was Bush’s Pragmatist belief system when considering the value of public 
opinion on foreign policy. 
Time between start of the Iraq war and additional information into the education 
process the Bush administration conducted to garner support for the war in 2002 and 
2003 affords an additional observation regarding the impact of beliefs and executive 
decision making.  Maintaining Pragmatist beliefs, the executive had determined a preset 
policy of force in Iraq.  To implement this policy, public support was required.  As the 
administration pushed toward public acceptance, the need to tailor the education to 
specifically cover broad bases of support was identified.  Writing about the 
administration’s need to provide universal education of the Iraq policy to cover different 
facets, Foyle explains: 
Although the administration chose to justify its actions by reference to 
WMD, its motivations really stemmed from a more diffuse and uncertain 
projection of what an Iraqi WMD program would mean for American 
security sometime in the future.  Since the administration believed that this 
assessment would not effectively sell the policy to the UN and Congress 
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(and the American Public to a lesser extent), it chose instead to describe its 
policy in terms of Iraq actually possessing WMD.  Thus, from a public 
relations standpoint, the administration faced a conundrum of a convinced 
public, a persuadable Congress, and a hostile international community; 
each requiring different arguments and evidence.257 
The result of this pursuit of policy and the need to educate the public prior to 
implementation may have led the administration to “oversell”258 the issues surrounding 
Iraq to “generate public support and overcome domestic opposition.”259  Initially hinging 
use of force on WMD, the oversell to generate support is evidenced by post conflict 
reports generated by Congress, the CIA, British Parliament, Iraq Survey Group,260 as 
well as Chaim Kaufmann who writes in International Security: 
By now there is broad agreement among U.S. foreign policy experts, as 
well as much of the American public and the international community, 
that the threat assessments that President George W. Bush and his 
administration used to justify the war against Iraq were greatly 
exaggerated, and on some dimensions wholly baseless.261 
Providing independent assessments that counter the administration’s pre-war education, 
these reports help illuminate potential conflicts of policy as uncertain public opinion 
collides with executive beliefs about the need to educate the public to garner support for 
policy implementation.   
Additionally, similar to Clinton’s Iraq WMD issue, the Bush situation with Iraq 
illustrated a previously undisclosed observation.  Levels of public constraint and 
executive self constraint reflect conflict timelines.  Conflicts considered as crisis, where 
action time and public information are limited, minimize the direct constraint by the 
public and increase the self constraint by the executive and/or their staff.  When time 
                                                 
257 Foyle, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 290. 
258 T. Lowi, The End of Liberalism:  The Second Republic of the United States (New York: Norton, 
1979), 2nd ed.,  quoted in Foyle,  International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 290. 
259 Foyle,  International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 290. 
260 For additional information about these agencies WMD assessment and links to their analysis see 
National Public Radio’s “Iraq WMD Timeline: How the Mystery Unraveled,” 23 November 2005, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4996218 (accessed 15 November 2006). 
261 Chaim Kaufmann, “Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas:  The Selling of 
the Iraq War,”  International Security,  Summer 2004, 5. 
 111 
between decision and action is increased or becomes deliberate, education and 
understanding by the public is broadened.  This increases the potential for direct 
constraint by the public on the executive’s decisions.  Any belief structure other than 
Guardian will be impacted because they value public interaction either during policy 
formation, policy implementation, or both in the case of the Delegate.  Time also 
provides the executive a recipe to answer the limitations expressed by the public through 
polls, thus increasing the opportunity for the executive to educate the public and obtain 
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V.   CONCLUSION 
A.   SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 Based on the analysis of foreign policy decisions Clinton and Bush made in 
response to crises they encountered during their tenures as executive, several distinct 
conclusions are drawn regarding the constraining factors each administration 
encountered.   
• Beliefs of the executive and decision context of the incident are 
primary inhibitors or catalysts for policy. 
• Actual public constraints can be very low, but perceptions of public 
opinion by the executive or his staff may effectively constrain 
decisions. 
• Constraint may apply more to how force is used rather than whether 
to use it (i.e., a review of public opinion’s constraint on the executive 
should not center on just whether the public supports use of force, 
but also which options or tactics it supports). 
A review of each of the variables of the Foreign Policy Constraint (FC) equation (DEBE + 
DPBP = FC) will help illustrate the dynamics of each factor and highlight what factors 
constrained executive decision-making to greater or lesser degrees for each case.  At the 
conclusion of reviewing each variable, the relationship between public opinion and other 
factors with effects on foreign policy decision-making will be determined.  Ultimately, 
these insights will lead to expectations about the decisions of future policy makers as they 
relate to use of force during conflict situations. 
 
1. Decision Context of the Executive (DE) 
 
 The decision context of the executive was one of the key constraining variables 
that stood out for each conflict and effectively constrained both Clinton and Bush.  
Reviewing foreign policy responses by the administrations to situations within 
Afghanistan and Iraq revealed a contextual dynamic that was not expected.  By showing 
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how decision context combines with public education going both to and from the 
executive, a solid constraint on executive decision-making is found. 
 Despite a sound economy and a population that did not tie Clinton's indiscretions 
to his job performance, the scandal played a constant role in the mind of the executive.  
Clinton's significantly diminished interaction with the public through question and 
answer sessions with the media, lack of national attention to the embassy bombings, 
constant coverage by the media of the scandal, and continual emphasis by Clinton during 
speeches of his commitment to do the people's work together show the true effect the 
scandal had on the executive.  Although Clinton stated that his personal problems would 
not conflict with his professional obligations, this statement is patently false.  The 
evidence points to a decision context engulfed by personal constraint caused by a 
perception that the public placed more importance on the scandal than it really did.  In the 
end, Clinton's decisions to use cruise missiles in Afghanistan and Sudan in response to 
the embassy bombings were constrained by the executive’s own perception of the 
public's opinion and need to enact policy that would provide the least amount of potential 
backlash should it prove unreliable.   
 In addition to the overall self-perception by Clinton on the limitations the scandal 
placed on his decision-making, the scandal had a unique by-product which worked to 
intensify the constraining impact which confronted the administration.  As the scandal 
monopolized the media and poll forums of the country, little direct information was 
garnered about the public's perception of the embassy bombings or the potential reactions 
the public expected the country to pursue in this time of crisis.  Unlike past attacks on 
U.S. sovereignty, the embassy bombings were marked by a void of information from the 
executive to the public and more importantly, as we would see multiplied in the Bush 
administration and intensified in the Iraq analysis, from the public to the executive.  As a 
Delegate who needed information from the people to create and enact policy, Clinton had 
no frame of reference from which to judge the public's expectations for action other than 
the incessant media coverage of his personal issues.  In past crises, the time spent from 
surprise crisis to U.S. action was filled with polls, media reports, and numerous personal 
sessions with the executive and public.  This time allowed not only executive to public 
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education but also public to executive.  As a crisis incident, defined earlier in the 
introduction by Foyle, Clinton's decision time was already short. With inclusion of a 
virtual media blackout due to its focus on issues other than the attacks, Clinton’s 
education through public polls and interactions was increasingly diminished.  Without the 
information flow from the public to the executive, Clinton as a Delegate was not afforded 
the information, expectations, or limitations normally expressed by the public through the 
media.  The crisis decision context led to Clinton's own self perceptions heightened by 
lack of information and one-sided emphasis by the media.   As a result, Clinton needed to 
enact a policy that would result in minimal downside and backlash from the public. 
 Although they were not self-constrained by scandal, decision context, and more 
specifically the crisis nature of 9/11, played an equally important role in constraining 
foreign policy decisions of the Bush administration.  Similar to Clinton, Bush enjoyed 
high approval ratings.  The public’s decisional context was less constraining and allowed 
Bush room to choose his policy direction.  For Bush, the constraint, while considering 
foreign policy options in response to 9/11, would come indirectly through his advisers 
and their perception of the decision context created by the media.  Bush, a president with 
little practical foreign policy experience prior to 9/11, relied to a greater degree on the 
advice of his principal NSC staff.  While freely espousing a Guardian-like belief in doing 
the right thing despite public opinion, he equally admitted to relying on the advice of the 
more experienced staff that he surrounded himself with.  As 9/11 unfolded, his principals 
drew from the crisis context and the strong wishes the public expressed through polls to 
develop a foreign policy response.   
 Interestingly, a paradox was created.  Normally in crisis situations where there is 
little time between incident and state response, the public will rally around whichever 
response the executive decides upon and allow him the room to maneuver.   For the 
public, this was exactly the case during 9/11.  The paradox was created as time and 
technology are thrown into the intervening period between incident and action.  Time 
allows direct education by the public to the executive and his staff.  One view of the polls 
conducted during September 2001 showed a public open to the entire range of U.S. force.  
Another view showed a decisional context created by the public that could potentially 
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provide constraint to foreign policy options.  Although the public was openly supportive 
of the president and provided a less constraining environment for him to maneuver, the 
time between incident and U.S. response allowed for the development of an indirect 
public constraint through the public education of Bush's advisers.  For the 9/11 crisis, 
polls were conducted and rather than openness of action by the public, public 
expectations and potential limitations were provided.  While the normal non-constraining 
rally around the executive was not lost on Bush, his advisers were susceptible to the 
information provided by the media and other sources identifying the popular expectations 
for U.S. response. A contextual environment was created from which Bush's advisers 
would take their lead.  They concluded the public would not accept a long delay in 
beginning military action against al Qaeda, and that it also would not support immediate 
action against Iraq.  Indirectly, the actions Bush took, which were provided by his NSC 
team, were constrained by their perception of public acceptance.  
 This phenomenon was illuminated further when foreign policy decisions made by 
both Clinton and Bush in response to Iraq's disregard for U.N. WMD mandates were 
reviewed.  The contextual difference between the embassy bombings and 9/11 and the 
U.S. response to Iraq is time.  The former required policy to be immediate in response to 
surprise attacks on U.S. interests.  An unopposed and possibly uneducated or unjustified 
rally was created for the president and his policy.  The latter saw policy development 
over a longer period of time where public education as well as executive education 
transpired.  Although different in time and crisis mode, the similarity of decisional 
context comes in the form of public education of the executive from media, polls, and 
contact.   
 Many times the executive attempts to educate the populace towards his policy 
option.  The question needs to be asked: why?  The executive is responding to resistance 
or ignorance expressed by the populace to the policy option.  In crisis situations, the need 
to act outweighs the public’s need to learn more before it gives policy support.  In a 
deliberate situation, where anticipation and extended decision time are available, 
education is used to remove or attempt to modify public resistance to policy.  Time is 
afforded to not only educate the executive and public but also ascertain what expectations 
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are for action.  When public opinion remains unchanged or is adamant about specific 
requirements for action, the executive modifies policy or adopts the tactic that will satisfy 
the publicly stated requirement.  Education of the executive by the public is done.  
Because of technology and ready access to data, the executive is more inclined to use poll 
information and public opinion to judge the rules for playing the game.  He may attempt 
to change those rules by appealing to the public, but when the public is resolved, the 
decisional context expressed to the executive through public opinion will be followed like 
a checklist.  Despite stated desires to pursue other policy options, both Clinton and Bush 
followed the desires of the public that were developed through a more constraining 
decisional context.   
 
2. Beliefs of the Executive (BE)  
 
 The second and most telling constraint on foreign policy is the beliefs of the 
executive.  Foyle's two by two matrix and the analysis done on Clinton and Bush portray 
them as Delegate and Pragmatist respectively.   
  Is public support of a foreign policy 
necessary? 





Is it desirable for 
input from public 







Table 18. Bush and Clinton Public Opinion Belief Structure 
 
Presidents bring their own personal beliefs and leadership styles to the executive.  
Judging these styles early provides an initial indication on their decision-making and the 
importance of public opinion.  Clinton, who required public opinion both during policy 
formulation and implementation, was effectively mired down when public input was not 
provided.  The muting of public education of the executive via polls and other media 
sources stemmed the input Clinton required to make decisions.  As a result, Clinton 
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developed his own perception of the public constraint which affected his policy choice.  
In the end, rather than enact policy which may have backfired and created public 
consternation, Clinton chose the safe option of cruise missiles. 
 Bush, as a Pragmatist, was able to make the initial policy decisions without input 
from the public.  As he moved forward toward policy implementation he made speeches 
and answered direct policy questions to educate the public to gain acceptance and 
understanding of the policy choice prior to its enactment.  In this way, Bush required 
public support of foreign policy prior to its implementation. 
 Each executive had a different belief system and their policy choices were met 
with varying degrees of success as a result.  Reviewing the initial policy results following 
use of force, Clinton, weighted down by the need for public opinion during the entire 
policy formulation and enactment cycle, chose force options against Afghanistan and Iraq 
that proved very ineffectual and lacking in resolve.  Taking the safe option for fear of 
public retribution was not the correct choice.  Bush, on the other hand, determined initial 
policy and moved to gain public support prior to use.  While he was indirectly affected by 
the constraint felt through his advisers, the initial results in Afghanistan and Iraq were 
positive.  Conversely as results and assessments were reviewed in later years of the Iraq 
war, pitfalls for the Pragmatist were identified.  Relating too strongly to an initial course 
of action not vetted by the public and instituting an education program to move opinion 
in favor of policy implementation, the Pragmatist may fall prey to overselling a policy 
that may prove inaccurate.  In a deliberate situation, care is required to ensure that the 
policy created without public input is actually founded on an accurate assessment to 
ensure when policy is implemented and public is educated (if needed) the honorable 
intentions of short term success and security do not come at the cost of long term failure. 
 Public opinion provides checks and balances to executive decision making.  
While additional cases are needed to analyze the constraints to Executor and Guardian 
belief structures, a preliminary conclusion made from insights of Delegate and Pragmatist 
beliefs can be drawn for the overall importance of executive beliefs.   Some moderate 
level of public input is required.  The two extremes of Delegate and Guardian can provide 
a severe negative to policy, because they either overly favor or completely negate public 
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opinion.  For the Delegate, listening to the public exclusively and being afraid and 
tentative to take action due to public outcry can result in stagnation of efforts, missed 
opportunities, and, in some cases, an ineffective U.S. policy or use of force.  This is 
shown in Clinton’s inability and inaction to take out the terrorists in Afghanistan.  His 
inaction arguably allowed al Qaeda to generate its forces and structure to such a complete 
system that 9/11 was possible.  Rather than break down al Qaeda after its initial assaults 
on the United States, Clinton did not act due to his concern for public opinion.  This 
allowed al Qaeda to grow and become stronger and more structured.   
 For the Guardian, totally disregarding the need to listen to public opinion at some 
point as a test or sounding board, removes the additional opportunity to reflect on policy.   
Taking actions solely based on one’s own beliefs involves risks because those actions are 
not fully vetted with others.  There is no room for error, the person must be right.  Public 
opinion provides a sounding board and provides potential limitations or expectations of 
action.   
 The moderate tendency prevalent in the Executor and Pragmatist beliefs provide 
equal ground for the executive to be forceful and understanding.  Public opinion is 
worked into the decision-making cycle at either beginning or end to ensure that checks 
are conducted but also to maintain a constant forward movement in policy.  Bush, as a 
Pragmatist, did value public acceptance of policy prior to implementation.  While he 
made decisions initially based on his own beliefs, he acknowledged through action the 
need to garner public support before the policy was enacted.  Although not a focus of this 
paper, problems can arise for the Executor and Pragmatist if they try to forcefully exert 
an educational program on the populace for a policy that has been rejected.  Over time 
the aggregate voice of the people provides a good basis for reflection.  Pragmatists and 
Executors who do not recognize this fact, especially in deliberate settings where the 
public has had ample time to ponder options, and force through their agenda fall short in 
the long run once an operation continues past the initial rally around the executive at the 





3. Decision Context of the Public (DP) 
 
 Each case showed little constraint provided by the decision context of the public. 
Unlike the executive who was constrained significantly by the crisis situation, the public 
was more inclined to release constraint on the executive in these situations.  As discussed 
earlier, the paradox of this came when the expectations of the public were polled and 
expressed.  Rather than open the policy possibilities available to the executive, they 
provided limitations and expectations of action.  The overall effect, while less 
constraining to the public, was more constraining to the executive. 
 
4. Beliefs of the Public (BP) 
 
 Similar to the decision context, the beliefs of the public were less constraining on 
the executive.  Each action was shown to be in the vital interest of the nation.  As a top of 
the staircase situation, public constraint and acceptance for use of force was maximized.  
Theoretically, this provided the executive the room to maneuver and plan policy based on 
his desires.  In most cases the lack of public input or constraint led to the executive 
adopting a self perception of constraint either through his own beliefs or those of his 
principals.   
 
5.  Overall Foreign Policy Constraint (FC) Impactors 
 
 Beliefs of the executive are the greatest constraining impactor on foreign policy.  
Thoughts on the importance public opinion should play in developing and implementing 
policy provide the first telltale signs of potential constraint.  Whether too much focus on 
the public as Clinton, the Delegate, showed or moderately correct as Bush and his initial 
actions illustrated, the emphasis the executive places on public input will illuminate 
future decision criteria and context. 
 Decision context of the executive provides additional constraint on foreign policy 
decision-making.  Crisis situations, where direct public input is lacking creates a situation 
where the executive or his principal advisers self constrain based on perceived notions of 
public acceptance.  A non-crisis context, where time is afforded to provide information 
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on public acceptance and expectations, ensures education of the executive to the 
limitations and knowledge of the public.  Depending on the presidential belief structure, 
education by the public through polls and media exchanges will help sway the decisions 
and final policy solutions the executive enacts. 
 The public, rather than being a direct and voiced constraint, becomes an 
intervening variable in the equation affecting the decision context just as situation and 
environment type.   
 
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC OPINION 
 
 Several policy implications are evident.  During times of crisis, it is important to 
weigh and judge the opinions of the public to provide the initial education for the 
executive.  While the public may not perceive this as overly constraining and in fact may 
open up the option box for the executive, it does, depending on the belief structure and 
emphasis placed on advisers, indirectly provide limitations and expectations of action for 
the executive.  This creates a complex decision context for the executive which will 
effectively constrain his decision-making. 
 There is a nefarious potential in this observation.  Polls can be used and 
conducted to show skewed interest in one form of action over another.  The possibility of 
biased poll reporting on the part of media to push one form of policy over another is 
possible and for executives relying on that education (Delegate, Executor, and 
Pragmatist) the potential to sway decision-making away from more valid policy options 
due to public numbers is foreseeable.  There is also the opposite possibility – the ability 
for the executive to use poll questions and data to sway public opinion to his policy 
option. 
 Equally, in situations where media and public information is lacking due to a 
predominance of reporting of other issues (scandal), the opportunity for faulty policy for 
executives whose beliefs fall into the Delegate and Executor area is high.  Without public 
input, initial policy decisions made by these two will be based on their own possibly 
skewed perception of public acceptance or constraint.  Recognizing what the executive 
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needs to make decisions is vital to ensuring sound policy or at the very least ensuring the 
executive has the information he needs to make and implement policy. 
 
C. FINAL THOUGHTS ON PUBLIC OPINION 
 Public opinion, as it was researched in this thesis, takes on a double life within the 
decision-making realm of the executive.  It serves as a deterrent on the executive when 
public opinion is accepting and the direct constraining impact is limited or it is acutely 
constraining evidenced by negative poll numbers and overt public opinion voiced through 
media or other outlets.   
 The former generally takes place when the decisional context of the country is 
sound and the incident is a crisis requiring immediate attention and action.  As a result, 
there is no two-way communication of expectations by the executive or the public.  In 
this deterrent situation, the idea of public opinion will deter the actions of the executive.  
The executive and/or his principals will self-constrain their actions based on the 
perceived expectations or limiting factors the public is assumed to advocate.   
 The latter situation is more direct and public opinion is considered more 
constraining.  Rather than subtly deterring and impacting policy decisions, the public 
conveys more clearly and loudly its expectations and ideas of acceptable policy.  In these 
situations, the decisional context reflects poor domestic conditions or the incident is 
deliberate where the public and executive have ample time to review the situation and its 
implications.  The incident generally unfolds over time resulting in a longer decision and 
planning cycle where executive and public education have time to shape opinions. 
 Equally important are the beliefs about public opinion’s importance to decision-
making each executive brings to the job.  Where the executive is totally immersed in 
doing the people’s work as a Delegate, the need for public opinion for policy input and 
implementation is high.  This can lead to stagnation and stunted policy decisions when 
opinion is negative or absent.  The absence of public opinion during the initial stages 
leads to limited education of the executive of the public’s desires and expectations.  
Although the dynamics of public opinion and its effects on executive decision-making are 
complex and vary depending on the decisional context and beliefs of the executive, an  
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analysis of each of these areas in combination with the public’s beliefs and decisional 
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APPENDIX – PRESIDENT CLINTON’S COMMENTS 






Volume 1 21-Jan-98 “But meanwhile, I’ve got to 
go on with the work of the 
country. I got hired to help 
the rest of the American 
people.” 
Personal Turmoil Independent 
Counsel’s 
Investigation 
Page 89 - Interview 
with Jim Lehrer of the 
PBS “News Hour” 
Volume 1 21-Jan-98 “But I can tell you, 
whatever I feel about it, I 
owe it to all the American 
people to put it in a little 
box and keep working for 
them.” 
Personal Turmoil Independent 
Counsel’s 
Investigation 
Page 98 - Interview 
with Jim Lehrer of the 
PBS “News Hour” 
Volume 1 5-Feb-98 “I think it’s important to go 
back and do the work for 
the American people that I 
was hired to do.” 
Personal Turmoil Independent 
Counsel’s 
Investigation 
Page 175 - Remarks 
Prior to Discussions 
with Prime Minister 
Tony Blair of the 
United Kingdom and 
an Exchange with 
Reporters 
Volume 1 5-Feb-98 “But there is an ongoing 
investigation.  Under those 
circumstances, the right 
thing to do is to go back 
and do the job the 
American people hired me 
to do, and that’s what I am 
doing” 
Personal Turmoil Independent 
Counsel’s 
Investigation 
Page 178 - Remarks 
Prior to Discussions 
with Prime Minister 
Tony Blair of the 
United Kingdom and 
an Exchange with 
Reporters 
Volume 1 6-Feb-98 It’s better to let the 
investigation go on, and 
have me do my job and 
focus on my public 
responsibilities … That’s 
what I think I should do, 
and that’s what I intend to 
do.” 
Personal Turmoil Independent 
Counsel’s 
Investigation 
Page 187 - The 
President’s News 
Conference with Prime 
Minister Tony Blair of 
the United Kingdom 
Volume 1 6-Feb-98 “You know, I was elected 
to do a job.  I think the 
American people know two 
or three things about me … 
I think they know that I 
care very much about them, 
that I care about ordinary 
people whose voices aren’t 
often heard here.  And I 
think they know I have 
worked very, very hard for 
them.” 
Personal Turmoil Possibility of 
Resignation 
Page 187 - The 
President’s News 
Conference with Prime 
Minister Tony Blair of 
the United Kingdom 
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Volume 1 19-Feb-98 “Well, if further action 
becomes necessary, I will 
obviously speak directly to 






Page 245 - Remarks on
the Situation in Iraq 
and an Exchange with 
Reporters 
Volume 1 11-Mar-98 “Well, you know I’m not 
going to talk about that 
today. I can’t. I’ve got to do 
the work that the people of 
this country hired me to do, 
so I can’t—I’m not going 
to discuss that.” 
Personal Turmoil Independent 
Counsel’s 
Investigation 
Page 355 - Remarks 
Prior to Discussions 
with United Nations 
Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan and an 
Exchange with 
Reporters 
Volume 1 24-Mar-98 “I’m glad to be doing the 
business of the United 
States and the people … I 
think most Americans want 
me to do the job I was 
elected to do.  And so I’m 
going to try and do what 
most people want me to 
do.” 
Personal Turmoil President’s 
Visit to Africa
Page 425 - Exchange 
with Reporters Prior to 
Discussions with 
President Yoweri 
Kaguta Museveni of 
Uganda in Kampala, 
Uganda 
Volume 1 2-Apr-98 “… but the most important 
thing is that I can go back 
now and continue the work 
I’m doing.  That’s the most 
important thing to me.  I 
want to get back to the 
business of the people.” 
Personal Turmoil Dismissal of 
Paula Jones 
Civil Lawsuit 
Page 489 - Exchange 
with Reporters in 
Dakar 
Volume 1 2-Apr-98 “… and that’s what I intend 
to continue to do … I need 
to keep working on the 
people’s business, and 
that’s what I intend to do.” 
Personal Turmoil Independent 
Counsel’s 
Investigation 
Page 489 - Exchange 
with Reporters in 
Dakar 
Volume 1 3-Apr-98 “Our economy is the 
strongest on a generation; 
our social fabric is on the 
mend … the American 
people want us to use this 
sunlit moment not to sit 
back and enjoy but to act.  
We were hired by the 
American people to act.” 
Beliefs Legislative 
Agenda 
Page 498 - Remarks on 
the Legislative Agenda 
and an Exchange with 
Reporters 
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Volume 1 28-Apr-98 “I’ve told you, Mr Gingrich 
said alot of things last night 
that I don’t think deserve a 
response, and I think it 
would not serve the 
American public well for 
me to waste my time doing 
it.  I think I need to be 
focused on the public issues 
that affect them, and that’s 
what I intend to do.” 
Personal Turmoil Criticism from 
Speaker of the 
House 
Page 633 - Remarks on 
Receiving the Report 
of the Social Security 
and Medicare Trustees 
and an Exchange with 
Reporters 
Volume 1 28-Apr-98 “So we have to-we really 
need to continue this effort 
we’re making this calendar 
year to educate the public 
and to get the ideas out 
there … and then I think 
what you’ll see-is very a 







Page 634 - Remarks on 
Receiving the Report 
of the Social Security 
and Medicare Trustees 
and an Exchange with 
Reporters 
Volume 1 30-Apr-98 “… Justice Scalia was right 
when he said that nothing 
that could be done to me in 
a legal way would in any 
way affect my job as 
President … and I’m going 
to do my best to prove him 
correct by doing the 
public’s business.” 
Personal Turmoil Presidential 
Standards 
Page 643 - The 
President’s News 
Conference 
Volume 1 30-Apr-98 “If they - if the American 
people will send them a 
clear signal and they 
conclude it’s in their 
interest to work with me … 
all of us working together 
to do it, then I think that’s 
what will happen.” 
Public’s Power Congress and 
Legislative 
Agenda 
Page 648 - The 
President’s News 
Conference 
Volume 1 4-May-98 “I’ve done my best to 
demonstrate to the 
American people that I’m 
letting all this business 
from Mr. Starr be handled 
by my lawyers and others 
speaking on my behalf … 
but that I am working on 
their business.” 
Personal Turmoil Independent 
Counsel’s 
Investigation 
Page 687 - Interview 
with Al Hunt for 
CNBC and the Wall 
Street Journal 
Volume 1 17-Jun-98 “They nearly always -the 
public almost always gets it 
right when they have 
enough time, and they’ve 





Page 979 - Remarks on 
Senate Action on 
Tobacco Legislation 
and an Exchange with 
Reporters 
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Volume 2 2-Sep-98 “No, I’ve been quite 
heartened by the reaction of 
the American people … 
and I said I was going to 
get back to work.  I believe 
that’s what the American 
people want me to do … 
and that is what I intend to 
do.” 
Personal Turmoil President’s 
Effectiveness 
Page 1499 - The 
President’s News 
Conference with 
President Boris Yeltsin 
of Russia in Moscow 
Volume 2 4-Sep-98 Philosophy of why we 





Page 1530 - Exchange 
with Reporters Prior to 
Discussions with 
Prime Minister Bertie 
Ahern of Ireland in 
Dublin 
Volume 2 16-Sep-98 “Let me first of all say that 
the personal toll on me is of 
no concern … I’m working 
on what I should be 
working on.  I believe the 
right thing for the country-
and what I believe the 
people of the country want 
is, now that they know 
what happened, they want 
to put it behind them, and 
they want to go on.  And 
they want me to go on and 
do my job, and that’s what 
I intend to do.” 
Personal Turmoil Testimony 
Before Grand 
Jury 




Havel of the Czech 
Republic 
Volume 2 22-Sep-98 “I think it’s important that I 
focus on what I’m doing 
for the American people, 
and that’s what I intend to 
do.” 
Personal Turmoil Independent 
Counsel’s 
Referral 
Page 1641 - Remarks 
During Discussions 
with Prime Minister 
Keizo Obuchi of Japan 
and an Exchange with 
Reporters in New York 
City 
Volume 2 7-Oct-98 “What happens to me I 
think ultimately will be for 
the American people to 
decide.  I owe them my 
best efforts to work for 
them, and that’s what I am 
going to do.” 
Personal Turmoil Impeachment 
Inquiry Vote 
Page 1748 - Remarks 
Prior to Discussions 
with Prime Minister 
Viktor Orban of 
Hungary and an 
Exchange with 
Reporters 
Volume 2 7-Oct-98 “But I want them 
[congress]- more important 
than anything else to me is 
that they do the people’s 
work and then let- the 
people will decide where 
we go from here.” 
Personal Turmoil Impeachment 
Inquiry Vote 
Page 1749 - Remarks 
Prior to Discussions 
with Prime Minister 
Viktor Orban of 










Volume 2 8-Oct-98 “Those are my priorities.  I 
think those are the priorities 
of the American people.” 
Personal Turmoil Impeachment 
Inquiry Vote 
Page 1767 - Remarks 
on the Impeachment 
Inquiry Vote and 
Exchange with 
Reporters 
Volume 2 11-Oct-98 “They [congress] shouldn’t 
be worried about whether 
the President is here or not 
… I’m worried about what 
they do when they are here. 
They kill everything that 
the American people want.  
And that’s what they’ve got 
to get to work on, to do the 
things people want done.” 
Public’s Role Continuing 
Resolution 
Legislation 
Page 1779 - Remarks 
During Education 
Budget Negotiations 
and an Exchange with 
Reporters 
Volume 2 2-Nov-98 “Well, that depends upon 
who votes and what the 
message is.  And I hope 
that the American people 
will turn out, and I hope 
that the electorate 
tomorrow will reflect what 
we know the electorate as a 
whole feels.  The American 
people as a whole want us 
to put this partisanship 
behind us, want us to get 
back to their business ... So 
I agree with that, and I 
think they can do alot 




1998 Elections Page 1967 - Interview 
with Tavis Smiley of 
Black Entertainment 
Television 
Volume 2 2-Nov-98 “The American people, 
given enough time, 




1998 Elections Page 1956 - Telephone 
Interview with Tom 
Joyner, Sybil Wilkes, 
and Myra J. of the 
Tom Joyner Morning 
Show 
Volume 2 5-Nov-98 “I think the important thing 
is that we’ve got to go back 
to doing the people’s 
business.  The American 
people sent us a message 
that would break the 
eardrums of anyone who 
was listening.  They want 
their business tended to.  
They want the people and 
their issues and their future 
taken care of and that’s 
what we’re here to do.” 
Personal Turmoil Impeachment 
Inquiry 
Page 1979 - Remarks 
on the Legislative 










Volume 2 2-Dec-98 “It’s important to me to get 
on with the work of the 
country, and that’s what I 
am doing here, and that’s 
what I intend to continue to 
do.” 
Personal Turmoil Impeachment 
Inquiry 
Page 2111 - Remarks 
Prior to Discussions 
with Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif of 
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